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ABSTRACT 
The United States defines terrorism through the lists it maintains identifying those who 
are engaged in, support, and/or facilitate terrorism. One such list is the Foreign Terrorist 
Organization (FTO) list. Because the FTO designation process occurs without the 
organization’s knowledge or ability to challenge the evidence, uses classified information 
to make the determination, and has limited judicial oversight, concerns have been 
expressed that the Executive Branch has too much discretion in this process. The 
concerns are exacerbated by the perception that political motivations dominate the 
decision-making process. 
Using content analysis, the FTO list is analyzed using a quantitative and 
qualitative approach. First, the terrorist designation processes used in allied countries is 
examined, and the list is analyzed by reviewing FTO decisions made before and after 
9/11. Through an analysis of the annual State Department country reports describing the 
FTOs, the nonstatutory factors that influence FTO decisions emerge, and include whether 
a group attacked Israel or other allied nation of strategic interest to the United States, 
attacked the United States or its citizens, or is affiliated with al Qaeda. These 
nonstatutory factors and their application to U.S. counterterrorism strategy, is how the 
United States defines terrorism at any point in time.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
One way in which the United States defines terrorism is through the lists it maintains that 
identifies foreign governments, organizations, and individuals who are engaged in, 
support, or facilitate terrorism throughout the world. One list that has been subjected to 
increasing scrutiny and criticism is the foreign terrorist organization (FTO) list. 
Currently, 57 organizations appear on the FTO list. Once on the FTO list, it is relatively 
difficult to be removed. In fact, since the list began in 1997, only nine groups have been 
removed or “delisted.”  
The FTO designation decision rests exclusively with the Executive Branch, but it 
is becoming increasingly influenced by actions taken by the legislative and judicial 
branches of government. This increasing involvement appears to be based on a concern 
that the FTO designation process places too much power in the hands of the Executive 
Branch with little oversight. Because the designation process takes place without the 
organization’s knowledge or ability to challenge the evidence relied upon, uses classified 
information from the intelligence community in making the determination, and has 
limited judicial oversight, concerns have been expressed that the Executive Branch has 
too much discretion in this process. 
Many of the concerns about the designation process appear to be based on a lack 
of understanding about, and an inability to identify, the nonstatutory factors influencing 
the FTO designations. Identifying and understanding the factors that influence the 
process could provide the assurances needed that the designation process is thorough and 
expeditious, the nonstatutory factors are being applied consistently among all foreign 
organizations, may minimize the concern that political issues are overly influencing the 
process, and may help demystify the designation process.  
As a result, this research focuses on the following.  
• Whether the nonstatutory factors that influence the Secretary of State’s 
decision to designate a terrorist organization to the FTO list can be 
identified.  
 xvii 
• Whether, despite not having a single universally accepted definition of 
terrorism, the FTO list is the mechanism through which the United States 
actually defines terrorism. 
The Secretary of State has never publicly identified the nonstatutory factors that 
influence the FTO decision. All the terrorist organizations on the FTO list have a history 
of violent terrorist acts. While all the FTOs have that characteristic in common, this 
factor does not automatically result in all terrorist groups who kill civilians being added 
to the FTO list, since by some counts, there are over 600 known terrorist groups in the 
world. 
A content analysis research approach was used to evaluate FTOs. The research 
first analyzed the terrorist organization lists used by allied countries, namely the United 
Kingdom (U.K.), Australia, and Canada. Each of these countries maintains its own 
independent list with procedures legislatively adopted by that country to determine which 
groups are added. In addition, the Executive Branch designates each country’s terrorist 
organizations, with an oversight function performed by other branches of government. 
An evaluation is conducted of each country’s designation process, the oversight and 
review conducted, and the public disclosure mechanisms.  
The United Kingdom, Australian, and Canadian models were selected for 
evaluation because the forms of governance, the nature of the terrorist threats, and the 
public reaction to government actions are most similar to the United States. Therefore, 
analyzing these designation models, and the advantages and disadvantages they present, 
can aid in the evaluation of the U.S. system and whether modifications should be adopted 
to improve the U.S. designation method. The designation models from allied nations 
offer insight into modifications the United States could adopt to identify the nonstatutory 
factors that influence the designation process and to enhance disclosure of that 
information. While all designation models are criticized, the UK, Australian, and 
Canadian models suggest that more could be done within the U.S. system to clarify the 
factors being weighed in making FTO determinations. 
The U.S. FTO list was then analyzed by reviewing government reports issued, 
namely the State Department annual Country Reports on Terrorism (previously called 
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Patterns of Global Terrorism, and hereinafter, collectively referred to as “country 
reports”) from 1997, when the FTO list was statutorily created, through to the 2012 
country reports, the last report issued prior to publication of this research. In each annual 
report, the State Department provides the following categories of information about each 
individual FTO: the date on which the FTO was designated by the United States, a 
description of the FTO that frequently includes the group’s origin, a summary of the 
FTO’s recent activities, the location of the FTO’s operations, the FTO’s current strength, 
and the FTO’s sources of funding or support. The information published in the country 
reports for each FTO from 1997 to 2012 was gathered into one database and compared 
using a quantitative and qualitative approach.  
While the FTO list can be analyzed as a whole, to include all the groups that have 
been designated since the inception of the FTO list, analyzing the FTO list based on 
whether the organizations were designated before or after 9/11 is a more appropriate 
delineation for analysis. Analyzing the list in this manner also demonstrates the dramatic 
changes that occurred in American counterterrorism policy as a result of those terrorist 
attacks. Prior to 9/11, the dominant terrorism focus of U.S. foreign terrorism policy was 
on communist insurgent groups that might undermine the government of an allied nation. 
The second most significant concern was the protection of the State of Israel. Next was 
the threat of al Qaeda and radical Islam. The fourth concern was the threat to the security 
of an allied nation. Following 9/11, the overwhelmingly dominant counterterrorism focus 
of the United States is the threat of al Qaeda and radical Islam. While other areas hold 
some concern for the country, those areas are minor in comparison to the dominant 
concern presented by al Qaeda.  
The nonstatutory factors used to determine which organizations are added to the 
list are whether the group is related to al Qaeda, its affiliates, and its associates; lends, 
supports, or promotes the interests of al Qaeda; attacks a U.S. interest, such as a U.S. 
embassy, or attacks or harms a U.S. citizen; attacks Israel or attempts to undermine its 
existence; seeks to undermine a peace process advanced or advocated by the United 
States; or seeks to undermine a country in a geographical location or region strategically 
important to addressing U.S. counterterrorism efforts. 
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The Cynefin Framework assists in understanding the complex FTO decisions. 
While the FTO list reflects a diverse collection of terrorist organizations that initially 
appear to represent a disconnected list of organizations, the list, the nonstatutory factors 
that influence the FTO decisions, and the FTO decision-making process itself, reflect the 
complex nature of U.S. foreign relations and strategy. It also reflects a predictable, 
systematic, and logical decision-making process that further supports the conclusion that 
the list is the mechanism through which the United States defines terrorism.  
The FTO list reflects the fact that terrorist threats have evolved over the years, 
and has shifted from state sponsorship of terrorism, where a country could be identified 
as the foundation or primary supporter of terrorism, to more independent groups. It also 
reflects how the United States defines terrorism at any given point in time. Prior to 9/11, 
the focus of U.S. counterterrorism foreign policy was on neutralizing the threat posed by 
communist insurgent groups that might undermine the government of an allied nation. 
Following 9/11, the U.S. focus shifted to al Qaeda, and its associated and affiliated 
organizations. The shift in focus was appropriate, and is reflective of the evolving 
definition of terrorism over time. As with the changing definition of terrorism, the nature 
of the groups represented on the FTO list have also evolved. The FTO list then represents 
what the United States perceives to be those terrorist organizations that pose the greatest 
risk to this nation, based on the actions taken by the group. The changes in the list over 
time reflect the changing priorities and the changing threats and, therefore, reflect how 
the United States defines terrorism. The FTO list reflects the criteria used by the United 
States in actually defining terrorism, by highlighting this nation’s priorities and 
identifying its enemies. Similarly, as groups are removed from the FTO list, terrorism is 
further being re-defined by identifying this country’s shifting priorities and those groups 
perceived to no longer be a threat.  
Greater confidence in the FTO designation procedure could be developed by 
publicly identifying the nonstatutory factors that influence the decisions (and eliminate 
speculation), articulating these factors clearly, and providing information to the public 
about these factors. Therefore, it is recommended that the State Department: (1) identify 
and define the nonstatutory factors that influence the FTO designation process, (2) 
 xx 
publish a robust explanation or justification for the designation, (3) clarify the nature of 
the evidence that the Secretary of State will weigh in the designation process, and (4) 
require more frequent review of the FTO list.  
The recommendations are aimed at creating greater clarity about the key policy 
factors to be analyzed, developing a consensus as to the specific factors used among 
members of the intelligence community, streamlining the process so that it is less time 
consuming, and avoiding controversy over specific designations. Further, by identifying 
the nonstatutory factors used to determine an FTO, the courts and Congress can receive 
the assurances they need that the designation process is thorough and expeditious, and 
may minimize the concern that political issues are overly influencing the process. 
Implementation of the recommendations will not detract from the authority of the 
Executive Branch, but clarify how it exercises its authority without compromising its 
independence or its foreign policy decisions.  
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We are citizens of the world.  
The tragedy of our times is that we do not know this. 
—Woodrow Wilson, 
28th U.S. President 
 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The U.S. State Department, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Department of Defense (DOD) each utilize different, 
and sometimes competing, definitions of terrorism. As noted by securities studies scholar 
Bruce Hoffman, “there is not a widely accepted or agreed-on definition for terrorism” and 
each department’s definition “reflects the priorities and particular interests of the specific 
agency involved.”1  
One way in which the United States defines terrorism is through the lists it 
maintains that identifies foreign governments, organizations, and individuals who are 
engaged in, support, or facilitate terrorism throughout the world. The lists maintained by 
the U.S. government relevant to the counter-terrorism effort include the state sponsors of 
terrorism list,2 the not fully cooperating list,3 the specially designated terrorists (SDT) 
list,4 the specially designated global terrorists (SDGT) list,5 the specially designated  
 
1 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 2006), 30–31, 35.  
2 50 U.S.C. App. § 2405(6)(j) (list maintained by the Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign 
Assets Control).  
3 22 U.S.C. § 2781. 
4 50 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq. (list maintained by the Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets 
Control).  
5 Presidential Executive Order 13224 (list maintained by the Department of Treasury, Office of 
Foreign Assets Control). 
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nationals and blocked person (SDN) list,6 the terrorism exclusion list (TEL)7 list,8 and 
the foreign terrorist organization (FTO) list.9 
This system of lists developed in response to different events, including the 
takeover of the U.S. embassy in Iran, the first attack on the World Trade Center, the 
Oklahoma City bombing, and 9/11. As a result, the underlying legislative authority, the 
penalties for being on each list, and the criteria used for inclusion or removal from each 
list varies. Satisfaction of the statutory requirements, however, does not necessarily result 
in an individual or entity being added to the list.10 For example, the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO), Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the Taliban have 
never been on the FTO list, and Afghanistan and Pakistan have never been on the State 
Sponsors of Terrorism list. The nonstatutory factors that influence whether an individual 
or entity is added to or excluded from a list are important to understanding how the 
United States defines terrorism. Determining those factors, however, is a challenge 
because the government does not identify them in any comprehensive way.  
One list that has been subjected to increasing scrutiny and criticism is the FTO 
list. Created after the Oklahoma City bombing,11 as part of the Antiterrorism and 
6 Audrey Kurth Cronin, The FTO List and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations, Order Code RL32120 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research 
Service, October 21, 2003. (A master list that contains all the other lists—list maintained by the 
Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control). 
7 Ibid. (Like the FTO list, the TEL includes the names of terrorist organizations, but it has a broader 
standard for inclusion, is subject to less stringent administrative requirements, and is not challengeable in 
court).  
8 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (Section 411 of the USA Patriot Act of 2001, providing that the list is to be 
maintained by the Department of State).  
9 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1).  
10 See e.g., The group called Boko Haram was not designated in 2012, despite it being considered for 
designation by the State Department and despite it having committed terrorist acts. H.R. 5822/S.3249 (The 
Boko Haram Terrorist Designation Act, requiring the State Department to determine whether the 
organization meets the legal criteria for an FTO designation); John Shiffman, “US to Slap ‘Terrorist’ Label 
on Nigerian Militants,” Reuters, June 20, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/20/us-usa-
militants-bokoharam-idUSBRE85J1NC20120620; The Heritage Foundation, Boko Haram: Obama Fails to 
Designate Nigerian Sect A Terrorist Organization, Issue Brief, June 22, 2012; Morgan Lorainne Roach, 
“The U.S. State Department Should Designate Boko Haram a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” Issue Brief 
No. 3612, Heritage Foundation, May 22, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/05/boko-
haram-should-be-designated-as-a-foreign-terrorist-organization#_ftn3. 
11 Department of Justice, “Responding to Terrorism Victims: Oklahoma City and Beyond,” October 
2000, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovclpublicationsiinfores/respterrorism/chapl.html. 
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Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),12 it was designed to provide “valuable 
tools for stopping and punishing terrorists,”13 and to combat the circumstance, as found 
by Congress, that “foreign terrorist organizations, acting through affiliated groups or 
individuals, raise significant funds within the United States, or use the United States as a 
conduit for the receipt of funds raised in other nations.”14 The FTO list was first issued in 
1997, and included 30 organizations.15 Currently, 57 organizations appear on the FTO 
list.16 Once on the FTO list, it is relatively difficult to be removed. Since the list began in 
1997, only nine groups have been removed or “delisted.” While it has existed for only 17 
years, the “FTO list has a unique importance not only because of the specific measures 
undertaken to thwart the activities of designated groups but also because of the symbolic 
public role it plays as a tool of U.S. counterterrorism policy.”17 
The FTO designation decision rests exclusively with the Executive Branch, but it 
is becoming increasingly influenced by actions taken by the legislative and judicial 
branches of government. This increasing involvement developed from a concern that the 
FTO designation process places too much power in the hands of the Executive Branch 
with little oversight. While the D.C. Court of Appeals is statutorily identified as the sole 
judicial authority empowered to review the Executive Branch’s FTO designations, the 
court has determined that its review is limited and that it may not review foreign policy 
decisions of the Executive Branch.18 Since the designation process occurs without the 
organization’s knowledge or ability to challenge the evidence relied upon, classified 
information from the intelligence community is used in making the determination, and 
12 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Public Law 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). 
13 Presidential Statement, 1996 WL 203049, at *1 (April 26, 1996). 
14 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 301(a)(6), 110 Stat., 1247. 
15 Cronin, The FTO List and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 6. 
16 U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” September 28, 2012, 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 
17 Cronin, The FTO List and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 5. 
18 People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (“PMOI”) v. Department of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999); Julie B. Shapiro, “The Politicization of the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” 6 
Cardozo Public Law, Policy & Ethics Journal (Spring 2008): 547, 554–56.  
 3 
                                                 
judicial oversight is limited, concerns have been expressed that the Executive Branch has 
too much discretion in this process.  
As these concerns have grown, the legislative and judicial branches have become 
increasingly engaged in the designation process. For example, Congress passed the 
Haqqani Network Terrorist Designation Act of 201219 and the Boko Haram Terrorist 
Designation Act of 2012,20 requiring the Secretary of State to report to Congress about 
whether these groups should be designated as FTOs. Also, in 2012, the D.C. Court of 
Appeals ordered the Secretary of State to decide whether an FTO’s petition to be 
removed from the list should be granted.21 If the Secretary did not act within the time 
limit set, the court stated that it would remove the organization from the FTO list. Such 
action by the courts and Congress were unprecedented.22  
Concerns over whether the Executive Branch appropriately exercises its authority 
are exacerbated by the perception that political motivations dominate the decision-
making process and that the FTO list will lose its effectiveness if decisions appear to be 
arbitrary and biased.23 “Each political exception [] diminishes the credibility and value of 
the list itself . . . Any apparent inconsistencies in application of the law risk generating 
skepticism about the consistency of the overall U.S. commitment to counterterrorism.”24 
Further, the concern over the politicization of the designation process has also grown 
19 Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011, Public Law 112–166.  
20 H.R. 5822/S.3249 (The Boko Haram Terrorist Designation Act, requiring the State Department to 
determine whether the organization meets the legal criteria for an FTO designation). 
21 PMOI v. U.S. Department of State, 613 F.3d 220, 230–31 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
22 Ibid. 
23 Shapiro, “The Politicization of the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” 566–67, 578–
79; Cronin, The FTO List and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 9. (“If 
there are countervailing foreign policy priorities, then [the Secretary’s] judgment prevails. Nonetheless, 
inconsistencies of standards from the perspective strictly of terrorism can make the U.S. appear hypocritical 
. . .”).  
24 Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 
2001), 153; Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz, Strategic Intelligence, Windows Into a Secret World (Los 
Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing Company, 2004. 
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recently due to some FTOs engaging in extensive lobbying efforts to be removed from 
the list.25  
The increasing involvement by Congress and the judiciary reflects the growing 
lack of confidence in the current FTO designation process. Consequently, they will likely 
increasingly insert themselves into the designation process and increase their oversight to 
ensure that the Executive Branch, along with the intelligence community, is properly 
executing their responsibility in evaluating the threats to the United States and being 
rigorous in the analysis of terrorist organizations.26  
Many of the concerns about the designation process appear to be based on a lack 
of understanding about, and an inability to identify, the nonstatutory factors influencing 
the FTO designations. Identifying and understanding the factors that influence the 
process could provide the assurances needed that the designation process is thorough and 
expeditious, the nonstatutory factors are being applied consistently among all foreign 
organizations, may minimize the concern that political issues are overly influencing the 
process, and may help demystify the designation process.  
To be effective, the designation process must be flexible enough to allow the 
Executive Branch to consider a variety of factors that will serve the diplomatic and 
strategic interests of the United States. At the same time, the decision-making process 
and the list must have credibility. Identifying the nonstatutory factors that influence the 
decisions and determining the tipping points that result in an entity being added to, 
excluded from, or removed from the FTO list, could aid in gaining a better understanding 
of the lists and how the United States defines terrorism.  
 
 
25 Chris McGreal, “Iranian Exiles, DC Lobbyists and the Campaign to Delist the MEK,” The 
Guardian, September 21, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/21/iranian-exiles-lobbyists-
delist-mek.  
26 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence, From Secrets to Policy (CQ Press, 2012), 217, 223.  
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As a result, this research seeks to address the following. 
• Whether the nonstatutory factors that influence the Secretary of State’s 
decision to designate a terrorist organization to the FTO list can be 
identified.  
• Whether, despite not having a single universally accepted definition of 
terrorism, the FTO list is the mechanism through which the United States 
actually defines terrorism. 
C. OVERVIEW OF UPCOMING CHAPTERS 
The subsequent chapters more fully explore the FTO process and the designation 
decisions made since 1997. Chapter II outlines the current FTO designation procedures. 
Chapter III examines the state of the current literature on FTOs that, for the most part, 
criticizes the current process without a detailed analysis of the FTO decisions.  
Chapter IV outlines the quantitative and qualitative analysis used in this research, 
beginning with Chapter V’s exploration of the terrorist organization lists used by allied 
countries. The FTO list is analyzed in great detail in Chapters VI and VII, which include 
a review of the FTO designations before and after 9/11, the recent designations made in 
2013 and early 2014, the dormant or inactive FTOs on the list, and the delisted 
organizations. Through this analysis, the nonstatutory factors that influence the FTO 
decisions are identified.  
Chapter VIII evaluates the FTO decisions in the complex counterterrorism 
environment. Chapter IX examines the relevance of the FTO decisions to U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy and concludes that the factors used in the FTO decision-making 
process is, in fact, the mechanism through which the United States defines terrorism at 
any point in time. Chapter X concludes with recommendations to assist in addressing the 
criticisms of the FTO process found in the literature. The recommendations are aimed at 
offering clarity and transparency to the FTO decisions made by the Secretary of State.  
 6 
II. BACKGROUND: THE FTO DESIGNATION PROCESS 
The world is not going to be saved by legislation. 
—William Howard Taft, 
27th U.S. President 
 
The secretary of state is authorized to designate an organization as a “foreign 
terrorist organization” if three conditions exist. 
1. The organization is a foreign organization.  
2. The organization engages in terrorist activity, or retains the capability and 
intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.  
3. The terrorist activity threatens the security of U.S. citizens or the national 
security of the United States.27 
Criminal penalties apply to anyone who knowingly provides “material support or 
resources”28 to a designated FTO, deportation consequences apply to representatives and 
members of a designated FTO,29 and assets may be frozen.30  
The FTO list is aimed at: (1) curbing terrorism financing and encouraging other 
nations to do the same, (2) stigmatizing and isolating designated terrorist organizations 
internationally, (3) deterring donations or contributions to and economic transactions 
with named organizations, (4) heightening public awareness and knowledge of terrorist 
organizations, and (5) signaling to other governments our concern about named 
organizations.31 
27 The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA); 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (a) (1).  
28 The term “material support or resources” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) as “any property, 
tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, 
financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false documentation or 
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 
or more individuals who maybe or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or religious 
materials.” 
29 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V), 1227 (a)(1)(A). 
30 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(2). (U.S. financial institutions possessing or controlling any funds in which a 
designated FTO or its agent has an interest are required to block all transactions involving those funds).  
31 U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” 
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Once an organization is identified as a potential FTO, the State Department 
prepares a detailed “administrative record” on the organization, which contains a 
compilation of information, typically including both classified and open source 
information, which demonstrates that the statutory criteria for designation have been 
satisfied.32 The process requires the State Department, Department of Treasury, 
Department of Justice, and the intelligence community to collaborate in providing 
relevant information and in evaluating the information collected. Designations normally 
occur after an involved interagency process; but the secretary of state makes the ultimate 
decision.33  
If the secretary of state, in consultation with the attorney general and the secretary 
of the treasury, decides to make the FTO designation, Congress is notified of the 
secretary’s intent to designate the organization seven days before the designation is 
published in the Federal Register, as section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
requires. Upon the expiration of the seven-day waiting period, and in the absence of 
Congressional action to block the designation, notice of the designation is published in 
the Federal Register, at which point the designation takes effect. The FTO designations 
remain in effect until set aside by judicial review, an act of Congress, or repeal by the 
secretary of state.34  
Organizations can be removed from the list at any time. The Secretary may 
revoke a designation upon determining either that the circumstances that were the basis 
for the designation have changed, or that the national security of the United States 
warrants a revocation of the designation.35 The secretary must review each designation at 
32 U.S. State Department, “Terrorism Designations FAQs, Fact Sheet,” July 10, 2012, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/07/194808.htm. 
33 Cronin, The FTO List and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations.  
34 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (Before the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 amended 8 
U.S.C. § 1189, FTO designations were effective for two years and subject to re-designation by the 
Secretary).  
35 Ibid.  
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minimum every five years,36 but can review it sooner if the FTO challenges its 
designation.37 
As originally enacted, AEDPA required the secretary of state to review FTO 
designations every two years.38 Under that process, the Secretary either renewed the 
designation every two years or allowed it to lapse.39 The statute was revised so that the 
Secretary’s designation no longer lapses. Instead, every two years, an organization listed 
as an FTO can file a petition for delisting.40 If no petition is filed, the Secretary must 
review the designation every five years to determine whether the designation shall remain 
or be revoked.  
The overall designation process is graphically depicted in Figure 1. 
 
36 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (a)(4)(C)(i); U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” 
37 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (a)(4)(B)(ii); U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” 
38 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1214 (amends § 219 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (Public Law 82–414; 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et. seq.) [hereinafter AEDPA]. 
39 See AEDPA, “Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4)(B) (2003). 
40 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (a)(4)(B)(ii); U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations”; Under 
the AEDPA, the Secretary may designate an entity an FTO if: (1) “the organization is a foreign 
organization,” (2) “engages in terrorist activity . . . or terrorism . . . or retains the capability and intent to 
[do so],” and (3) “the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the security of United 
States nationals or the national security of the United States”; 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1). 
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Figure 1.  FTO Designation Process. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The best way to enhance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here 
that our democratic system is worthy of emulation. 
 
—Jimmy Carter, 
39th U.S. President 
 
The FTO designation has been subjected to criticism for the unreliable nature of 
the information used in making the determinations, inconsistency in the types of groups 
placed on the FTO list, decision-making authority being so heavily placed in the 
Executive Branch with little oversight, and political issues that may unduly sway the 
process. Nevertheless, based on the research conducted for this review, no comprehensive 
studies analyze the overall decisions made to include organizations on the FTO list. 
Instead, most of the literature on the FTO list centers around specific criticisms of the list, 
the process used to designate the groups, the apparent inconsistency in the decisions 
made, or criticism about specific groups being added or omitted from the FTO list. These 
criticisms are presented without providing any comprehensive evaluation of the entire 
FTO list.  
A. THE DESIGNATION PROCESS 
The FTO designation process has been criticized as a lengthy, cumbersome 
process that is slow to respond to the evolving nature of international terrorist groups. 
Some argue that any list could not accurately reflect the blurred and ever-changing 
organizational lines that characterize modern international terrorism.41 While concern 
exists over creating an accurate list of the greatest terrorism threats, the process involved 
for creating the FTO list is considered particularly cumbersome. As noted by Paul Pillar, 
author of Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, “The initial designation of thirty groups 
was a long and (for the officials involved) painful process that consumed enormous time 
and attention in each of the agencies involved . . . the process was not completed until 
41 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 153. 
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nearly a year and a half after [the FTO list] had become law.”42 In addition, Pillar 
criticizes the FTO process for its inability to adapt quickly to changing circumstances. 
“The fact that Al Qaeda was not one of the groups listed in October 1997 (just ten months 
before the bombings in East Africa) illustrates the difficulty the system has in responding 
promptly to the emergence even of a group that directly threatens U.S. interests.”43 
B. THE NATURE OF THE MATERIALS RELIED UPON IN THE 
DESIGNATION PROCESS 
The nature of the materials that can be contained in the administrative record is 
very diverse. The literature notes that nothing prevents the secretary of state from relying 
on third-hand accounts, media stories, and hearsay.44 As a result, concerns have been 
expressed that the information the Secretary relies upon could be unreliable or untrue, 
that the government relies on “makeshift procedures,” and that the validity of the 
designations may depend upon the quality of the information presented to the secretary of 
state.45  
While on one hand the literature argues that the administrative record could be 
unreliable and contain false information, the studies and legal authorities that the 
literature relies upon do not identify a single instance in which inaccurate information 
was contained in the administrative record or led to a group being wrongly designated. In 
fact, the criticism that the information relied upon could be unreliable is undermined by 
those who observe that the designation process is too cumbersome because the 
administrative record must be sufficient to withstand judicial scrutiny.46 As noted by one 
author, the designation process is impacted by the fact that the FTO designation may 
42 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 154.  
43 Ibid. 
44 People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (“PMOI”) v. Department of State, 182 F. 3d 17, 19 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999); Shapiro, “The Politicization of the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” 547, 554–
56. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 154.  
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undergo judicial review.47 In fact, the Secretary sometimes considers the ability to win in 
court as an element in the decision whether to designate.48 If the Secretary cannot amass 
a sufficient administrative record, the designation may not occur. As a result of the need 
to create an administrative record that can withstand evaluation by a judicial officer, 
which the literature indicates is a time-consuming and cumbersome process, the criticism 
that the administrative record could be unreliable seems misplaced.  
C. THE VARIETY OF GROUPS THAT ARE DESIGNATED AS FTOS  
Some have noted that the FTO list is a mixture of the “apples and oranges” of 
terrorist organizations, and reflects “the shift from well-organized, localized groups 
supported by state sponsors to loosely organized, international networks of terrorists.”49 
For example, the FTO list includes the following.  
• Large multidimensional groups based on Islamic ideologies (such as 
Hamas, Hezbollah), Marxism (the FARC and ELN), a combination of the 
two (MEK) 
• Ethnic-based groups (LTTE, PKK, ETA)  
• Palestinian groups seeking a peaceful solution (Popular Front for the 
Liberation Front of Palestine) and those that do not (PLFP-GC, Palestine 
Liberation Front, Abu Nidal Organization) 
• Non-Palestinian leftist groups  
• Small but deadly European groups (November 17, Revolutionary People’s 
Struggle in Greece, and the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front 
in Turkey) 
• Radical Islamists (al Qaida and its associated organizations)  
• Small Jewish groups (Kach and Kahane Chai) 
• Idiosyncratic groups (Aum Shinrikyo) 
The FTOs on the list vary in size, strength, activity, ideology, goals, outside 
support, anti-U.S. orientations, and whether the group is waning or waxing.50  
47 Shapiro, “The Politicization of the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” 566; Cronin, 
The FTO List and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 9.  
48 Ibid. 
49 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 153. 
50 Ibid. 
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Al Qaeda is on the same list as groups whose mission does not involve harming 
the United States. The danger of the list appearing to contain a list of co-equal 
organizations has been subject to ongoing concern about the designation process.  
Besides the general drawback of encouraging a truncated view of these 
organizations by looking at all of them through a single lens, there is the 
more specific drawback of possibly burning bridges to groups with which 
the United States might want to deal in the future. In a worst case, such 
bridge-burning may make a group more inclined to attack U.S. interests 
directly.51 
Some analysis has been conducted to determine whether, despite the apparent 
differences in objectives of the designated FTOs, the groups on the list, in fact, possess a 
common characteristic. Such an analysis is instructive in explaining how such desperate 
groups are on one unified list. According to a review conducted in an Indiana Law 
Review article titled “The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy,” all the 
groups on the FTO list have used violent attacks on civilians as a means to intimidate or 
coerce a sovereign government.52 In reviewing the State Department country reports, 
which outline the FTOs and some of their history, this analysis appears to be an accurate 
common denominator of all the groups on the FTO list.53 Consequently, groups that 
engage in violent activity in pursuit of political goals run the risk of being declared an 
FTO by the United States.54 However, not all groups that engage in such actions will be 
designated.55 In other words, while the analysis can assist in understanding why groups 
with different goals can all be clustered together on a single list, it does not explain which 
groups or factors lead a group being added to or omitted from the FTO list.56 
51 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 153. 
52 Wadie E. Said, “The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy,” 86 Indiana Law Review 
543 (Spring 2011): 566–67  
53 Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, released July 2012.  
54 Said, “The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy,” 567.  
55 Ibid. (for example, the Cambodian Freedom Fighters, the IRA, and the PLO). 
56 Ibid., 568. 
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D. THE RISK OF ABUSE BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
The literature suggests that whether an organization will or will not be designated 
an FTO depends on the third element required for designation, whether the organization 
poses a threat to U.S. national security. The evaluation of this element, and the public 
policy factors involved in this evaluation, is done at the exercise of the secretary of state’s 
discretion and is not subject to judicial review. As a result, a common criticism of the 
FTO designation process is that it puts too much power in the hands of the Executive 
Branch in determining which organizations will be named a terrorist organization, and 
that little effective oversight of the Executive Branch occurs in this decision-making 
process.57  
Some members of the judiciary have also made this criticism. The D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals is statutorily identified as the sole judicial authority empowered to 
review the FTO designation, when the organization challenges its designation. The court 
has determined that it can only review the first two statutory elements of the designation 
process, that is, whether the organization is a foreign entity and whether it engages in 
terrorist activities. The final statutory factor, whether the terrorist activity committed by 
the organization threatens U.S. security, is not subject to judicial review58 because 
foreign policy decisions of the Executive Branch are beyond the judicial function of the 
court.59 Not all judges agree, as Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, wrote in a non-binding opinion: 
I can understand the panel’s resistance to interfere with matters of 
National Security, but the entire purpose of the terrorist designation 
process is to determine whether an organization poses a threat to national 
57 Shapiro, “The Politicization of the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” 548 (“Congress 
tightened its reign on the Judicial Branch in 2004, and amended the designation statute to impose greater 
limitations on the opportunities for judicial review”); Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004, Public Law 108–458, Section 7119, 118 Stat. 3638, 3801–03 (2004).  
58 People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (“PMOI”) v. Department of State, 182 F. 3d 17, 23 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999); Shapiro, “The Politicization of the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” 555. 
59 People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, 182 F. 3d at 23 (“These are political judgments, 
‘decisions of a kind for which the judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and have long 
been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.”); Shapiro, 
“The Politicization of the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” 555 (“the court determined that 
such review of the foreign policy of the Executive Branch was beyond the judicial function for a court”).  
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security under the constitution, the State Department does not have carte 
blanche to label any organization it chooses an FTO and make a criminal 
out of anyone who donates money to it. Far too much political activity 
could be suppressed under such a regime.60 
Others who have evaluated the FTO designation process have expressed this 
sentiment. In short, they argue that because the statutory scheme minimizes the potential 
an organization can overturn its FTO designation, too much power over the designation is 
consolidated in the Executive Branch.61 
Among the concerns expressed is that the designation process occurs without the 
organization’s knowledge or ability to challenge the evidence relied upon. Also, to the 
extent that classified information is relied upon, the organization will never have the 
opportunity to review or counter the information.62 This fact, combined with the lack of 
guidance on what factors might allow a group to overcome its designation, creates the 
concern that the Executive Branch may not exercise its power appropriately.63 The 
appropriate exercise of the Executive Branch’s power and the concern over the power 
being exercised appropriately, is exacerbated by the fact that in the 17 years since the 
FTO list was created, the FTO designation has been challenged in court by only a few 
organizations and no designation has ever been repealed by a court or by Congress. 
While the literature highlights this concern, no author has identified a case in which the 
Executive Branch inappropriately exercised its power.  
E. THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The concern that the Executive Branch will inappropriately exercise its authority 
is exacerbated by the perception that political motivations can dominate the decision-
making process, and that, if it does, the FTO list will lose its effectiveness since decisions 
would appear arbitrary and bias.  
As Paul Pillar noted:  
60 United States v. Afshari, 446 F.3d 915, 915–22 (9th Cir. 2006).  
61 Said, “The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy,” 562, 575–77.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid. 
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The Secretary of State can inject political and diplomatic considerations 
into decisions on designating FTOs. . . Each such political exception, 
however, diminishes the credibility and value of the FTO list itself. The 
law only authorizes, rather than requires, the Secretary to designate any 
organization that meets the criteria as an FTO, the list has tended to be 
viewed as a more comprehensive and definitive “A list” of the groups the 
United States considers terrorist. Any apparent inconsistencies in 
application of the law risk generating skepticism about the consistency of 
the overall U.S. commitment to counterterrorism.64  
Similarly, Julie B. Shapiro, in a Cardozo Law Review article titled “The 
Politicization of the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations: The Effect on the 
Separation of Powers,” stated: 
Though sweeping powers of the State Department the federal government 
has the ability to ban and effectively close down any cantankerous group it 
does not like. Foreign policy interests often determine who is added and 
who is not. As a result, the designation process can appear arbitrary, as 
certain foreign revolutionary groups are blacklisted while others evade 
designation.65  
The specific concerns expressed include that the secretary of state could designate 
a group as an FTO based on political motivations,66 apply the law selectively (“one 
man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”),67 use a political agenda as motivations 
for the designations and rely on factors other than the protections of U.S. national 
security from terrorist threat,68 and designate an FTO based on obtaining a desired 
political appearance of being tough on terrorism.69  
64 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 153. 
65 Robert Dreyfuss, “Colin Powell’s List: The Targeting of “Terrorist’ Groups Hard Back to Earlier 
Repress of Dissent,” The Nation, March 25, 2002, 16 (suggesting that “the terrorism lists could be used to 
justify federal and state assaults against a wide range of dissent groups.”); Shapiro, “The Politicization of 
the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” 577. 
66 Cronin, The FTO List and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 9. 
(“If there are countervailing foreign policy priorities, then [the Secretary’s] judgment prevails. Nonetheless, 
inconsistencies of standards from the perspective strictly of terrorism can make the U.S. government appear 
hypocritical . . .”; Shapiro, “The Politicization of the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” 567. 
67 H.R. Rep. No. 104–383 at 179–80 (1995); Shapiro, “The Politicization of the Designation of 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” 578. 
68 Shapiro, “The Politicization of the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” 566; Cronin, 
The FTO List and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 10. 
69 Shapiro, “The Politicization of the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” 579.  
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Shapiro argues that the combination of statutory breath and the lack of judicial 
oversight empowers the Executive Branch to pick and choose which groups to label as an 
FTO.70 Shapiro also notes that the Executive Branch has far-reaching powers to advance 
a political agenda and blacklist groups based on the current political agenda, that the 
secretary of state’s mission is to advance the foreign policy agenda of the United States 
and the political agenda of the President, and that those agendas might tempt the 
Secretary to designate groups opposed to repressive regimes as a tactic.71 According to 
Shapiro, the only distinction between freedom fighters and terrorists may be the 
Executive Branch’s predilection for that group or not. When two groups employ the same 
tactics that fit the FTO definition of terrorist activity, the Executive Branch is choosing to 
support a group’s underlying agenda when it opts not to designate that group as an 
FTO.72 Bruce Hoffman makes a similar argument, but focuses on the groups designated 
on the list, and observes that “nearly a third of the thirty-seven groups [in 2003] on the 
U.S. State Department’s “Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations” list could just as 
easily be categorized as guerrillas.”73  
While the literature expresses concerns about the influence of politics in the 
designation process, the literature fails to identify any organization that has been added to 
the list based on improper political motives. In fact, very little analysis of the factors that 
contributed to the inclusion of any group to the FTO list, other than the group’s 
involvement in terrorist activities, was done. While some of the literature recognizes that 
the list contains groups that threaten U.S. national security and notes that the basis for 
some groups being on the list is opaque,74 the literature lacks an analysis of the factors 
that may have supported inclusion on or exclusion from the FTO list.  
The literature, however, occasionally reviews groups not added to the FTO list, 
and questions their omission based on politics. For example, Paul Pillar questions the 
70 Ibid., 577. 
71 Ibid., 579. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 36; U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003, 113. 
74 Said, “The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy,” 562–577. 
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omission of the IRA from the list, and argues that the Secretary injected political and 
diplomatic considerations into the decision to exclude the group from the FTO list. 
According to Pillar, “The IRA certainly qualified for designation under the terms of the 
statute, and it presented a more significant threat to U.S. interests as defined in the law 
than did many of the groups that were designated.” Nevertheless, Pillar concludes that the 
decision to exclude the IRA from the list was probably correct “given that there was more 
to gain (in terms of counterterrorism, as well as other objectives) from dealing with it as 
an interlocutor in a peace process than from branding it formally as a terrorist 
organization.”75  
Thus, the literature expresses concern over a number of issues ranging from the 
effectiveness of the designation process itself, to the apparent lack of similarity among 
the FTOs designated, to the concern about over politicalization of the FTO process and 
potential abuses by the Executive Branch in exercising its power in this arena. The 
literature, however, does not analyze all the FTO decisions made to determine whether 
these criticisms are valid or to determine whether the nonstatutory factors influencing the 
designation process can be identified. This research seeks to fill this gap by evaluating all 
FTOs that have been designated since the inception of the list, to determine whether the 
nonstatutory factors can be identified, and to determine how those factors are applied to 
complex counter-terrorism decisions. 
75 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 153; Jonathan D. Stewart, “Balancing the Scales of Due 
Process: Material Support of Terrorism and the Fifth Amendment,” 3 Georgetown Journal of Law and 
Pubic Policy (Winter 2005): 311–312 (arguing that the designation process is flawed because the African 
National Congress would have been designated if the list existed in the 1980s). 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
Sometimes when people are under stress, 
they hate to think, 
and it’s the time when they most need to think. 
—Bill Clinton, 
42nd U.S. President 
 
The object of this study is to identify and evaluate the nonstatutory factors that 
influence whether an organization will be designated an FTO by the State Department, 
and to determine whether those factors, and therefore the FTO list itself, is the method 
through which the United States actually defines terrorism.  
The secretary of state has never publicly identified the nonstatutory factors that 
influence the FTO decision. All of the 57 terrorist organizations on the FTO list have a 
history of violent terrorist acts that killed civilians. While all the FTOs have that in 
common, this factor does not automatically result in all terrorist groups that kill civilians 
being added to the FTO list. By some counts, there are over 648 known terrorist groups in 
the world.76 How then does the secretary of state determine which of these hundreds of 
groups will be included on the U.S.’ FTO list?  
Due to speculation about the decision-making process, arguments have been made 
that the list is arbitrary, makes little sense, and that the designation decisions are 
political.77 Therefore, a more detailed analysis of the factors that influence the process is 
needed to better understand the FTO designation decisions. The research seeks to 
determine whether the factors that influence the FTO designation decisions can be 
determined by analyzing the groups that have been designated and removed from the 
FTO list.  
 
76 Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End, Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida 
(Rand Corporation, 2008).  
77 Ibid.  
 21 
                                                 
A content analysis research approach was used to evaluate the FTOs. Content 
analysis is “a detailed and systematic examination of the contents of a particular body of 
material for the purpose of identifying patterns, themes, or biases.”78 The research will 
take a qualitative and quantitative research approach, with the goal of interpreting the 
data, inductively and deductively, to identify the nonstatutory factors used in the FTO 
decision-making process. 
The research will first analyze the terrorist organization lists used by allied 
countries, namely the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. Each of these countries 
maintains its own independent list with procedures legislatively adopted by that country 
to determine which groups are added. In addition, the Executive Branch designates each 
country’s terrorist organizations, with an oversight function performed by other branches 
of government. An evaluation is conducted of each country’s designation process, the 
oversight and review conducted, and the public disclosure mechanisms utilized.  
To analyze the U.S. FTO list, the research next reviewed government reports 
issued, namely the State Department annual Country Reports on Terrorism (previously 
called Patterns of Global Terrorism, and hereinafter, collectively referred to as “country 
reports”) from 1997, when the FTO list was statutorily created, through to the 2012 
country reports, the last report issued prior to the publication of this research.79 In each 
annual report, the State Department provides the following categories of information 
about each individual FTO: the date on which the FTO was designated by the United 
States, a description of the FTO that frequently includes the group’s origin, a summary of 
the FTO’s recent activities, the location of the FTO’s operations, the FTO’s current 
strength, and the FTO’s sources of funding or support.  
The information published in the country reports for each FTO from 1997 to 2012 
was gathered into one database. Since the reports contain a limited amount of information 
about the FTOs, all of the information from all 16 reports was incorporated into the 
78 Paul D. Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Ormrod, Practical Research: Planning and Design, 10th ed. (New 
Jersey: Pearson, 2013), 148. 
79 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001–2003; U.S. Department of State, 
Country Report on Terrorism 2004–2011. 
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database. The information was then coded to determine whether themes and patterns 
developed, and whether the nonstatutory factors that influence the designation process, 
could be identified. 
The specific steps used in the analysis included: (1) reviewing all State 
Department county reports issued that described the FTOs in order to capture the data, (2) 
inputting all of the county report information into a single database, and (3) categorizing 
the data to determine if the designated FTOs follow a pattern, whether the nonstatutory 
factors that influence the FTO decisions can be identified and whether they are 
predictable, and whether the nonstatutory factors are being applied consistently across all 
groups.  
To first organize the data, the categories initially used were the same categories 
presented in the country reports, namely, the date designated, the description of the FTO 
(for each year the group was named in a country report), the activities of the group (for 
each year the group was named in a country report), the size of the FTO, the resources of 
the FTO, and location of its activities. 
After all the information from the country reports was organized into a single 
database, the information for each FTO was further categorized to determine the types of 
terrorist acts committed, the group’s association, if any, to al Qaeda, the location of the 
organization, the location of the FTO’s terrorist activities, whether the FTO killed, 
attacked or harmed a U.S. citizen, whether the FTO attacked a U.S. business or 
government interest (such as a U.S. embassy), the date of the FTO’s last terrorist attack, 
countries in which the FTO commits its attacks, whether the FTO was engaged in Iraq or 
Afghanistan, whether the FTO was engaged in peace negotiations, and whether the FTO 
is associated with any other FTO.  
Finally, the information about each FTO from the country reports was analyzed 
quantitatively to determine whether references to certain terms or countries increased or 
decreased over time, as reflected by the number of references to that term in the country 
reports.  
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All organizations currently on the FTO list and those that have been removed 
from the list were included in this study. This consists of a total of 57 current FTOs and 
nine organizations that have been removed from the FTO list, resulting in a total of 66 
organizations reviewed for this study. 
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V. TERRORIST ORGANIZATION LISTS MAINTAINED BY 
ALLIED NATIONS 
Even states that are allies can disagree, for reasons of history, culture and 
politics, over whether or not members of a certain organisation are 
terrorists. 
—Michael Head, 
 Author of Crimes Against the State, From Treason to Terrorism 
 
The process of designating organizations and attempting to minimize their 
effectiveness by outlawing support for them is now a widely accepted counterterrorism 
tool used by many countries and organizations, including the European Union (EU) and 
the United Nations. While the U.S. model has been criticized, the designation process is 
criticized in other countries as well because it raises questions about the limits on 
executive power while also challenging the accepted boundaries of the criminal justice 
system. Also, universal concerns exist about the dominant role played by the executive in 
the decision-making process and the risk that the public may place an undue amount of 
pressure on the executive branch that may result in the excessive listing of terrorist 
groups. It is frequently difficult to understand how certain organizations that have no 
direct link to a country are proscribed and yet other organizations are not proscribed.  
This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the terrorist organization 
designation processes used in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. While no 
system is a perfect match to the U.S. system, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia 
were selected for this research due to the similarity in the designation processes used. 
Each of these countries maintains its own independent list with procedures legislatively 
adopted by that country to determine which groups are designated. Like the U.S. system, 
the Executive Branch makes the designation decision with an oversight function 
performed by other branches of government. Many other countries also have lists of 
terrorist organizations, but were not included in this analysis due to differences in their 
designation process that make an analytical comparison less helpful. For example, New 
Zealand maintains a terrorist organization list pursuant to its Terrorism Suppression 
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Act.80 Since the enactment of the Terrorism Suppression Act, the New Zealand 
government has designated a number of terrorist organizations. However, it only 
designates organizations that have also been listed by the United Nations. “A primary aim 
of the New Zealand legislative response has been to bring its law into compliance with 
United Nations Conventions and determinations about terrorism.”81 As a result, countries 
like New Zealand that have a terrorist list that mirror that of the United Nations, or that 
mirror other multi-country organizations, such as the EU, were not included in this 
analysis. 
The United Kingdom, Australian, and Canadian models were selected for 
evaluation because the forms of governance, the nature of the terrorist threats, and the 
public reaction to government actions are most similar to the United States. Therefore, 
analyzing these designation models, and the advantages and disadvantages they present, 
can aid in the evaluation of the U.S. system and whether modifications should be adopted 
to improve the U.S. designation method.  
A. UNITED KINGDOM 
The purpose of terrorism lies not just in the violent act itself. It is in 
producing terror. It sets out to inflame, to divide, to produce consequences 
which they often use to justify further terror. 
—Tony Blair,  
U.K. Prime Minister (1997–2007) 
 
Prior to 2000, the United Kingdom proscribed a number of organizations that 
existed in Northern Ireland.82 Under the Terrorism Act of 2000 (which became effective 
on February 19, 2001), the list expanded to include international terrorist organizations. 
Fifty-one international organizations are currently proscribed under the Terrorism Act of 
2000. Of these, two organizations are proscribed under powers introduced in the 
80 Terrorism Suppression Amendment Act 2003 (NZ). 
81 George Williams, “The Rule of Law and the Regulation of Terrorism in Australia and New 
Zealand,” in Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, ed. Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor, and Kent Roach 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 550.  
82 Alexander Horne and Diana Douse, The Terrorism Act 2000: Proscribed Organizations (House of 
Commons Library, January 7, 2013 (updated); The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 
1989 and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996.  
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Terrorism Act 2006, as glorifying terrorism. In addition, 14 additional organizations in 
Northern Ireland are proscribed under pre-existing legislation.  
1. The Listing Process 
Under the Terrorism Act, the Home Secretary may proscribe an organization if 
the Secretary believes the group is “concerned” with terrorism,83 meaning that the group 
does the following.  
• commits or participates in acts of terrorism 
• prepares for terrorism 
• promotes or encourages terrorism (including the unlawful glorification of 
terrorism) 
• is otherwise concerned in terrorism84  
It is a criminal offense to belong to or invite support for a proscribed organization, 
arrange a meeting in support of a proscribed organization, or wear clothing or carry 
articles in public that arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or 
supporter of the proscribed organization.  
Initially, criticism arose that the list of factors lacked clarity in specifying the 
criteria the Home Secretary would use in determining whether to exercise discretion to 
add an organization to the list. In response, in 2011, the Home Secretary issued an 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Terrorism Act and specified that the factors that would 
be weighed in exercising discretion would include the following.  
• the nature and scale of an organization’s activities 
• the specific threat that it poses to the United Kingdom 
• the specific threat that it poses to British nationals overseas 
• the extent of the organization’s presence in the United Kingdom 
• the need to support other members of the international community in the 
global fight against terrorism85  
83 Section 3(4) of the 2000 Act. 
84 Section 3(5) of the 2000 Act. 
85 Explanatory Memorandum to the Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment 
Order) 2011.  
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In developing its system and rationale for creating a list of terrorist organizations, 
Lord Lloyd and Paul Wilkinson, in their Inquiry into Legislation Against Terrorism, 
presented three principal rationales for the role of the list in the United Kingdom: ease of 
proof in criminal trials, providing a basis for the criminalization of fundraising and other 
activities of terrorist groups, and as a clear symbol of public revolution and reassurance 
that severe measures are being taken.86 
2. Review and Oversight 
While the Home Secretary develops the list, the adding or removing of 
organizations is subject to an affirmative approval of both Houses of Parliament.87 A 
proscribed organization, or any person affected by the proscription of the organization, 
may apply to the Home Secretary for delisting and, if the Home Secretary refuses the 
application, the applicant may appeal to the Proscribed Organizations Appeals 
Commission (POAC).88 It should be noted that the Home Secretary has never de-
proscribed an organization. The only organization to be de-proscribed was the People’s 
Mojahadeen Organization of Iran (PMOI, aka MEK), which was the result of an appeal it 






86 Lord Lloyd of Berwick and Paul Wilkinson, Inquiry into Legislation Against Terrorism (London: 
Stationery Office, 1996), vol. 1, 29–30, vol. 2, 57. 
87 Section 3 of the 2000 Act.  
88 Explanatory Memorandum to the Terrorism Act 2000. 
89 Horne and Douse, The Terrorism Act 2000: Proscribed Organizations, 17.  
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B. AUSTRALIA 
Nobody should underestimate how much the world changed on the 11th of 
September 2001. 
—John Howard,  
Prime Minister of Australia (1996 to 2007) 
 
Since 2002, Australia has maintained a terrorist organizations list as required by 
the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act of 2002. Currently, 18 terrorist 
organizations are on the list.90  
1. The Listing Process 
In Australia, two procedures are employed to add an organization to the terrorist 
organization list, specifically: (1) a court can list an organization when presented with a 
prosecution of an individual for a terrorism offense (it may not independently consider 
listing an organization), and (2) the government may list an organization pursuant to its 
criminal code. The latter mechanism is the typical method. Under this process, the 
attorney general is authorized to designate organizations if satisfied on reasonable 
grounds that an organization does the following.  
• is directly or indirectly engaged in preparing, planning, assisting, or 
fostering the commission of a terrorist act (whether or not the act has 
occurred or will occur) 
• advocated the commission of a terrorist act (whether or not a terrorist act 
has occurred or will occur)  
The Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) provides support to the 
Attorney general in this process, and provides the specific relevant information upon 
which a decision can be reached. Other agencies are also involved including the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, and the Australian Federal Police, who are consulted about the listing decisions. 
In providing information, the ASIO will evaluate whether the organization 
directly or indirectly is doing the following.  
90 Australian Government, Australian National Security, “Listed Terrorist Organisations,” 2014, 
http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/default.aspx. 
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• engaging in a terrorist act 
• preparing to commit a terrorist act 
• planning a terrorist act 
• assisting in the commission of a terrorist act 
• fostering the commission of a terrorist act 
• advocating the commission of a terrorist act 
Australia recognizes that many groups could be considered a terrorist organization 
and could be qualified to be added to the list. As a result, Australia developed a list of 
non-legislative factors that can be used to guide and prioritize the selection of 
organizations to the list. The key non-legislative factors are as follows.  
• the organization’s engagement in terrorism 
• the organization’s ideology 
• links to other terrorist group 
• links to australia 
• threats to australian interests 
• listing by the united nations or like-minded countries 
• engagement in peace or mediation processes 
Furthermore, not all characteristics carry equal weight on Australia’s list. 
“Depending on available information, some factors may carry more weight than others in 
selecting organizations for consideration.”91 For example, information indicating links to 
Australia or threats to Australian interests may prioritize the listing of a particular group 
as a terrorist organization. However, a lack of information with respect to one or more 
factors will not preclude an organization from being considered for listing. 
ASIO provides advice to the Attorney general in the form of the Statement of 
Reasons that outlines the organization’s involvement in terrorism. The purpose of the 
Statement of Reasons is to outline how the organization meets the legislative factors for 
listing. The Statement of Reasons may also include information that relates to the non-
legislative factors. The Statement of Reasons is intended to be based on unclassified 
91 Australian Government, Attorney-General’s Department, Protocol, Listing Terrorist Organisations 
Under the Criminal Code.  
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information about the organization that can be corroborated by classified information, 
which enables the Statement of Reasons to be made available to the public, and provides 
transparency as to the basis on which the Attorney general’s decision is made. If 
insufficient unclassified information exists about an organization, the ASIO may provide 
a classified briefing to the Attorney general. 
2. Review and Oversight 
Australian law requires that a terrorist organization be reviewed for listing every 
three years, to ensure that a regular review of the organizations on the list occurs, and that 
a determination is regularly made as to whether the organization continues to satisfy the 
criteria for listing. The “ASIO’s Statement of Reasons for an organization being 
considered for re-listing will provide information . . . indicating the organization’s 
involvement in the doing, preparing, planning, assisting, fostering, or advocating of 
terrorism since the time it was last listed.”92 An organization can apply to be delisted at 
any time. 
After listing, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security 
(PJCIS) can review the listing and the supporting evidence for the listing. If the PJCIS 
determines that insufficient evidence exists to support the listing, the PJCIS can 
recommend that Parliament disallow the listing. According to materials issued by the 
Attorney general’s office, this process “provides openness, transparency and 
accountability in the listing process.”93  
In addition, the judiciary has oversight powers when it comes to the listing 
process, and can review the Attorney general’s decision to ensure it was made based on 
“logically probative evidence” and that is was a proper exercise of power “not flawed by 
irrelevant considerations, improper purpose or exercised in bad faith.”94  
92 Australian Government, Attorney-General’s Department, Protocol, Listing Terrorist Organisations 




                                                 
3. Public Information 
Australia makes its terrorist organization list publicly available on the Internet, 
along with the factual basis that supports the designation.95 The public, therefore, has 
easy access to information supporting the designation of terrorist groups.96  
Specifically, the Australian information provided about each designated terrorist 
organization includes the following.  
• the legal basis for designating the group as a terrorist organization 
• the objectives of the group, its structure, and its leadership 
• the nature of its membership and how the group recruits its members 
• how the group receives its funding 
• the acts of terrorism the group has been engaged in both directly and 
indirectly 
• how the organization fosters terrorism 
• the names of other terrorist groups it associates with 
• whether other countries also list the group as a terrorist organization 
• whether the group is engaged in peace negotiations 
• how the group’s terrorist activities impact Australia’s national security 
interests 
All this information is obtained from the Statement of Reasons which, as 
described above, is the non-classified document that outlines the basis of the designation 
provided to the Australian Attorney general who makes the terrorist designation 
decision.97 According to Australian law, the Statement of Reasons contains the publicly 
available information about the terrorist group, which can then be corroborated by 
classified information.98 The fact that publicly available information forms the 
foundation for the decision-making process, allows the Australian public to have access 
95 Australian Government, Australian National Security, “Listed Terrorist Organisations.” 
96 Ibid. 
97 Australian Government, Attorney-General’s Department, Protocol, Listing Terrorist Organisations 
Under the Criminal Code.  
98 Ibid. 
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to many of the details about why a particular group has been designated by its 
government.  
C. CANADA 
The free and civilized nations of the world have joined hands to press the 
first great struggle for justice of the 21st century—the struggle to defy and 
defeat the forces of terrorism. 
—Jean Chretien,  
Prime Minister of Canada (1993–2003) 
 
Since December 18, 2001, article 83.05 of the Canadian Criminal Code provides 
that the Governor in Council can maintain a list of the entities engaged in terrorism, 
facilitating it, or acting on behalf of such an entity. Currently, 46 organizations are on the 
Canadian list.99  
1. The Listing Process 
The Governor in Council may place any organization on the terrorism list if, on 
the recommendation of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, 
reasonable grounds exist to believe the following. 
1. The organization has knowingly carried out, attempted to carry out, 
participated in or facilitated a terrorist act 
2. The organization is knowingly acting on behalf of, at the direction of, or in 
association with an organization described in (1) 
The listing process requires extensive analysis of security or criminal information 
and intelligence to ensure that the decision to list meets the legal threshold. Once at the 
threshold, if reasonable grounds exist to believe that the entity has knowingly participated 
in or facilitated a terrorist activity, or is knowingly acting on behalf of, at the direction of, 
or in association with such an entity, the organization is listed.100 
99 Government of Canada, Public Safety Canada, “Currently Listed Entities,” 2013, 
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-eng.aspx. 
100 Government of Canada, Public Safety Canada, “The Government of Canada Lists the Haqqani 
Network and the Taliban as Terrorist Organization,” May 15, 2013, http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/ 
cnt/nws/nws-rlss/2013/20130515-eng.aspx. 
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While not a crime to be a member of a listed entity, under the Criminal Code, any 
person or group listed may have their assets seized and forfeited. Persons and 
organizations that deal in the property or finances of a listed entity may be subjected to 
severe penalties. In addition, it is a crime to knowingly participate in, or contribute to, 
any activity of a listed entity for the purpose of enhancing the ability of the entity to 
facilitate or execute a terrorist activity.101 The Criminal Code “outlaws participation in 
terrorist group activities, the facilitation of terrorist activity, acting to benefit a terrorist 
group, or harboring terrorists. Many of these activities are specifically defined as illegal 
whether or not terrorist activity is actually carried out and whether or not the person 
involved with the organization is aware of any specific attacks being planned by the 
organization, thus enabling authorities to use the law in a preventive fashion in addition 
to punishment after the fact.”102 
An organization can apply to the Minister to be removed from the list. In ruling 
on the application, the Minister must determine whether reasonable grounds exist to 
recommend to the Governor in Council that the group should be delisted. The Minister 
has 60 days to rule upon the application, and if no decision is made within that time, the 
organization remains listed (the decision is “deemed” to have been made).  
2. Review and Oversight 
The organization can then apply for judicial review of the decision to remain on 
the list. When an application is made, the judge must examine the security and criminal 
intelligence reports considered in the listing and hear any evidence or information that 
may be presented on behalf of the Minister and the applicant. The judge then determines 
whether the listing decision was reasonable. If it is found to be unreasonable, the group is 
removed from the list. The judge may receive into evidence any information deemed 
reliable and appropriate, even if it is not otherwise admissible under Canadian law.  
101 Government of Canada, Public Safety Canada, “The Government of Canada Lists the Haqqani 
Network and the Taliban as Terrorist Organization.” 
102 Nadav Morag, Comparative Homeland Security, Global Lessons (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & 
Sons, 2011), 73.  
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The list of organizations on the Canadian list is reviewed every two years to 
ensure that it is up-to-date, and to determine whether reasonable grounds still exist to 
keep an organization on the list.103  
D. THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
Overall, many similarities exist between the designation processes used by the 
United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. First, and perhaps most obviously, the 
Executive Branch in each country makes the decision about which organizations will be 
designated as a terrorist organization. In some cases, it is the equivalent to the secretary 
of state, and in others, to the Attorney general. In either case, the Executive Branch 
exercises the authority—in some cases, with the oversight of the judicial branch, and in 
others, the legislative branch.  
Further, while the U.S. model has been criticized, it appears that the designation 
process is routinely criticized in other countries as well. For example, Professor Clive 
Walker of the University of Leeds has argued that in the United Kingdom: 
Proscription has been of marginal utility in combatting political violence, 
to which the survival of the IRA over most of a century bears ample 
testimony. Paramilitary organisations cannot be abolished by legislative 
fiat, and proscription actually increases the difficulties of infiltration and 
monitoring so as to achieve the criminalization of those members engaged 
in violence.104  
Similarly, Kent Roach, Professor of Law at the University of Toronto, has argued 
that while judicial review of the Canadian designation process is available, “it is unlikely 
that such reviews would be successful or remove the stigma of being officially listed as a 
terrorist.”105 Roach also criticizes the judicial procedures used to conduct reviews of the 
Executive’s designation decision. Roach argues:  
103 Irwin Cotler, “Thinking Outside the Box: Foundational Principles for a Counterterrorism Law and 
Policy,” in The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill, ed. Ronald J. Daniels, 
Patrick Macklem, and Kent Roach (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 124. 
104 Clive Walker, Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti-Terror Legislation (Oxford, 2002), 64.  
105 Kent Roach, “Canada’s Response to Terrorism,” in Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, ed. 
Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor, and Kent Roach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 516–
517. 
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Hearings can be closed and the group challenging the listing can be denied 
access to evidence before the judge because of national security concerns. 
In cases of intelligence received from other governments or international 
organizations, the applicant can be denied access to even a summary of the 
evidence. In a case decided after September 11 in a non-terrorist context, 
the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized the importance for Canada of 
assuring foreign governments that their intelligence will be kept secret 
because Canada relies heavily on such intelligence.106  
Irwin Cotler of McGill University echoes Roach’s view and notes that all the 
safeguards currently in place are “after the fact” safeguards (such as judicial review and 
provisions for removal). He argues that consideration should be given to provide prior 
notice to the organizations being designated, with an opportunity for a hearing to occur 
prior to the designation.107  
In contrast to these remarks, Charles Clark, a former U.K. Home Secretary, 
commented that:  
There are three principal reasons why we think proscription is important. 
First, it has been, and remains, a powerful deterrent to people to engage in 
terrorist activity. Secondly, related offences are a way of tackling some of 
the lower-level support for terrorist organisations . . . Third, proscription 
acts as a powerful signal of rejection by Government—and indeed by 
society as a whole—of organisations’ claims to legitimacy.108  
Similarly, Vic Toews, Canada’s Minister of Public Safety, has supported the use 
of terrorist lists and recently commented that:  
The safety and security of Canadians is a priority for our Government, and 
the listing of terrorist entities sends a strong message that terrorist activity 
will not be tolerated. We have taken a number of actions to equip law 
enforcement and the courts with more tools to combat terrorism, including 
the recently passed Combating Terrorism Act.109  
106 Roach, “Canada’s Response to Terrorism,” 517.  
107 Cotler, “Thinking Outside the Box: Foundational Principles for a Counterterrorism Law and 
Policy,” 124.  
108 Charles Clarke, UK Home Secretary, House of Commons, January 18, 2000.  
109 Government of Canada, Public Safety Canada, “The Government of Canada Lists the Haqqani 
Network and the Taliban as Terrorist Organization.” 
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Consistent with the views of Toews and Clark, the process of designating 
organizations and attempting to minimize their effectiveness by outlawing support for 
them is now a widely accepted counterterrorism tool used by many countries and 
organizations, such as the EU and the United Nations.110 While it is a widely adopted 
counterterrorism tool, the process used to designate terrorist organizations can be 
improved. It is, therefore, important to examine the underlying basis for the criticisms of 
the designation systems used.  
For example, in Australia, proscription of terrorist organizations remains 
controversial because it raises questions about public law and the limits on executive 
power, while also challenging the accepted boundaries of the criminal justice system.111 
With respect to the specific process developed in Australia, critics have challenged “the 
dominant role played by the executive in the decision-making process.”112 Included in 
the concerns expressed are that the decision making is arbitrary and politicized. 
Specifically, the Castan Centre for Human Rights Law noted: 
The Minister is not bound by any rules of precedent nor is s/he required to 
follow any set criteria and as such is free to exercise the power to list 
terrorist organizations in a politically motivated, inconsistent, selective, 
and discriminatory fashion.113 
Concern has also been expressed in Australia that the public may place an undue 
amount of pressure on the executive branch for protection from actual and perceived 
terrorist threats, resulting in the excessive listing of terrorist groups. “In the aftermath of a 
terrorist attack, such pressure may be based on a general climate of fear, especially about 
particular ethnic and religious groups within the community, rather than a rational 
assessment of the security threat.”114 Some have observed that in Australia, no member 
110 See e.g., Security Council Resolution 1267, UN SCOR, 54th Session, 4051st meeting (1999). 
111 Andrew Lynch, Nicola McGarrity, and George Williams, “The Proscription of Terrorist 
Organisations in Australia,” Federal Law Review, Tobin Centre of Public Law, University of New South 
Wales (2008): 3–4.  
112 Ibid., 12. 
113 Ibid., 13; Castan Centre for Human Rights Law, Monash University, Submission No. 2 to PJCIS, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Terrorist Organizations Listing Provisions of the Criminal Code 
Act 1995, January 22, 2007, 6.  
114 Lynch, McGarrity, and Williams, “The Proscription of Terrorist Organisations in Australia,” 13.  
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of Parliament has spoken out strongly against proscription of a specific organization—
notwithstanding the fact that the executive has often failed to put forward any evidence 
that the organization poses a direct or indirect threat to the security of the country.115 
This suspicion was exacerbated when the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) was listed in 
Australia when the Turkish prime minister visited the country in 20106, causing the 
Australian Muslim Civil Rights Network to comment that: 
We are concerned that the listing of an organization with seemingly no 
security threat to Australia illustrates a proscription regime that is 
primarily dictated by foreign policy considerations rather than the more 
appropriate ends of protecting Australian citizens from the threat of 
terrorism.116  
While many might agree that the PKK is in fact a terrorist organization, the timing of the 
designation in Australia provided an opportunity for many to question the process.  
As in the United States, the Australian process has been subjected to criticism 
because it is difficult to understand how certain organizations that have no direct link to 
the country are proscribed, and yet other organizations, such as Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which has a link to Australia, are not proscribed. One analyst 
commented that of the organizations proscribed in Australia, 13 had no connection to the 
country, two involved organizations with no link other than being linked to Iraq where 
Australian personnel were located, and only four could be identified as presenting a threat 
to Australia’s security.117  
The criticisms leveled at the Australian system are interesting since that country is 
the most conservative in adding groups to its list, among the countries studied for this 
research. Currently, Australia only has 18 organizations designated and all of them have 
also been designed by United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Australia also has 
a robust system that provides the public with details as to each terrorist organization, the 
115 Lynch, McGarrity, and Williams, “The Proscription of Terrorist Organisations in Australia,” 13. 
116 Australian Muslim Civil Rights Advocacy Network, Submission No. 14 to PJCIS, Parliament of 
Australia, Review of the Listing of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a Terrorist Organisation under 
the Criminal Code Act of 1995, 2006, 1.  
117 Patrick Emerton, Submission 23 to PJCIS, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Terrorist 
Organisation Listing Provisions of the Criminal Code Act 1995, 2007, 3.  
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basis for its listing as a terrorist organization, details of its terrorist activity, and its 
association with other terrorist groups.118 In addition, Australia is one of the countries 
that publishes the nonstatutory factors that influence the designation. Despite using an 
approach that provides more transparency than many other countries, and despite having 
a very narrow list of terrorist groups, the same criticisms leveled against the U.S. system 
are used against the Australian system. 
At the other end of the spectrum is the UK model, which appears to be the most 
liberal in designating terrorist groups. The United Kingdom has designated over 50 
international terrorist organizations, and an additional 14 terrorist groups based in 
Northern Ireland. Fourteen of the organizations on the UK list are not designated by the 
United States, Australia or Canada. The designation process also appears to be among the 
easiest: 
The process of proscription is a convenient one for the executive. Subject 
only to the assent of Parliament and to consideration of the five 
discretionary factors set out . . . . the Secretary of State may proscribe an 
organization on the basis of nothing more than a belief that it is, in the 
broadest possible sense, concerned in terrorism. Neither before nor after 
the addition of an organization . . . is she required to satisfy a court that it 
is concerned in terrorism. The only legal constraint she faces is the 
possibility that a proscribed organization may subsequently seek to 
discharge the burden of persuading POAC that her decision was flawed on 
public law grounds.119 
In addition to the ease of the process and the limited oversight, the UK model has 
been criticized because of the difficulty in being removed from the list. It has been noted 
that the Home Secretary has never delisted any organization and that only one 
organization, the PMOI, has successfully appealed to the POAC to be delisted.120 In 
contrast, nine organizations have been delisted in the United States by the secretary of 
state, and none of those were court-mandated delistings. Although, it should be noted that 
in the United Kingdom, the criticisms presented about the listing process did result in the 
118 Australian Government, Australian National Security, “Listed Terrorist Organisations.” 
119 Horne and Douse, The Terrorism Act 2000: Proscribed Organizations, 17. 
120 Ibid.  
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identification of the nonstatutory factors that influence the decision-making process. 
Nevertheless, of the models studied, the UK model appears to afford the Executive 
Branch the most power. 
The designation models from allied nations offer insight into modifications the 
United States could adopt to identify publicly the nonstatutory factors that influence the 
designation process and to enhance disclosure of that information. While all designation 
models are criticized, the UK, Australian, and Canadian models suggest that more could 
be done within the U.S. system to clarify the factors being weighed in making FTO 
determinations. The research presented in the next two chapters suggests that information 
about the nonstatutory factors influential in U.S. FTO decisions is already contained 
within public documents, although not always easily accessible to the public. Therefore, 
modifications could be made to the U.S. model to make this information more easily 
available and accessible, without impacting U.S. national security interests.  
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VI. THE FTO LIST 
In preparing for battle 
I have always found that plans are useless, 
but planning is indispensable. 
—Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
34th U.S. President 
A. BACKGROUND 
The development of the FTO list represents “the shift from well-organized, 
localized groups supported by state sponsors to loosely organized, international networks 
of terrorists.”121 The list reflects the fact that terrorist threats have shifted over the years, 
and it reflects the movement from state sponsorship of terrorism, where a country could 
be identified as the foundation or primary supporter of terrorism, to more independent 
groups that  
rely less on direct state sponsorship and more on private financial and 
logistical support. Many terrorist groups secretly exploit the resources of 
international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), companies, and 
wealthy individuals.122  
Due to the proliferation of these independent terrorist groups throughout the world, the 
FTO list will likely become increasingly important to the United States. As a result, other 
lists, such as the State Sponsors of Terrorism list, may become less significant since they 
no longer reflect the primary sources of terrorist threats against the United States.  
Since its inception in 1997, the State Department has been active in adding and 
deleting groups from the FTO list. The largest number of groups added to the list was at 
its inception, in 1997, when 30 organizations were designated to form the inaugural FTO 
list.123 Additions and deletions to the list have occurred in each year since, with the 
exceptions of 2006 and 2007, during which time no organization was added to or 
121 Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 152–53. 
122 The National Commission on Terrorism, “Countering the Changing Threat,” June 7, 2000, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html. 
123 See Appendix C for the full list of 30 FTOs designated in October 1997.  
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removed from the list. In recent years, significant activity has occurred. Sixteen terrorist 
organizations were added and three groups removed in the 2010–2014124 time frame, 
which represents the highest level of activity on the list since the five-year period 
following 9/11 at which time, 16 groups were added to the list, and two groups were 
removed.125  
 
Figure 2.  Graph Representing Timeline of FTO Listing and Delisting 
B. OVERVIEW OF FTOS ON THE LIST 
In the annual country reports, the State Department provides, among other things, 
a summary of the activities engaged in by each designated FTO, which frequently 
includes a description of the most significant terrorist attack committed by the group, the 
location of the attack, and the number of lives lost. The descriptions occasionally include 
whether arrests were made that year, or whether other governmental actions have 
occurred to thwart or curtail the terrorist activities of a particular group.  
124 This calculation includes activity through January 2014, when this research was concluded.  
125 The two FTOs delisted were removed from the list in October 2001. It is, therefore, likely that the 
delisting process began significantly before 9/11.  
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The country reports’ descriptions of the types of terrorist activities engaged in by 
the designated FTOs includes bombings, mortar attacks, assassinations, shootings, 
suicide bombings, kidnappings, rocket propelled grenade attacks, car bombs, and 
biological attacks. Some of the FTO activities described include what may be considered 
more traditional criminal acts, such as extortion, robberies,126 drug trafficking,127 
murder, use of false identities,128 cigarette smuggling,129 and even bank robberies. 
However, the State Department frequently reports that these more traditional criminal 
activities are typically committed in an effort to fund the more serious terrorist 
activities.130 In one case, a leader of an FTO claimed that 70% of its operations were 
financed through narcotics trafficking.131 
The description of FTO activities frequently, but not always, indicates the group’s 
activities against the United States. When the information is provided, it is frequently 
provided in one year’s report but not repeated in the next year’s country reports. As a 
result, it is necessary to review all the country reports to determine which groups have 
taken action against the United States. Even for those FTOs whose descriptions indicate 
the group attacked a U.S. citizen or a U.S. interest, the information is frequently provided 
in vague terms and reading all the country reports is necessary to determine which groups 
have attacked or otherwise directly challenged the United States. 
Of the 66 FTOs designated between 1997 and January 2014, 33 of the groups 
murdered, participated in the murder of, or facilitated the murder of a U.S. citizen. An 
additional nine attacked or attempted to attack a U.S. interest, such as a U.S. embassy or 
a business owned by U.S. citizens. The descriptions provided for 17 FTOs contained in 
126 See e.g., U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 1997–2012 (see descriptions for 
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), Continuity Irish 
Republican Army (CIRA), Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), and Revolutionary Organization 17 
November (17N)). 
127 See e.g., U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 1997–2012 (see descriptions for 
United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), Hizballah, and National Liberation Army (ELN)).  
128 Ibid. (see descriptions for Lashkar I Jhangvi).  
129 Ibid. (see descriptions for Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA).  
130 Ibid. (see descriptions for Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and al Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI).  
131 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, released April 2003, 124. 
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the State Department country reports132 fail to state any information about whether the 
FTO has killed, injured, kidnapped a U.S. citizen or that it harmed or attempted to harm 
an entity connected or associated with the United States. Of those 17 groups, three have 
been delisted. However, for the remaining 14 groups, the descriptions offered through the 
country reports fail to explain the specific U.S. interest being challenged or attacked by 
the designated FTOs.  
The 14 groups are based in Japan, Spain, Israel/Palestine, Turkey, Sri Lanka, 
Northern Ireland, Colombia, Libya, Bangladesh, Iran, and Indonesia. Some of these 
countries are allies; some are not. Some are members of North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) whose interests the United States would likely be inclined to 
support, but most of these countries are not a member of NATO. The specific interest the 
United States has with respect to the actions of these groups, warranting each group’s 
designation as an FTO, are not identified by the State Department in the country reports.  
C. THE 9/11 DIVIDE 
While the FTO list can be analyzed as a whole, to include all the groups that have 
been designated since the inception of the FTO list, analyzing the FTO list based on 
whether the organizations were designated before or after 9/11 is a more appropriate 
delineation for analysis. Analyzing the list in this manner also demonstrates the dramatic 
changes that occurred in American counterterrorism policy as a result of those terrorist 
attacks.  
As stated previously, 66 organizations have been designated since the inception of 
the FTO list. Thirty-two of these groups were designated prior to 9/11 and 34 were 
designated following that day. Nine groups have been removed since the inception of the 
list, which leaves 57 groups currently on the FTO list. Of the 57 groups currently 
designated, 24 were designated prior to 9/11 (representing 42% of the list) and 33 were 
designated after (representing 58% of the list). Thus, more than half of the groups that the 
132 The FTOs designated in 2013 and 2014 were not yet described in a country report at the time this 
research was conducted. Therefore, information provided in the press release announcing the designation 
was relied upon for the seven groups designated in 2013 and in January 2014.  
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United States currently recognizes as terrorist groups were designated following the 
events of 9/11.  
1. The FTOs Designated before 9/11 
Thirty-two terrorist groups were designated FTOs before September 11, 2001, and 
24 of those groups remain on the FTO list today. The eight no longer on the FTO list 
were removed from the list by the secretary of state, and some of those removals occurred 
before and some after 9/11.133 The FTOs designated prior to 9/11 are a mix of 
organizations from around the world reflecting groups challenging governments located 
in Israel, Colombia, Turkey, Greece, India, Sri Lanka, Spain, Japan, Egypt, England, and 
the Philippines.  
While the FTO list was created after the Cold War was officially over, the groups 
designated to be on the list were heavily influenced by Cold War-era concerns. Of the 32 
FTOs designated prior to 9/11, 15 groups (or 47% of the designated FTOs) were founded 
on communist principles. While the foundational principles of all 15 groups were based 
on Marxist/Maoist doctrine, the groups designated were from geographic regions all over 
the world. For example, the designated communist groups were based in Peru, Colombia, 
Spain, Turkey, Japan, Greece, Syria, Lebanon, and the Israeli-occupied territories, Chile, 
Iran, and Cambodia. Table 1 reflects the list of communist FTOs designated prior to 9/11, 








133 It should be noted that al Jihad was not removed from the list, but merged into al Qaeda.  
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Organization134 Description135 
Basque Fatherland and 
Liberty (ETA) 
Founded in 1959 to establish an independent homeland based on Marxist 
principles in Spain’s Basque region, among other areas. 
Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP) 
Marxist-Leninist organization founded in 1969 when it split from the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Believes Palestinian 
national goals can be achieved only through revolution of the masses. 
Japanese Red Army 
(JRA) 
An international terrorist group formed around 1970 after breaking away 
from Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction. 
Kurdistan Workers 
Party (PKK) 
Established in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist insurgent group primarily 




Founded in 1983 as the armed wing of the Chilean Communist Party and 
was named for the hero of Chile’s war of independence against Spain. 
Mujahadin-e Khalq 
Organization (MEK) 
Formed in the 1960s, follows a philosophy that mixes Marxism and Islam. 
Developed into largest and most active armed Iranian dissident group. 
National Liberation 
Army (ELN) 
Rural-based, anti-US, Maoist-Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group formed in 
1963. 
Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP) 
Marxist-Leninist group founded in 1967 by George Habash as a member of 
the PLO. 
Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia 
(FARC) 
The largest, best-trained, and best-equipped guerrilla organization in 




Successor to the Revolutionary People’s Struggle, is a self-described 
revolutionary, anti-capitalist, and anti-imperialist group, which has declared 
its opposition to “imperialist domination, exploitation, and oppression,” and 




A radical leftist group established in 1975, the group is anti-Greek 
establishment, anti-U.S., anti-Turkey, anti-NATO, anti-EU. 17N has 




Originally formed in 1978, it espouses a Marxist ideology and is virulently 
anti-United States and anti-NATO. 
Shining Path (SL), aka 
Communist Party of 
Peru 
Formed in the late 1960s, and based on militant Maoist doctrine. 









Traditional Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement formed in 1983, to 
rid Peru of imperialism and establish Marxist regime. 
Table 1.   Pre-9/11 FTOs Based on Communist Ideology 
134 The list includes all FTOs designated prior to 9/11, even if they were subsequently delisted.  
135 The information provided in the “description” is extrapolated from the State Department country 
reports from 1997–2001. In addition, information was obtained and confirmed through the National 
Consortium of the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), “Terrorist Organizations 
Profiles, 2010, http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/. 
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As noted by Nadav Morag, author of Comparative Homeland Security, Global 
Lessons, the Cold War influence on the FTO list is not surprising, “Since much of the 
development of the concept of national security occurred in the context of the Cold War, 
it is not surprising that the discipline of national security was focused on the Soviet threat 
and ensuring that the United States was able to contain and deter Soviet ambitions and 
actions worldwide.”136  
Eight of the pre-9/11 designated FTOs, or a quarter of all of the FTOs listed, 
focused on terrorist activities involving Israel, and most of these groups were focused on 
the destruction the State of Israel. Table 2 reflects the list of FTOs designated prior to 
















136 Morag, Comparative Homeland Security, Global Lessons, 5.  
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Split from PLO in 1974. ANO advocates the elimination of Israel 
and seeks to derail Middle East peace process. 
HAMAS Formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Uses both political and violent means to 
pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in place 
of Israel. 
Hizballah Seeks creation of Iranian-style Islamic republic in Lebanon and 
removal of non-Islamic influences from the area. Strongly anti-West 
and anti-Israel.  
Kahane Chai139 Stated goal is to restore the biblical state of Israel. Declared to be 
terrorist organization in March 1994 by the Israeli Cabinet. 
Popular Front for the 
Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP)140 
Marxist-Leninist group founded in 1967 by a member of the PLO. 
Opposes negotiations with Israel. Since 1978, PFLP has carried out 
numerous attacks against Israeli. 





Split from the PFLP in 1968, claiming it wanted to focus more on 
fighting and less on politics. Carried out numerous cross-border 
terrorist attacks into Israel, using unusual means, such as hot-air 
balloons and motorized hang gliders. 
Palestine Islamic 
Jihad (PIJ) 
Committed to the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state and the 
destruction of Israel through holy war. 
Palestine Liberation 
Front (PLF) 
Known for aerial attacks against Israel. Broke away from the PFLP–
GC in mid-1970s. Later split into pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-
Libyan factions. 
Table 2.   Pre-9/11 FTOs Targeting Israel 
Six of the 32 FTOs designated prior to 9/11, or 18% of the groups designated, had 
a relationship with al Qaeda or could be considered an Islamic fundamentalist group. 
While the FTO list has been criticized for failing to designate al Qaeda as one of the 
original FTOs in 1997, the original 1997 list did include a number of al Qaeda related 
organizations. For example, the 1997 FTO list did include al Jihad that later merged into 
al Qaeda. The 1997 list also designated Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG) and HaraKat ul-
137 The list includes all FTOs designated prior to 9/11, even if they were subsequently delisted.  
138 The information provided in the “description” is extrapolated from the State Department Country 
reports from 1997–2001.  
139 In 1997, the State Department designated both Kahane Chai and Kach as terrorist organizations, 
and these were later merged on the FTO list as one organization. Therefore, these groups are counted as 
one FTO for purposes of this calculation.  
140 PFLP appears on both the list of FTOs based on Communist principles and those against the State 
of Israel.  
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Mujahideen (HUM). Both organizations signed Bin Laden’s fatwa in 1998 that called for 
attacks against U.S. civilians and western interests. While the omission of al Qaeda from 
the original list was significant in that the list failed to identify one of the largest threats 
against the United States, al Qaeda was later designated in 1999, the first time FTOs 
could statutorily be added after the issuance of the original FTO list. The designation 
occurred less than two years before 9/11. Table 3 reflects the list of al Qaeda-related 




Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG) 
Members have studied or worked in the Middle East and developed 
ties to mujahidin while fighting and training in Afghanistan. 
al Qaeda (AQ)143 Established by Bin Laden in about 1990 for those who fought in 
Afghanistan against the Soviet invasion. Goal is to “reestablish the 
Muslim state.” Issued the 1998 “The World Islamic Front for Jihad 
Against The Jews and Crusaders,” saying it was the duty of all 








Islamic militant group based in Pakistan. Leader linked to Bin Laden 
and signed his 1998 fatwa calling for attacks on U.S. and western 
interests. Operates terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and 
suffered casualties in the U.S. missile strikes on Bin Laden-
associated training camps. 
Gama’a al-Islamiyya 
(IG) 
Signed Bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa calling for attacks against U.S. 
civilians. Former leader of group appeared in video with Bin Laden 
and al-Zawahiri threatening retaliation against the U.S. for al-
Rahman’s incarceration. 
Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan (IMU) 
Closely affiliated with al Qaida and embraced Bin Laden’s anti-US, 
anti-Western agenda.  
Table 3.   Pre-9/11 FTOs Related to al Qaeda 
141 The list includes all FTOs designated prior to 9/11, even if they were subsequently delisted.  
142 The information provided in the “description” is extrapolated from the State Department country 
reports from 1997–2001.  
143 Al Jihad merged into al Qaeda and was described in the country reports as an Egyptian Islamic 
extremist group active since the late 1970s. Appears to be divided into two factions: one led by Ayman al-
Zawahiri—who currently is in Afghanistan and is a key leader in terrorist financier Usama Bin Laden’s 
new World Islamic Front—and the Vanguards of Conquest. Increasingly willing to target U.S. interests in 
Egypt.  
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Of the groups included in the original 1997 FTO list, few had any significant 
relationship to Iraq or Afghanistan. Some groups were engaged in fighting the Soviets in 
Afghanistan, and others had a presence in Iraq. For example, the 1998 country reports 
stated as to one group: “Some ASG members have studied or worked in the Middle East 
and developed ties to mujahidin while fighting and training in Afghanistan”144 
Nevertheless, from the information provided in the country reports, it does not appear 
that any of the FTO groups were designated prior to 9/11 based on their activities in 
either country.  
Few FTO descriptions offered by the State Department in 1997 provided any 
reference to an action taken against or specific animosity towards the United States. 
However, of the 32 FTOs listed prior to 9/11, 17 of the groups (or 53% of the designated 
groups) had committed an act against a U.S. interest (such as a U.S. embassy or business 
interest), held a U.S. citizen hostage, or had killed a U.S. citizen. 
Four FTOs, however, do not fit neatly into any of the broad categories listed 
above. These groups are Aum Shinrikyo (Aum), Liberation Tiger of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), Real IRA (RIRA), and United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). These 
groups are based in Japan, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland (UK), and Colombia, respectively. 
Each represents a significant and prolonged terrorist threat to a nation that is a U.S. ally. 
AUM is a cult established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara that seeks to overthrow the 
government of Japan. On March 20, 1995, AUM members simultaneously released sarin 
nerve gas on several Tokyo subway trains, which killed 12 persons and injured up to six 
thousand. LTTE created a battlefield insurgent terrorism strategy that targeted senior Sri 
Lankan political and military leaders, such that political assassinations and bombings 
became commonplace. RIRA formed in the late 1990s to remove British forces from 
Northern Ireland, unify Ireland, and disrupt the Northern Ireland peace process. AUC was 
designated on September 10, 2001, and its designation represents the last reflection of 
pre-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy. AUC is an umbrella organization formed in 
April 1997 to consolidate Colombia’s local and regional paramilitary groups each with 
144 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1998–2000 (see description of Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG)). 
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the mission to protect economic interests and combat FARC and ELN insurgents locally. 
In the list of its terrorist activities, as reported in the 2002 country reports, the first 
country reports issued after the designation of AUC, the State Department stated:  
AUC operations vary from assassinating suspected insurgent supporters to 
engaging guerrilla combat units . . . The AUC generally avoids 
engagements with government security forces and actions against U.S. 
personnel or interests.145  
This statement represents the last time that the United States reported that a newly 
designated FTO avoided taking “actions against U.S. personnel or interests.”  
The FTOs designated prior to 9/11, therefore, can be identified as falling into one 
of four broad categories. Namely, that the group: (1) was founded on communist 
principles, (2) was related to al Qaeda or Islamic fundamentalism, (3) sought the 
destruction of Israel, or (4) presented a prolonged terrorist threat to an allied nation.  
Consistent with the fact that the FTO list did not adequately anticipate the al 
Qaeda threat, or the growth of terrorist groups in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, many 
of the groups designated prior to 9/11 appear to have been designated for their historical 
acts of terrorism, rather than for their anticipated future threat to the United States. For 
example, the pre-9/11 Country Reports provided the following information about the 
FTOs. 
• “The group earned a reputation for spectacular international attacks in the 
1960s and 1970s.”146  
• .” . . committed numerous international terrorist attacks in the 1970s. 
Since 1978 has conducted numerous attacks against Israeli or moderate 
Arab targets.”147  
• “In the 1970s carried out numerous small bombings and minor assaults 
and some more spectacular operations in Israel and the occupied 
territories, concentrating on Israeli targets.”148  
145 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, 124. 
146 U.S. Department of State, Reports on Terrorism 2006, released April 2007, 267. 
147 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, released April 2005, 106. 
148 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997, released April 1998, 76 (Democratic 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)). 
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• Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985, 
the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul and the Pan Am Flight 73 
hijacking in Karachi in September 1986, and the City of Poros day-
excursion ship attack in July 1988 in Greece. . . . assassinated a Jordanian 
diplomat in Lebanon in January 1994 and has been linked to the killing of 
the PLO representative there. Has not attacked Western targets since the 
late 1980s.149  
• The Khmer Rouge conducted a campaign of genocide in which more than 
1 million persons were killed during its four years in power in the late 
1970s . . . Virtually has disintegrated as a viable insurgent organization 
because of defections . . .150 
Thus, the pre-9/11 FTO list represented a historical list of groups that committed terrorist 
attacks, some with a prior history of attacking U.S. citizens or allied nations, rather than a 
reflection of emerging threats the country was likely to face in the future.  
While 32 groups were designated as FTOs prior to 9/11, three were delisted prior 
to 9/11. Therefore, on September 11, 2001, the FTO list consisted of 29 organizations. 
The list appears in Appendix B, and reflects the following.  
• Eleven groups founded on communist principles (representing 38% of the 
FTOs).151  
• Eight groups focused on Israel (representing 28% of the FTOs). 
• Six groups associated with al Qaeda and/or radical Islam (representing 
20% of the FTOs). 
• Four groups challenging an allied nation (representing 14% of the FTOs). 
Thus, prior to 9/11, the dominant terrorism focus of U.S. foreign terrorism policy 
was on communist insurgent groups that might undermine the government of an allied 
nation. The second most significant concern was the protection of the State of Israel. 
Next was the threat of al Qaeda and radical Islam. The fourth concern was the threat to 
the security of an allied nation.  
 
149 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1997, 72 (Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), 
Activities). 
150 Ibid., 90 (The Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge), Descriptions). 
151 For purposes of this calculation, and to avoid double counting one group, PFLP is counted in the 
group of FTOs that are anti-Israeli even though the group is also founded on Communist principles.  
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2. The FTOs Designated following 9/11 
Thirty-four FTOs were designated following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and only 
one of these groups have been removed from the list by the secretary of state.152 The 
additions to the list post-9/11 represent a shift in focus of the American terrorism effort 
from the pre-9/11 designation focus. The geographic locations of the groups designated 
remain diverse, but the post-9/11 groups are bound by characteristics other than 
geography.  
Unlike the pre-9/11 list, where a significant number of the designated groups were 
founded on communist principles, only two groups added to the FTO list following 9/11 
are identified by the State Department as being based on communist principles, the 
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) and the 
Revolutionary Struggle (RS). Prior to 9/11, groups whose philosophy was based on 
Marxist doctrine represented 47% of the total groups designated. Following 9/11, such 
groups represented only 6% of the new groups designated.  
Similarly, two groups were added that are focused on the destruction of the State 
of Israel: Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) and Army of Islam (AOI). While the total 
number of anti-Israeli FTOs was raised to 10, this number is deceptively low since a 
number of the designated FTOs are opposed to Israel, including the al Qaeda affiliated 
organizations. This number simply reflects the groups whose sole purpose is the 
destruction of Israel.  
One group, the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), was designated that 
challenges an allied nation. Jundallah, a group based in Iran, was also designated.153 
Little information was provided about this designation and some speculate that it was 
152 The 34 include the FTOs designated as of January 15, 2014, the date this research concluded. Any 
organizations designated following that date are not included in this analysis.  
153 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary of State’s Terrorist Designation of Jundallah,” November 3, 
2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/11/150332.htm.  
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designated to generate renewed diplomatic relations with Iran, a state sponsor of 
terrorism.154  
The remaining 28 FTOs added to the list following 9/11, representing 82% of the 
groups designated post-9/11, are organizations affiliated with al Qaeda or are identified 
as a radical Islamic group. Prior to 9/11, only 18% of the total groups designated had 
such an affiliation, and on 9/11, 20% of the groups still designated on that day had an 
affiliation to al Qaeda. The increase following 9/11 to 82% demonstrates a significant, 
but not unexpected, shift in focus on the FTO list. Table 4 reflects the list of al Qaeda-





Pakistani Islamic extremist group, openly declared war against the 
United States. 
 
Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) 
Formed in 1980s, militant wing of an Islamic extremist organization 
opposed the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, responsible for 2008 
Mumbai attacks.  
Asbat al-Ansar (AAA)  Lebanon-based, Sunni extremist group, associated with Bin Laden.  
al-Qaida in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM)  
Formed in 1998, members left GIA leadership and tactics, seeks to 
overthrow Algerian government and install an Islamic regime. 
Merged with AQ. 
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)  
Southeast Asian terrorist network linked to AQ. Responsible for the 
Marriott Hotel bombing; Bali bombings, and attack on Australian 
Embassy in Jakarta. 
Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)  Militant offshoot of a Sunni sectarian group, focusing on anti-Shia attacks. Has worked closely with the Taliban and TTP.  
Ansar al-Islam (AAI)  Goals include expelling western interests from Iraq and establishing an Iraqi state based on Sharia law, conducted attacks coalition forces. 
Libyan Islamic Fighting 
Group (LIFG)  
Emerged in 1990s among Libyans who fought Soviets in Afghanistan 
and opposed Qadhafi. Aligned with Bin Laden and part of AQ 
leadership. 
al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI)  
Formed by al-Zarqawi in the 1990s to oppose U.S. and Western 
military forces in the Islamic world, and support for and the existence 
of Israel. Joined AQ and pledged allegiance to Bin Laden. Targeted 
154 Ali Gharib, “U.S. Labels Iranian Rebel Group ‘Terrorist’ Ahead of Talks, Lobe Log Foreign 
Policy,” November 4, 2010, http://www.lobelog.com/u-s-labels-iranian-rebel-group-terrorists-ahead-of-
talks/. 
155 The list includes all FTOs designated following 9/11, even if they were subsequently delisted.  
156 The information provided in the “description” is extrapolated from the State Department Country 
Reports from 2002–2012. 
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Organization155 Description156 
U.S. and coalition forces.  
Islamic Jihad Union 
(IJU)  
Sunni extremist organization based in Pakistan that splintered from 
the IMU in the early 2000s. IJU remains committed to overthrowing 
the government of Uzbekistan, but also has a global agenda to include 




Formed in 1992 to establish Islamic rule in Bangladesh. Connected to 
LeT. Leaders signed the 1998 Bin Laden fatwa that declared 
American civilians legitimate targets. 
al-Shabaab (AS) 
Militant wing of the former Somali Islamic Courts Council, pledged 
obedience to al-Zawahiri and AQ. Also developed ties to AQAP and 
AQIM. 
Kata’ib Hizballah (KH)  
Radical Shia Islamist group formed in 2006 with an anti-Western 
outlook and extremist ideology that has conducted attacks against 
Iraqi, U.S., and Coalition targets in Iraq. Links to Hizballah and 
receives support from Iran. 
al-Qa’ida in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP)  
Result of a merger of al-Qa’ida in Yemen (AQY) and Saudi al-
Qa’ida. Self-stated goals include establishing a caliphate in the 
Arabian Peninsula and the wider Middle East, as well as 
implementing Sharia law.  
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami 
(HUJI)  
Founded in 1980 in Afghanistan to fight against the former Soviet 
Union. Seeks the annexation of Indian Kashmir and expulsion of 
coalition forces from Afghanistan. Has supplied fighters for the 
Taliban, and aligned with AQ.  
Tehrik-e Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP)  
Goals include waging a terrorist campaign against the Pakistani 
military and government, and NATO forces in Afghanistan. AQ relies 
on TTP for safe haven in the Pashtun areas along the Afghan-
Pakistani border, giving TTP access to AQ’s global terrorist network 
and its operational experience. 
Indian Mujahedeen (IM)  
Maintains close ties to other U.S.-designated terrorist entities 
including LeT, JEM, and HUJI. Objective is an Islamic Caliphate 
across South Asia. 
Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid 
(JAT)  
Formed in 2008, seeks an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia. Maintains 
close ties to JI and other indigenous terrorist groups in Southeast 
Asia. 
Abdallah Azzam 
Brigades (AAB)  
Claimed responsibility for a February 2009 rocket attack against 
Israel. Named after Ziad al Jarrah, a Lebanese citizen who was one of 
the masterminds of the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Leader 
linked to AQ. 
Haqqani Network 
(HQN)  
Formed in the late 1970s, around the time of the former Soviet 
Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, established relationship with Bin 
Laden in the mid-1980s, and joined the Taliban in 1995.  
Ansar al-Dine (AAD)  Operates in Mali, closely cooperates with AQIM. 
Boko Haram  
Nigeria-based militant group with links to AQIM, responsible for 
thousands of deaths, conducted attacks against a United Nations 
building, that killed 21 people and injured dozens more, many of 
them aid workers. 
Ansaru  A Boko Haram splinter group. Focuses on Nigerian military and 
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Western targets. Raided a police station killing Nigerian police 
officers, attacked security services, kidnappings of foreigners living 
or working in Nigeria. 
al-Mulathamun Battalion  
Part of AQIM, claimed responsibility for the 2013 attack against a gas 
facility in Algeria. The four-day siege resulted in the death of at least 
38 civilians, including three U.S. citizens. Seven other Americans 
escaped.  
Ansar al-Shari’a in 
Benghazi157  
Created after the fall of the Qadhafi regime, group involved in 
terrorist attacks, assassinations and attempted assassinations of 
Libyan officials, and the attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and 
Annex in Benghazi, Libya.  
Ansar al-Shari’a in 
Darnah158  
Created after the fall of the Qadhafi regime, group involved in 
terrorist attacks, assassinations and attempted assassinations of 
Libyan officials, and the attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and 
Annex in Benghazi, Libya.  
Ansar al-Shari’a in 
Tunisia  
Involved in the September 14, 2012 attack against the U.S. embassy 
and American school in Tunis, which put the lives of over 100 U.S. 




Seeks to establish an Islamic state in Morocco, supports AQ. 
Emerged in the 1990s and is composed of Moroccan recruits who 
trained in armed camps in Afghanistan, including some who fought in 
the Soviet Afghan war.  
Table 4.   Post-9/11 FTOs Related to al Qaeda 
Unlike the pre-9/11 list, where few groups had a significant relationship to Iraq or 
Afghanistan, 11 out of the 34 groups added to the FTO list following 9/11 designated, or 
approximately 32% of the additions to the list, were directly engaged in the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. As reflected in Table 5, many of these groups targeted coalition forces, 






157 In including this group as an al Qaeda-related FTO, it is recognized that this issue is in dispute. For 
the reasons stated in Chapter IX, the group is included in the chart.  
158 Ibid.  
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Organization159 Description160 
al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) Established in Iraq soon after commencement of war to bring 
together jihadists and insurgents fighting against U.S. and 
coalition forces. 
Ansar al-Islam One of the leading groups engaged in anti-coalition attacks in 
Iraq; goals include expelling the U.S.-led coalition from Iraq. 
Asbat al-Ansar (AAA) Fighting coalition forces in Iraq since at least 2005 and several 
members of the group have been killed in anti-coalition 
operations. 
Haqqani Network Planned and executed a number of significant attacks against U.S. 
and coalition forces in Afghanistan.  
Harakat-Ul Jihad Islami 
(HUJI) 
Seeks the annexation of Indian Kashmir and expulsion of 
coalition forces from Afghanistan. 
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) Primarily operated against coalition forces in Afghanistan, and 
claimed responsibility for attacks targeting coalition forces.  
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) Group’s aim is to annex Indian Kashmir and expel coalition 
forces in Afghanistan, and has openly declared war against the 
United States. 
Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) Attacks U.S. and coalition forces, designed to undermine the 
establishment of a democratic, viable Iraqi state. 
Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT/LET) Conducted a number of operations against coalition forces in 
Afghanistan. 
Moroccan Islamic 
Combatant Group (GICM) 
Implicated in the recruitment network of individuals for Iraq, and 
executed suicide attacks against coalition forces in Iraq. 
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP) 
Goals include usurping the government of Pakistan through a 
terror campaign against its leader, its military, and against NATO 
forces in Afghanistan. 
Table 5.   Post-9/11 FTOs Attacking Coalition Forces 
Significantly, of the 34 groups added to the FTO list following 9/11, 29 of the 
groups (or approximately 85% of the designated groups) committed an act against an 
U.S. interest (such as a U.S. embassy or business interest), held a U.S. citizen hostage, or 
had killed an U.S. citizen. This percentage is up from 53% prior to 9/11. While the 
increase in this percentage is likely due to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 
increased numbers of terrorist organizations that developed in those countries who 
attacked U.S. military personnel, it also reflects a change in the focus of the FTO list and 
the priorities set for the designation process. 
159 The list includes all FTOs designated following 9/11, even if they were subsequently delisted. 
160 The information provided in the “description” is extrapolated from the State Department Country 
Reports from 2002–2012. 
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Following 9/11, 34 groups were designated as FTOs and six were delisted. The 
designations following 9/11 consisted of the following.  
• Twenty-eight groups associated with al Qaeda and/or radical Islam 
(representing 82% of the post-9/11 FTOs). 
• Two groups founded on communist principles (representing 6% of the 
post-9/11 FTOs). 
• Two groups focused on undermining Israel (representing 6% of the post-
9/11 FTOs). 
• One group challenging an allied nation (representing 3% of the post-9/11 
FTOs). 
• One group apparently designated for diplomatic reasons (representing 3% 
of the post 9/11 FTOs). 
Thus, following 9/11, the overwhelmingly dominant counterterrorism focus of the 
United States is the threat of al Qaeda and radical Islam. While other areas hold some 
concern for the country, those areas are minor in comparison to the dominant concern 
presented by al Qaeda.  
D. THE FTOS DESIGNATED IN 2013 AND 2014 
Four terrorist groups were added to the FTO list in 2013, and three additional 
groups were added in January 2014. Due to their recent designation, these groups have 
not yet been included in a State Department country reports, and therefore, the more 
formal descriptions of these organizations are not yet available.161 Nevertheless, an 
overview of these groups and the basis for their recent designations is helpful to 
understanding the factors used in designating organizations to the FTO list.  
1. 2013 FTOs 
Four terrorist groups were added to the FTO list in 2013: Ansar al- Dine (AAD), 
Boko Haram, Ansaru, and al-Mulathamun Battalion. In March 2013, the secretary of state 
designated AAD as an FTO. AAD operates in Mali and, according to the State 
Department’s designation announcement, “cooperates closely with al-Qa’ida in the 
161 The 2013 Country Reports is expected to be published in mid-2014. 
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Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).”162 The designation announcement stated that AAD received 
support from AQIM in its battles against Malian and French forces, and that in the 
process, 82 Malian soldiers were executed and 30 additional were kidnapped.163 The 
State Department announcement does not articulate the specific U.S. interest at risk by 
this Malian group, other than its affiliation with al Qaeda.  
Similarly, on December 18, 2013, the secretary of state designated al-
Mulathamun Battalion, which was originally part of AQIM but became a separate group 
when its leader, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, split from AQIM in late 2012. In the designation 
announcement, the secretary of state specifically cited the January 2013 attack against a 
gas facility in Algeria during which time 38 civilians, including three U.S. citizens, were 
killed.164 The designation announcement also noted that the group had recently merged 
with the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), collectively named 
themselves “al-Murabitoun,” and committed twin suicide bombings in Niger. The 
Secretary added, “The newly formed al-Murabitoun extremist group constitutes the 
greatest near-term threat to U.S. and Western interests in the Sahel.”165 
In July 2013, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York announced 
the filing of criminal charges against Mokhtar Belmokhtar for, among other things, his 
alleged participation in the January 2013 terrorist attack in Algeria that killed three 
Americans. Specifically, Belmokhtar was charged in an eight-count criminal complaint 
for providing material support to al Qaeda and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 
hostage-taking conspiracy, kidnapping of internationally protected persons, and 
conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction. While the charges were filed five months 
prior to the FTO designation, the State Department did not mention the existence of 
criminal charges in its al-Mulathamun Battalion designation announcement.  
162 U.S. State Department, “Terrorist Designations of Ansar al-Dine,” March 21, 2013, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/03/206493.htm. 
163 Ibid.  




                                                 
In November 2013, the secretary of state designated Boko Haram and its splinter 
group, Ansaru, as FTOs. Both of these groups operate primarily in Nigeria, and have 
links to AQIM. According to the State Department’s designation announcement, these 
groups are responsible for “thousands of deaths in northeast and central Nigeria over the 
last several years including targeted killings of civilians”166 and for killing and 
kidnapping international construction workers.167 
The Boko Haram designation is interesting because the United States publicly 
debated the merits of an FTO designation for over a year. In 2012, Boko Haram was 
considered for an FTO designation, but the State Department declined to designate the 
group despite public efforts undertaken by members of Congress,168 the Department of 
Justice,169 and independent organizations.170 Instead, three of its leaders were designated 
SDGTs:171 Abubakar Shekau, Abubakar Adam Kambar, and Khalid Al-Barnawi. Shekau 
is considered the “most visible” leader, while the other two have ties to Boko Haram and 
Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (an FTO).172 According to the Heritage Foundation, the 
State Department provided little insight as to why Boko Haram was not designated an 
FTO in 2012, but some Nigeria “watchers” argued that Boko Haram was unique from 
other international terrorist groups and that a designation would discourage political 
solutions to address the political and economic grievances that underlie Boko Haram’s 
campaign against the Nigerian state.173 
166 U.S. State Department, “Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram and Ansaru,” November 13, 2013, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/11/217509.htm. 
167 Ibid. 
168 H.R. 5822/S.3249 (The Boko Haram Terrorist Designation Act, requiring the State Department to 
determine whether the organization meets the legal criteria for an FTO designation). 
169 Shiffman, “US to Slap ‘Terrorist’ Label on Nigerian Militants.” 
170 The Heritage Foundation, Boko Haram: Obama Fails to Designate Nigerian Sect A Terrorist 
Organization; Roach, “The U.S. State Department Should Designate Boko Haram a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization.” 
171 The Heritage Foundation, Boko Haram: Obama Fails to Designate Nigerian Sect A Terrorist 
Organization. 
172 U.S. State Department, “Designation of Haqqani Network Commander,” May 11, 2011, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163021.htm. 
173 The Heritage Foundation, Boko Haram: Obama Fails to Designate Nigerian Sect a Terrorist 
Organization; A. Carl LeVan et al., “Letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,” May 21, 2012, 
http://carllevan.com/wo-content/uploads/2012/05/Boko-Haram-FTO-letter-to-Clinton-5-21-2012.pdf. 
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Media reports offered support for that conclusion, and referenced numerous 
experts on Nigerian politics warning that branding Boko Haram an FTO would empower 
the group on an international level and enhance its profile with Al-Qaida.174 Defense 
minister Bello Halliru Mohammed said the effort to designate Boko Haram as an FTO 
would also affect dialogue between the group and the Nigerian government.175  
We are looking at a dialogue to establish the grievances of the Boko 
Haram. The attempt to declare them an international terrorist organization 
will not be helpful. Boko Haram is not operating in America and America 
is not operating in Nigeria. They are not involved in our internal security 
operations, so I don’t think it would be much significance really in that 
respect. But, we don’t support it.176  
The United States was not alone in declining to designate Boko Haram as a 
terrorist group. At the end of 2012, Boko Haram was not on the terrorist list of the United 
Kingdom, Canada, the EU, or Australia.  
Boko Haram’s ability to escape a 2012 designation was not the end of the story. 
First, its terrorist activities continued and began to generate national and international 
prominence.  
• In 18-month period from January 2011 to June 2012, it is estimated that 
Boko Haram militants killed more than 1,000 people, including an August 
2011 attack on the United Nations Building in Abuja that killed at least 23 
people, a December 25, 2011 attack on a church that killed at least 35 
people, and a January 2012 attack that killed more than 180 people.177 
• On June 21, 2012, the group claimed responsibility for killing at least 21 
people in two separate attacks on churches.178 
 
 
174 Gianluca Mezzofiore, “Is America Ready to Label Boko Haram a Terrorist Organization?, 




177 U.S. Department of State, “Terrorist Designations of Boko Haram Commander,” June 21, 2012, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/06/193574.htm. 
178 Mezzofiore, “Is America Ready to Label Boko Haram a Terrorist Organization?” 
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• The U.S. House of Representatives connected Boko Haram to the 
September 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya.179  
On March 12, 2013, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued its 
Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community to the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence. In this document, James Clapper, Director of National 
Intelligence, made mention of Boko Haram several times in the 2013 Worldwide Threat 
Assessment. For example: 
• In describing “The Global Jihadist threat Overseas: Affiliates, Allies and 
Sympathizers,” Clapper listed AQ, AS, Lashkar-e-Tayibba, and Boko 
Haram. Boko Haram was the only non-FTO group specifically named.180  
• Under the category of “Mass Atrocities” Boko Haram was specifically 
named for conducting attacks on churches in Nigeria, and it was noted that 
the group exploits conditions in the country to attack civilians.181  
• Later in the document, when addressing issues in Nigeria, Clapper stated 
that Boko Haram is a “northern Sunni extremist group with ties to AQIM 
—whose attacks on Christians and fellow Muslims in Nigeria have 
heightened religious and ethnic tensions and raised concerns of possible 
attacks against U.S. interests in the country.”182 
At the same time, broader outreach efforts began on the merits of an FTO 
designation. For example, former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria (2004–07), John 
Campbell, began public discussions on Boko Haram, and why the United States should 
care about it. In short, he stated the United States should care about this group because: 
(1) Nigeria has 175 million people, which makes it the most populous African country, 
(2) the group seeks to overthrow the government of Nigeria, (3) the current Nigerian 
government cooperates greatly with the United States, and (4) Boko Haram is a very 
179 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, “Boko Haram, Growing Threat 
to the U.S. Homeland,” September 13, 2013, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/ 
files/documents/09-13-13-Boko-Haram-Report.pdf; Emma Anya and Dayo Oketola, “B. Haram Linked to 
Group Behind Keya Mall Attack, Punch,” September 27, 2013, http://www.punchng.com/news/bharam-
linked-to-group-behind-kenya-mall-attack/. 
180 James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, March 12, 2013, 5–6. 
181 Ibid., 13. 
182 Ibid., 21. 
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diffuse group, which is hard to identify and could develop strong international Jihadist 
links—making it a larger threat than many perceived.183  
In July 2013, U.K.’s Home Secretary said, “Increasingly, the threat to Britain 
comes not just from al-Qaeda’s core leadership itself, but from these so-called al-Qaeda’s 
affiliates in places like Yemen and North Africa . . . and from associated groups like al-
Shabab in Somalia and Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.”184 Shortly thereafter, the UK 
Home Secretary began its designation process by formally requesting that Boko Haram 
be banned under UK’s terrorism laws.185 
Later in the year, on September 13, 2013, the House of Representatives issued a 
report titled “Boko Haram: Growing Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” which pointed to a 
growing relationship between Boko Haram and AQIM. Among the recommendations 
provided in this report was that the secretary of state designated Boko Haram as an FTO. 
The report denounced the slow FTO designation process and the failure to designate 
Boko Haram as an FTO, and found: 
The U.S. Intelligence Community risks repeating the mistakes made with 
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) in failing to recognize the threat these groups posed until after 
each attempted to attack the U.S. Homeland. Boko Haram and its splinter 
group Ansaru have proven themselves as increasingly sophisticated and 
equally ruthless killers. Boko Haram, Ansaru, and al Qaeda are unified by 
an ideology that justifies horrific violence and views the United States as 
an enemy and a target.186  
While a concerted effort was undertaken to address those concerned with a Boko 
Haram designation, none of this background was provided in the State Department 
designation announcement. Nevertheless, the Boko Haram FTO designation was unique 
183 Mezzofiore, “Is America Ready to Label Boko Haram a Terrorist Organization?” 
184 BBC News, “Minbar Ansar Deen and Boko Haram Face UK Membership Ban,” July 8, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23228908.  
185 Ibid. 
186 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, “Boko Haram, Growing Threat 
to the U.S. Homeland, United States House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security,” 
September 13, 2013, 6, http://homeland.house.gov/boko-haram-growing-threat-us-homeland; U.S. House 
of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, “Boko Haram, Growing Threat to the U.S. 
Homeland,” pdf report.  
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due to the considerable public nature of the debate, and could foreshadow an increased 
effort by the State Department and members of the intelligence community to garner 
public support for its more controversial FTO designations.  
2. 2014 FTOs 
On January 10, 2014, three additional FTOs were designated, namely, Ansar al-
Shari’a in Benghazi, Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah, and Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia. In 
explaining these new FTO designations, the State Department press release provided: 
Created separately after the fall of the Qadhafi regime, Ansar al-Shari’a in 
Benghazi and Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah have been involved in terrorist 
attacks against civilian targets, frequent assassinations, and attempted 
assassinations of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya, 
and the September 11, 2012 attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and 
Annex in Benghazi, Libya. Members of both organizations continue to 
pose a threat to U.S. interests in Libya . . .  
. . . Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia was involved in the September 14, 2012 
attack against the U.S. Embassy and American school in Tunis, which put 
the lives of over one hundred United States employees in the Embassy at 
risk. The Tunisian government has declared Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia a 
terrorist organization, and the group has been implicated in attacks against 
Tunisian security forces, assassinations of Tunisian political figures, and 
attempted suicide bombings of locations that tourists frequent. Ansar al-
Shari’a in Tunisia, which is ideologically aligned with al-Qa’ida and tied 
to its affiliates, including AQIM, represents the greatest threat to U.S. 
interests in Tunisia.187 
Thus, the latest U.S. designations of FTOs in 2013 and 2014 follow what seems to be the 
pattern that has developed following 9/11. The designations reflect the U.S. priority of 
designating groups that have attacked U.S. interests, including embassies, those that have 
killed U.S. citizens, and those affiliated with al Qaeda.  
187 U.S. Department of State, “Terrorist Designations of Three Ansar al Shari’a Organizations and 
Leaders,” January 10, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/01/219519.htm. 
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E. THE INACTIVE FTOS 
1. Delisted Groups 
Nine groups have been removed or “delisted” from the FTO list since its 
inception in 1997: Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM), Tupac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Japanese Red Army 
(JRA), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Khmer Rouge, Manuel 
Rodriquez Patriotic Front (FPMR), Mujahadin-e Khalq (MEK), and Revolutionary 
Nuclei (RN). The groups are based in a diverse group of countries: Morocco, Peru, 
Algeria, Japan, Palestine, Cambodia, Chile, Iran, and Greece. Of the nine groups, eight of 
the groups were among the original FTOs designated in 1997. One only group, GICM, 
was designated after the inaugural 1997 group. It is also the only group designated after 
9/11 to be removed from the list.  
Seven of the nine groups removed from the list were founded on communist 
principles. The two remaining groups delisted (GICM and GIA) were founded on Islamic 
extremist principles. Many of the delisted groups, according to the country reports, were 
dormant for many years. Many were dormant even at the time originally designated in 
1997. 
Three of the nine delisted groups, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP), the Part of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge), and Manuel 
Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FRMR), were delisted in 1999. This delisting occurred at the 
first opportunity to remove groups from the list, and only two years after being branded a 
terrorist organization by the United States. Each of the three groups appears to have been 
originally designated due to its historical terrorist actions, as opposed to its then-current 
engagement in terrorist activities. For example, according to the country reports, at the 
time of the designation in 1997: 
• The DFLP was only engaged in border raids, and the most recent terrorist 
act committed was listed as being from the 1970s 
• The Khmer Rouge, while previously a ruthless organization, had “virtually 
disintegrated” 
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• The FPMR effectiveness as a terrorist organization had been successfully 
undercut by successful government counterterrorism strategies 
While all three groups were removed from the list in 1999, it is unclear why these 
dormant groups were originally designated since it appears that they had in fact been 
dormant for many years prior to the designation. The State Department reports on these 
groups do not add any clarity on the reasons for the 1997 designations.  
In 2001, two additional groups were removed from the list, Peru’s Tupac Amaru 
Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) and Japan’s Japanese Red Army (JRA). According to 
the State Department’s report, the MRTA had suffered from defections and had its 
effectiveness as a terrorist group thwarted by successful government strategies. In the 
years leading up to the delisting, the State Department noted that the MRTA had not 
committed a terrorist act since 1997, and that most of its leaders had been killed or 
imprisoned. With respect to JRA, the State Department reports do not explain the specific 
reasons behind the delisting of the JRA. Nevertheless, in the years preceding the 
delisting, the State Department frequently referred to the number of years since a last 
JRA attack and the fact that many of the group’s leaders had been killed or imprisoned.  
Following the delisting of the five groups listed above, nearly eight years passed 
before another FTO was removed from the list. While the research has not uncovered an 
official explanation for eight-year lapse between delisting of FTOs, presumably it was 
caused by the 9/11 attacks and a distaste for removing groups that might pose a real or 
perceived threat.  
In 2009, delisting activities began again when Revolutionary Nuclei (RN) was 
removed from the list. In the last country reports issued before the group was delisted, the 
State Department noted that the group was dormant, in that it had not committed a 
terrorist act in nine years (since 2000). Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group (GIA) was 
removed from the list in 2010. Like many of the groups delisted before it, many of GIA’s 
supporters had been killed or captured. Others had joined different terrorist organizations, 
such as AQIM. In addition, the State Department noted that the Algerian government had 
begun a reconciliation program in 1995. At the time of its delisting in 2010, the last 
 66 
reported GIA terrorist act identified by the State Department occurred in 2001, nearly 
nine years before delisting.  
The State Department’s descriptions of GIA in the years prior to its delisting are 
insightful in that for many years, the State Department essentially stated that the group 
was dormant. For example, beginning in 2004, the State Department noted in its annual 
reports that the Algerian government had determined that GIA’s leaders had joined other 
groups, or had been killed or captured. In 2007, three years before it was delisted, the 
State Department report indicated that Algeria claimed that the GIA network was “almost 
entirely broken up.” Despite that declaration from Algeria, the very country dealing 
directly with the group’s terrorist acts, GIA remained on the FTO list until it was delisted 
in 2010.  
The above delisted seven groups generally consist of groups that appear to have 
been designated primarily based on historical reasons. Most were not active during the 
time in which they were branded terrorist by the United States. However, the above 
delisted seven groups provide insight into the significant factors that are evaluated for 
delisting: inactivity over a period of years, groups whose doctrine was based on 
communism, groups who were placed on the FTO list based on their historical acts of 
terrorism rather than current acts, the death or imprisonment of the group’s leaders, 
agreement by the country afflicted, or successful programs created by the county afflicted 
aimed at reconciling with the group.  
The two additional delisted groups, the MEK and GICM, were active during a 
period of their designation, but over the course of time, became less active. Both of these 
groups present additional insight into the delisting process.  
The MEK, an Iran-based terrorist organization, could be the subject of a 
completely separate research effort, due to the years of litigation and lobbying efforts the 
group engaged in to be removed from the FTO list. For purposes of this analysis, 
however, a brief overview of the delisting the issues involving the MEK issues is 
relevant. The MEK was one of the original organizations designated to the FTO list.188 
188 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, 248. 
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Throughout the nearly 15 years it was a designated FTO, the MEK challenged its 
designation in U.S. courts.189 The MEK never won any of its legal actions.190 
Nevertheless, throughout its FTO designation period, the MEK developed support for its 
delisting efforts.191 Furthermore, the MEK became very successful in its lobbying efforts 
to be delisted,192 and was successful in gaining sympathy for the group rather than 
condemnation for its terrorist history.193 Ultimately, the State Department was under a 
court order to determine whether the MEK should remain on the FTO list.194 The 
secretary of state responded by delisting the group.195  
In 2013, GICM was delisted, representing the first group delisted that was 
designated to the FTO list after 9/11. The delisting is unusual because according to the 
State Department, the group had alliances with al Qaeda and had been engaged in what 
could be considered “modern” terrorist acts, including involvement in the 2004 Madrid 
bombing, recruitment of individuals who would go to Iraq, and a suicide bombing against 
coalition forces in Iraq. Specifically, the State Department reports stated:  
189 See e.g., U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “1999 Report,” 
October 8, 1999, http://public.gettysburg.edu/~dborock/courses/Spring/int-sec/terror/10-8-99%20Foreign 
%20Terrorist%20Organizations.htm; PMOI v. U.S. Department of State, 613 F.3d 220, 230–31 (D.C. Cir. 
2010); People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. United States Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 20 (D.C. Cir. 
1999); National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Department of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 
National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Department of States, 373 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir. 2004).  
190 See e.g., People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. United States Department of States, 182 F.3d 
17 (D.C. Cir. 1999); National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Department of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 
2001); National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Department of States, 373 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir. 2004); 
PMOI v. U.S. Department of State, 613 F.3d 220, 230–31 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
191 Interview with Daniel Fried, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Camp Ashraf, U.S. Department of 
State, “Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Daniel Benjamin and Special Advisor to the 
Secretary on Camp Ashraf Ambassador Daniel Fried on the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) Designation and 
the Current Situation at Camp Ashraf,” Special Briefing, July 6, 2012, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ 
ps/2012/07/194656.htm; McGreal, “Iranian Exiles, DC Lobbyists and the Campaign to Delist the MEK”; 





194 PMOI v. U.S. Department of State, 613 F.3d 220, 230–31 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
195 U.S. Department of State, “Delisting of the Mujahedin-e Khalq,” September 28, 2012, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/198443.htm. 
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GICM members were believed to be among those responsible for the 2004 
Madrid train bombings, which killed 191 people. GICM members were 
also implicated in the recruitment network for Iraq, and at least one GICM 
member carried out a suicide attack against Coalition Forces in Iraq. 
According to open source reports, GICM individuals are believed to have 
participated in the 2003 Casablanca attacks. 
For several years preceding the 2013 delisting, the State Department indicated in 
the reports that “the group has largely been inactive since these attacks, and has not 
claimed responsibility for or had attacks attributed to them since the Madrid train 
bombings in 2004.” The State Department also stated that, “Much of GICM’s leadership 
in Morocco and Europe has been killed, imprisoned, or is awaiting trial.” 
Thus, a significant factor considered in the delisting process is whether the group 
no longer commits terrorist acts. It appears that the number of years that have passed 
since the FTO’s last terrorist act is a factor that influences whether an FTO will be 
removed from the list. For example, DFLP was removed 11 years after its last terrorist 
act, JRA was removed 13 years after its last terrorist act, GICM was removed nine years 
after its last terrorist act, the MEK was removed 11 years after its last terrorist act, and 
MRTA was removed five years after its last act.  
2. Dormant Groups on the Current FTO List 
A number of groups, however, remain on the FTO list despite the fact that they 
have not committed a terrorist act for many years. For example, according to the State 
Department country reports, the last terrorist act committed by Aum Shinrikyo was in 
1995, Gama’a al-Islamiyya was in 1997, Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh was in 
2005, Kahane Chai in 2005, LTTE in 2009, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group in the 1990s, 
Abu Nidal Organization’s in the late 1980s, and United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia 
was 2002. In many cases, it is unclear why the group remains on the list.  
In fact, some independent groups, such as the RAND Corporation, have 
concluded that a number of groups on the current FTO list no longer exist. In its study 
called How Terrorist Groups End, RAND coded hundreds of terrorist organizations to 
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determine when the organization began to use terrorism and, where applicable, when the 
group stopped. As defined by the study:  
The end year of a terrorist group was assigned based on the earliest 
evidence that the group no longer used terrorism to achieve its goals. This 
may be because security forces captured or killed most of its members, the 
group reached a peace agreement with the government, its members 
shifted to non-violent means to achieve their goals, or its members 
splintered to join other groups or start news ones. Regardless of the 
reason, the group did not commit further terrorist attacks under its 
name.196  
Following the standards developed under this study, RAND concluded that the Abu Nidal 
Organization, Aum Shinrikyo, the Palestine Liberation Front, the Revolutionary 
Organization 17 November, and United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia have all 
ended.197 Each of these groups, however, remains on the U.S. FTO list.  
The State Department itself recognizes the dormant nature of some of the FTOs. 
Of the 50 FTOs on the list described in the 2012 country reports,198 28 committed 
terrorist acts in 2012, the year of the reporting period. The remainder had not committed 
a terrorist act that year. Thirteen of the FTOs described in the 2012 country reports had 
not committed a terrorist act in many years, nine of the groups last committed a terrorist 
act in or before 2005, and four of the groups had committed their last terrorist act in or 
before 2000. In fact, in many instances, the State Department specifically reported that a 
group was inactive. For example, the following statements were included in the State 
Department 2012 annual report.  
• Abu Nidal Organization: “There were no known ANO attacks in 2012.”199  
• Basque Fatherland and Liberty (“ETA”): “In 2012, a number of ETA 
fugitives were arrested.”200  
196 Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End, Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida, 5. 
197 Ibid., 143, 150, 172, 177, 184. 
198 As noted previously, as of January 2014, seven additional FTOs have been designated since the 
publication of the 2012 country reports.  
199 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, released May 2013, 246. 
200 Ibid., 252. 
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• Gama’a Al-Islamiyya: “In 1999, part of the group publicly renounced 
violence.”201  
• Harakat Ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh: “HUJI-B committed no known 
attacks in 2012.”202 
• United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC): “The AUC did not carry 
out any terrorist attacks in 2012.”203  
These statements lead to the impression, whether true or not, that the FTO 
designations for these groups are outdated. This impression may be exacerbated by the 
fact that the organizations on the U.S. list are not reviewed frequently and remain on the 
list until affirmatively removed by the secretary of state.204 While these FTOs may be 
under consideration for delisting, the annual report, without additional context, lends to a 
perception that these designations are dated. 
In fact, logical reasons may exist as to why groups that appear dormant have not 
been removed from the list and the government may seek to make significant public 
policy statements by the non-removal of these groups. For example, with respect to the 
Palestine Liberation Front, its Abu Abbas fraction was responsible for the 1985 attack on 
the cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder of U.S. citizen Leon Klinghoffer. This event 
was subject to considerable media attention and public outrage, since Mr. Klinghoffer 
was confined to his wheel chair at the time of his murder and was seen as particularly 
defenseless.205  
Furthermore, in reviewing the State Department reports on the nine FTOs that 
have been delisted, none of the delisted groups has a record, as presented by the State 
Department, of killing Americans. As noted previously, harming Americans is a factor in 
the listing process. It therefore makes sense if it is a factor and perhaps even an 
impediment to delisting an organization. However, the State Department’s silence on 
201 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, 254. 
202 Ibid., 258. 
203 Ibid., 291. 
204 U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” 
205 Corky Siemaszko, “Daughters Keep Up Terror Fight for Leon Klinghoffer 25 Years After Attack 
on Achille Lauro,” Daily News, October 8, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/daughters-terror-
fight-leon-klinghoffer-25-years-attack-achille-lauro-article-1.188774. 
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these issues leads to speculation about why certain groups that appear dormant remain on 
the list, and feeds speculation that the listing and delisting process is arbitrary.  
This chapter focused on how the FTO list has gained in prominence as the 
terrorist threat shifted from countries that supported terrorism to the proliferation of 
independent terrorist groups around the world. The U.S. approach to the FTO list has 
similarly evolved over time, and this evolution is most dramatically seen when analyzing 
the U.S. approach before and after 9/11, and the shifting views toward communist-based 
groups, dormant groups, and al Qaeda-supported groups. To understand the importance 
of the FTO list to U.S. counterterrorism strategy more fully, it will be important to 
evaluate a more detailed analysis of the groups on the list and the factors that influenced 
their designation.  
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VII. FACTORS INFLUENCING FTO DESIGNATIONS 
National honor is the national property of the highest value. 
—James Monroe, 
5th U.S. President 
 
The previous chapter analyzed the organizations that have been named to the FTO 
list from a qualitative and quantitative approach, in an effort to identify nonstatutory 
factors that influence the FTO designation process. This chapter continues this analysis, 
but focuses on the FTO information provided in the annual State Department country 
reports, in an effort to identify the factors that influence the FTO designations. The last 
country report issued prior to the publication of this research was in July 2013, which 
included FTOs designated through 2012. Thus, the seven FTOs designated in 2013 and in 
January 2014 are not included in this chapter’s analysis.  
A. ALLIED NATIONS 
The FTO list contains organizations whose missions are aimed at undermining the 
governments of allied nations. There is, however, a limited number of allied nations that 
the United States supports through the naming of terrorist organizations to the FTO list. 
In each instance, there appears to be specific motivations for the designations.  
1. Support for Israel 
As stated earlier, eight of the pre-9/11 designated FTOs,206 or a quarter of all of 
the FTOs listed at the time, focused on terrorist activities involving Israel, and most of 
these groups are focused on the destruction of the State of Israel. Following 9/11, two 
additional FTOs were added that had as its core mission the destruction of Israel. The fact 
only two such groups have been designated after 9/11, however, does not equate to 
wavering U.S. support for Israel. To the contrary, a detailed analysis of the country 
reports finds that the U.S. concern for Israel appears to have increased over time. First, 
many of the designated al Qaeda affiliated groups are opposed to the State of Israel. If the 
206 The groups are ANO, Hamas, Hizballah, Kahne Chai, PFLP, PFLP-GC, PIJ, and PLF.  
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al Qaeda groups were added to the groups whose primary mission is to oppose Israel, it 
would equate to at least 43207 of the 57 (or approximately 75%) current FTOs being 
opposed to Israel. Further, a quantitative analysis of the country reports reflects increased 
discussion of Israel, Palestine, and Gaza over time. In fact, as illustrated in Figure 3, since 
the inception of the FTO list, the references to Israel have more than doubled in the 
section of the country reports that provides the descriptions of each FTO.  
 
Figure 3.  Graph of FTO Descriptions References to Israel, Palestine, Gaza. 
Furthermore, as illustrated in Figure 4, references to Israel in the section of the 
country reports that provides the descriptions of the terrorist acts more than quadrupled 
since the inception of the FTO list in 1997.  
207 This number was determined as follows: the eight pre-9/11 and two post 9/11 anti-Israel groups, 
added to the six pre-9/11 and 28 post-9/11 al Qaeda groups, minus one delisted group.  
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Figure 4.  Graph of FTO Terrorist Activity References to Israel, Palestine, Gaza. 
Based on this analysis, the U.S. support for the State of Israel is unwavering in the 
counterterrorism arena. Any organization that has as its core mission the destruction of 
Israel or support for groups that seek to undermine its security, will likely be designated 
an FTO. 
2. Allied Nations Representing Strategic Challenges 
Turkey, Greece, and the Philippines receive special attention on the FTO list and 
in the country reports. Each country is discussed numerous times each year, and has 
consistently been the subject of concern since 1997. See Figures 5 and 6.  
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Figure 5.  Graph Representing References to Turkey, Greece and the Philippines in the 
Descriptions of FTOs. 
 
Figure 6.  Graph Representing References to Turkey, Greece and the Philippines in the 
Terrorist Activities of FTOs. 
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The FTO list has consistently paid special attention to terrorism within the 
Philippines. “The Philippines is not a very large country but it has played a significant 
role in the spread of terrorism even beyond the boundaries of Asia. The country’s 
location, history and geopolitics offered an ideal breeding ground for terrorism to 
spread.”208 Furthermore, al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah (JI) have been identified as 
training in the Philippines, as well as having connections to a number of actual and 
attempted terrorist acts linked to planning and training in the Philippines.209 
The 9/11 Commission Report articulated the al Qaeda connection to the 
Philippines:  
Bin Laden also provides equipment and training assistance to the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines and also to a newly forming 
Philippine group that called itself the Abu Sayyaf Brigade. . . Al Qaeda 
helped Jemaah Islamiya (JI), a nascent organization headed by Indonesian 
Islamists with cells . . . [in the] Philippines.210 
Furthermore, the particular terrorist groups designated as FTOs have a direct 
connection to U.S. interests. For example, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) emerged in 1995 as 
a threat to the United States. The RAND Corporation summarized the nature of the threat 
this group presents in a report when it stated that ASG was involved in:  
Bojinka, a multipronged plot aimed at assassinating the Pope and 
President Clinton, bombing Washington’s embassies in Manila and 
Bangkok, and sabotaging U.S. commercial airliners flying trans-Pacific 
routes from U.S. West Coast cities. The plan was hatched by Ramzi 
Yousef, the convicted mastermind of the 1993 attack on the World Trade 
Center in New York, and was foiled only when volatile explosive 
compounds ignited a fire in the apartment that he was renting in 
Manila.211  
208 H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., “The Philippines: the Weakest Link in the Fight Against Terrorism?” in 
Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, ed. Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor, and Kent Roach (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 307.  
209 Ibid.  
210 The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 58. 
211 RAND National Defense Research Institute, “The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia, A 
Net Assessment,” 2009, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_ 
MG846.pdf. 
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The strategic importance of the Philippines to U.S. security interests and to the 
concern about the spread of al Qaeda is the basis for its focus in the FTO list. As 
summarized in one RAND report:  
The persistence of insurgent and terrorist networks in the Philippines is 
fundamentally the result of the general inability of the Philippine state to 
extend effective governance to the region, a very weak (and, in some 
instances, non-existent) law enforcement and judicial system . . . These 
interrelated conditions have . . . contributed to chronic gaps on ruling 
authority have been filled by these terrorist groups.212  
Similarly, Greece is a focus of the FTO list not as a statement of support for an 
allied nation, but due to overall concern that the country has not been a forceful opponent 
to the spread of terrorism. As stated by the National Commission on Terrorism:  
Greece has been disturbingly passive in response to terrorist activities. It is 
identified by the U.S. Government as ‘one of the weakest links in 
Europe’s effort against terrorism’.213 Since 1975 there have been 146 
terrorist attacks against Americans or American interests in Greece. Only 
one case has been solved and there is no indication of any meaningful 
investigation into the remaining cases. Among the unresolved cases are 
the attacks by the Revolutionary Organization 17 November which has 
claimed responsibility for the deaths of 20 people, including four 
Americans, since 1975. Greek authorities have never arrested a member of 
17 November, which is a designated FTO. The Turkish leftist group, the 
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP-C), also an FTO, 
has murdered four Americans since 1979 and maintains an office in 
Athens despite United States protests. Last year, senior Greek Government 
officials gave assistance and refuge to the leader of the Kurdish terrorist 
group, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).214 
In the 2012 country reports, the last report issued prior to the publication of this research, 
the State Department stated, “Overall, Greek government cooperation with the United States 
212 RAND National Defense Research Institute, “The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia, A 
Net Assessment,” 63–64, Roque, Jr., “The Philippines: the Weakest Link in the Fight Against Terrorism?,” 
318. 
213 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999, released April 2000. 
214 Federation of American Scientists, “Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, A 
Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, Pursuant to Public Law 277, 105th Congress,” 2000, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html. 
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on counterterrorism and the physical security of American interests in Greece was strong,”215 
but it also noted the following.  
• Seven members of Revolutionary Struggle were released from pretrial 
detention in October 2011. The Greek Counterterrorism Unit was not 
informed by the local police precinct that two of the lead members failed 
to show up for their required check-in (also October 2011) at the precinct 
until July 2012. Police have not been able to locate the two, and Greek 
authorities had not prosecuted the case by year’s end.  
• The trial of 17 suspected members of Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei, which began 
in 2011, was repeatedly postponed due to work stoppages by judges and 
judicial postponements in 2012.  
• The porous nature of Greece’s borders is of concern. While Greek border 
authorities try to stem the flow of illegal migration, its ability to control large-
scale illegal migration via its land and sea borders with Turkey is limited.  
• The recent political upheavals in North Africa and the Middle East have 
intensified illegal migration to and through Greece via the Greece-Turkey 
border and the Greek Aegean islands.216 
Similarly, Turkey, a country of tremendous strategic importance due to its 
geographic location, has had challenges in the area of counter-terrorism. As noted in the 
2012 country reports:  
The limited definition of terrorism under Turkish law, restricted to 
activities targeting the Turkish state and its citizens, represented an 
impediment to effective action by Turkey against global terrorist 
networks. For example, although Turkish police temporarily detained 
several al-Qa’ida (AQ)-affiliated operatives attempting to transit through 
Turkey illegally in 2012, Turkish authorities chose to deport these 
individuals to their countries of origin quickly rather than pursue domestic 
legal action against them, at least in part because of the lack of appropriate 
legal tools.217 
As a result, the designation of FTOs from the Philippines, Greece, and Turkey 
seems to have multiple purposes. First, the designations, which are frequently done at the 
request of the country involved, represents a statement of U.S. support for each country’s 
efforts to counter the efforts of terrorist groups seeking to undermine the government 
215 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, 77. 
216 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, 77. 
217 Ibid., 99.  
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involved. Yet, the designations also are aimed at making a significant, if not subtle, 
statement about U.S. displeasure with the counterterrorism efforts of the host country, 
and are aimed at signaling a U.S. effort to impose order in legal systems that seem 
insufficient to match the terrorism challenges presented by these groups.  
3. Peace Process Detractors 
A number of groups are on the list that threatens a peace process endorsed or 
promoted by the United States on behalf of allied nations. For example, according to the 
country reports, the following groups are listed.  
• PFLP—opposed to the Oslo process218  
• RIRA—seeks to disrupt the Northern Ireland peace process219  
• ANO—advocates the elimination of Israel and has sought to derail 
diplomatic relations efforts in support of the Middle East peace process220  
• AS—regularly kills activists working to bring about peace through 
political dialogue and reconciliation221 
• CIRA—The Independent Monitoring Commission, which was established 
to oversee the peace process, assessed that CIRA was responsible for 
continued terrorist acts in violation of the peace process222  
• DFLP—opposes the Israel-PLO peace agreement223  
• Hizballah—opposes Middle East peace negotiations224  
While the number of these groups is small compared to the total number of 
organizations historically listed as FTOs, the potential disruption to peace process efforts 
is an issue consistently listed by the State Department in the country reports as to certain 
organizations. Furthermore, the peace processes in Northern Ireland and in the Middle 
218 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, released April 2004, 131. 
219 Ibid., 133; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, released April 2009, 
323. 
220 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, 247 (ANO description). 
221 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, 287; see also U.S. Department of 
State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2009–2012 (Al-Shabaab Activities Section). 
222 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, 294. 
223 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999, released April 2000, 76. 
224 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, released April 2001 (Hizballah 
Description Section). 
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East are both processes that the United States has been actively engaged in for lengthy 
periods of time. The success of achieving peace in both of these regions is of critical 
importance to the United States, and is critical to important U.S. allies.  
Conversely, those organizations that use terrorism as a method through which to 
achieve its goals, but that engaged in peace negotiations with the United States to resolve 
the conflict politically, such as the PLO and IRA, managed to avoid an FTO designation. 
Therefore, engagement in or disruption of peace process efforts appears to be a factor that 
weighs into FTO designation decisions.  
B. THE WARS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 
Prior to 9/11, the country reports had minimal references to Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, and had no references to Iraq. The pre-9/11 references to Afghanistan and 
Pakistan related mostly to FTOs that had sent members to fight the Afghan war against 
the Soviets. While references were made to some groups supporting the Fatwa issued by 
Bin Laden in 1998, there were no references to the threats posed by any the groups to the 
security of the United States.  
As Figure 7 shows, following 9/11, the references to Pakistan increased in the 
country reports’ description of terrorist groups, from being mentioned once in 1997 to 
being mentioned 36 times in 2012. References to Afghanistan increased from zero in 
1997, to being referenced 23 times in 2012. References to Iraq similarly changed from 
not being mentioned in 1997, to a peak of 33 times in 2009, to 15 times in 2012.  
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Figure 7.  Graph of FTO Descriptions References to Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Similar swings in the references to these three countries are found when analyzing 
the summaries of specific acts of terrorism for the FTOs in the country reports, as 
reflected in Figure 8. Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq are not mentioned at all in the 1997, 
1998 and 1999 reporting. References to the three countries increase significantly 
following 9/11, with references to Iraq peaking at 41 in 2009, references to Pakistan 
peaking at 33 in 2010, and references to Afghanistan peaking at 11 in 2010 and 2012.  
 
 
Figure 8.  Graph of FTO Terrorist Activity References to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq. 
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The references to these countries and the terrorist activities by groups based in 
these countries ebbed and flowed with the development of the wars occurring in or, in the 
case of Pakistan, near those countries. The peaks and valleys demonstrated by the graphs 
correspond roughly to the level of American engagement in those countries.  
Organizations that attack U.S. troops are extremely likely to be designated as an 
FTO. As described earlier, there was also a proliferation of FTO designations as a result 
of the presence of U.S. troops at war in these countries. These impacts are likely an 
unintended consequence of both wars. Furthermore, this again highlights the fact that the 
FTO list is not a predictor of which groups may be enemies of the United States in the 
future, or of where the next threat is likely to come from in the future. The FTO list 
represents, instead, a historical reflection of what has already occurred. Nevertheless, the 
FTO list demonstrates that when wars take place, new insurgency groups aimed at 
opposing U.S. efforts are likely to develop. When this takes place, those groups are likely 
be added to the FTO list.  
C. INTERRELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER TERRORIST LISTS  
The terrorist lists maintained by the U.S. government include the state sponsors of 
terrorism list;225 the not fully cooperating list;226 the SDT list,227 the SDGT list,228 the 
SDN list,229 the TTEL230 list,231 and the FTO list.232 These lists have a relationship to 
225 50 U.S.C. App. § 2405(6)(j) (list maintained by the Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign 
Assets Control).  
226 22 U.S.C. § 2781. 
227 50 U.S.C. § 1701, et seq. (list maintained by the Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets 
Control).  
228 Presidential Executive Order 13224 (list maintained by the Department of Treasury, Office of 
Foreign Assets Control). 
229 Cronin, The FTO List and Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 
2003. (A master list that contains all of the other lists (list maintained by the Department of Treasury, 
Office of Foreign Assets Control).  
230 Ibid. (like the FTO list, the TEL includes the names of terrorist organizations, but it has a broader 
standard for inclusion, is subject to less stringent administrative requirements, and is not challengeable in 
court).  
231 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (Section 411 of the USA Patriot Act of 2001, providing that the list is to be 
maintained by the Department of State).  
232 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1).  
 83 
                                                 
the FTO designation process in that groups connected to other lists or those with leaders 
who are named to other lists appear likely to be designated an FTO.  
1. Relationship to State Sponsors of Terrorism 
The state sponsors of terrorism list currently includes four countries: Syria, which 
was added to the list in 1979, Cuba, which was added in 1982, Iran, which was added in 
1984, and Sudan, which was added in 1993. In the decade prior to 2004, the same seven 
countries appeared on the state sponsors of terrorism list: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North 
Korea, Sudan and Syria. At the same time, other countries, such as Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, successfully remained off the list. Since 2004, three countries, Iraq, Libya, and 
North Korea, have been removed, and each for different reasons—leaving the four 
countries on the current list: Syria, Cuba, Iran, and Sudan.  
Like the FTO list, the annual State Department Country Reports on Terrorism 
(formerly called Patterns of Global Terrorism) describe the justification for maintaining a 
country on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism.233 The goal of this list is to 
discourage countries from providing critical support to non-state terrorist groups, and to 
make it more difficult for terrorist groups to obtain the funds, weapons, materials, and 
secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations.234 
The FTO section of the country reports does not make a direct connection 
between countries sponsoring terrorism and the FTOs. However, an analysis of the 
country reports highlights a connection. With respect to the descriptions of the FTOs 
provided in the country reports, the state sponsors of terrorism are discussed frequently as 
illustrated in Figure 9.  
233 22 U.S.C. § 2656f. 
234 Larry A. Niksch, North Korea: Terrorism List Removal, CSR Report RL30613 (Washington, DC: 
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, November 6, 2008), 16; U.S. Department of State, 
Country Report on Terrorism 2005, April 2006, 171; U.S. Department of State, Country Report on 
Terrorism 2006, April 2007, 145. 
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Figure 9.  Graph of References to States Sponsors of Terrorism in Descriptions of FTOs. 
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 10, while some countries have been removed 
from the state sponsors list, the seven countries that have been named to the state 




Figure 10.  Graph of FTO References to State Sponsors of Terrorism (All Countries Ever 
So Designated) in Descriptions of FTOs. 
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With respect to the FTO terrorist activities described each year in the country 
reports, the countries currently named as state sponsors of terrorism do not, with the 
exception of Iran, appear frequently in the summaries of FTO terrorist activities, as 




Figure 11.  Graph of References to States Sponsors of Terrorism in Terrorist Activities of 
FTOs. 
Even when analyzing all seven countries named to the state sponsors of terrorism 
list, the references to those state sponsors in the terrorist activities section of the country 




Figure 12.  Graph of FTO References to State Sponsors of Terrorism (All Countries Ever 
So Designated) in Terrorist Activities of FTOs. 
The relatively low number of references to the state sponsors of terrorism in the 
FTO terrorist activity section is not fully reflective of the connection between the FTOs 
and state sponsors. The base of operations for each FTO is provided in a separate section 
of the country reports. In the FTO base of operations section, 13 FTOs are identified as 
having a presence in or based in Syria.235 In many of these cases, the country reports 
state that Syria provides a safe haven for these FTOs, or that Syria provides fundraising, 
weapons, and other training. The most explicit statement of support by Syria to a terrorist 
group is with respect to Hizballah about which the country reports states that the group 
“receives substantial amounts of financial, training, weapons, explosives, political, 
diplomatic and organizational aid.”  
235 The 13 groups are the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO): al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Democratic Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Hamas, Hizballah, the Japanese Red Army (JRA), Kata’ib 
Hizballah (KH), Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), Palestine Islamic 
Jihad (PIJ), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front 
(DHKP/C). 
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Fifteen FTOs236 receive support from or have a presence in Iran.237 For example, 
in the 2011 country reports, the State Departments states: “Iran continues to provide 
Hizballah with training, weapons, and explosives as well as political, diplomatic, 
monetary, and organizational aid.”238 
Five terrorist groups are named in the country reports as having a presence in or 
operating in Sudan.239 The case of Sudan, however, is complex. Beginning in 2006, 
Sudan was recognized for taking renewed steps to deter terrorists from operating within 
its borders, for increasing its international information sharing, and for strengthening its 
legal efforts to fight terrorism. Due to its progress in combating terrorist activity, Sudan 
was removed from the list of states not fully cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism 
efforts.240 This recognition continued in the 2011 country reports on terrorism, in which 
the State Department found that “Sudan was a cooperative counterterrorism partner of the 
United States.” The report also notes, however, that gaps remain in the government’s 
knowledge of and its ability to identify and capture violent extremists going to Iraq and 
Afghanistan. It also noted that Sudan maintains a relationship with Hamas (which Sudan 
does not consider a terrorist group), and that Sudan has maintained a relationship with 
Iran.241 As a result, it is the one country on the state sponsors of terrorism list, but is not 
on a separate list called the “not fully cooperating” list. As a result, an FTO’s relationship 
with Sudan is likely to have less of an impact of the FTO designation process than a 
country that has not taken positive measures to be removed from the list. Thus, an FTO’s 
236 This does not include two groups designated as FTOs opposed to the Iranian government, namely 
the MEK and Jundallah. While these groups are or were present in Iran, they are not receiving support from 
the government of Iran. In addition, the list does not include those FTOs that seek to emulate Iran, such as 
ASG that seeks to promote and Iranian-style Islamic State.  
237 The 15 groups are Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), al-Asqa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB), al Qaeda in 
Iraq (AQI), al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al-Islam (AAI), Armed Islamic Group (GIA), 
Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG), Hamas, Hizballah, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), al Jihad; Kata’ib 
Hizballah (KH), Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), Palestine Islamic Jihad–Shaqaqi Fraction (PIJ), and 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).  
238 U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Terrorism 2011, July 2012, 236. 
239 The five groups are Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG) and al-jihad (which merged into AQ). 
240 Preeti Bhattacharji, State Sponsors: Sudan, Council on Foreign Relations, April 2, 2008. 
241 U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Terrorism 2011, 173.  
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relationship with Sudan may not have the same impact on a designation decision as an 
FTO’s relationship with a country like Syria or Iran.  
The fourth country on the state sponsors of terrorism list is Cuba. According to 
the country reports, Cuba has played a role in supporting the Basque Fatherland and 
Liberty (ETA), National Liberation Army (ELN), and Revolutionary Forces of Colombia 
(FARC). However, the inclusion of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism itself is the 
subject of criticism. This criticism is based on the threat from Cuba ended in the early 
1990s when the Soviet Union dissolved (resulting in the end to the supplies and training 
provided by the Soviets).242 No evidence exists to suggest that Cuba is operationally 
engaged in supporting terrorist activity (in contrast to other state sponsors cited for 
activities that involve planning or conducting operations, allowing terrorists to use their 
national territory as a base of operations, or selling arms to terrorist groups). Further, 
other undesignated countries are promoting terrorism or are failing to restrain terrorist 
operations in their territory to a much larger extent than Cuba.243  
Cuba was added to the state sponsors of terrorism list in 1982, due to its support 
for communist rebels in Africa and Latin America. While Cuba remains on the state 
sponsors of terrorism list, the State Department has also recognized that Cuba’s inclusion 
is a “carryover from the cold war” and that “it is unlikely that Cuba will be removed from 
the terrorism list, absent a regime change.”244 In recent years, the State Department has 
also recognized that Cuba “no longer actively supports armed struggles in Latin America 
and other parts of the world”245 and that, “The United States has no evidence of terrorist-
related money laundering or terrorist financing activities in Cuba.” The 2009 country 
reports states, “There was no evidence of direct financial support for terrorist 
organizations by Cuba in 2009.” The 2010 country reports states, “The Cuban 
242 Phillip Peters, Cuba, the Terrorism List, and What the United States Should Do (Lexington 
Institute, November 20, 2001).  
243 Ibid. 
244 Raphael Perl, The Department of State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism Report: Trends, State 
Sponsors, and Related Issues, Order Code RL32417 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, June 1, 2004), 4.  
245 U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Terrorism 2008, 182.  
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government and official media publicly condemned acts of terrorism by Al Qaida and 
affiliates.”  
The 2011 country reports, however, also notes that current and former members 
of terrorists groups, specifically the members of the ETA and FARC are residing in Cuba. 
Although the report also states that, “There was no indication that the Cuban government 
provided weapons or paramilitary training for either ETA or the FARC.”246 The 2012 
country reports states “that the Cuban government was trying to distance itself from 
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) members living on the island by employing tactics 
such as not providing services including travel documents to some of them.”247 At the 
same time, the 2012 report concluded that, “The Government of Cuba continued to 
provide safe haven to approximately two dozen ETA members.”248 
Critics argue that the reasons for maintaining Cuba’s designation are disingenuous 
because ETA members are being allowed to live in Cuba pursuant to a decades-old 
bilateral agreement with Spain, and that Spain has publicly stated its appreciation for 
Cuba’s willingness to deal with the group.249 Moreover, a 2007 Congressional Research 
Service report states that the Colombian government has publicly stated that Cuba has 
played a useful role in facilitating peace talks with the rebels.250  
While the inclusion of Cuba on the state sponsors of terrorism list is considered, 
even by the State Department, as a remnant of the Cold War, the inclusion of the FTOs 
that apparently have received aid from Cuba can similarly be considered based on Cold 
War era thinking. For example, according to the country reports, the ELN is a Colombian 
Marxist-Leninist group formed in 1964 by intellectuals inspired by Fidel Castro and Che 
Guevara, the ETA was founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing an independent 
homeland based on Marxist principles, and the FARC was established in 1964 as the 
246 U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Terrorism 2011, 171. 
247 U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Terrorism 2012, released July 2013, 195. 
248 Ibid. 




                                                 
military wing of the Colombian Communist Party. While the FARC, ETA and ELN 
remain on the FTO list, their designations are more historical in nature. As with Sudan, 
an FTO’s relationship with Cuba is not likely to have a significant impact on a 
designation process in the post-9/11 era. 
Nevertheless, the relationship of an FTO to a designated state sponsor of terrorism 
appears to be an influencing factor in the designation of an FTO. Support from a country 
like Iran or Syria is likely to have greater influence on the FTO designation process than 
from Cuba or Sudan.  
2. Relationship to Other Terrorism Lists 
In addition to the state sponsors of terrorism list, organizations named to the FTO 
list also tend to have a relationship to other lists maintained by the U.S. government. 
Little of this information, however, is provided by the State Department in the country 
reports.  
For example, in 2013, the secretary of state designated al-Mulathamun Battalion. 
The United Nations designated its leader, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, as an al Qaeda-affiliated 
terrorist, in 2003, and the U.S. Treasury Department listed him as a terrorist financier. In 
addition, the United States posted a $5 million reward for his capture under the rewards 
for justice program.251 As noted earlier, he was also indicted in the Southern District of 
New York for his terrorist-related activities.252 In June 2004, a tribunal in Algeria 
sentenced Belmokhtar in absentia to life in prison for forming terrorist groups, robbery, 
and use of illegal weapons. In March 2007, an Algerian court sentenced Belmokhtar to 
death in absentia.  
251 Lee Ferran, “Alive After All? U.S. Offers $5M for Mokhtar Belmokhtar,” ABC News, June 3, 
2013, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2013/06/alive-after-all-u-s-offers-5m-for-mokhtar-
belmokhtar/; U.S. Department of State, “Rewards for Justice—First Reward Offers for Terrorists in West 
Africa,” June 3, 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/06/210204.htm. 
252 The Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Charges Filed in Manhattan Federal Court Against Mokhtar 




                                                 
Similarly, in 2011, the Haqqani Network was designated by the State Department. 
The Congressional Research Service refers to the Haqqani Network as “as the most 
dangerous Afghan insurgent groups battling U.S.-led forces in eastern Afghanistan.” “It 
is widely recognized as a semi-autonomous component of the Taliban and as the 
deadliest and most globally focused faction of that latter group.”253 As with other FTOs, 
many of the organization’s leaders have been added to the SDGT list. On November 1, 
2011, the U.S. Government added Haji Mali Kahn to a list of specially designated global 
terrorists under Executive Order 13224.254 Five other top Haqqani Network leaders have 
been placed on the list of specially designated global terrorists under Executive Order 
13224 since 2008.255  
While occasionally the country reports indicate an FTO’s relationship to another 
terrorist list, the information is not provided consistently. Frequently, the information is 
provided in the press release that announces a group’s FTO designation but that 
information is not always provided in the country reports.  
3. Relationship to Terrorist Lists Maintained by Other Countries  
As explained previously, a number of other countries to include the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, each have developed terrorism lists that identify 
253 Gretchen Peters, “Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, Haqqani Network Financing: The 
Evolution of an Industry,” July 2012, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/CTC_ 
Haqqani_Network_Financing-Report__Final.pdf. 
254 The Department of State described Khan as ‘‘a Haqqani Network commander’’ who has 
‘‘overseen hundreds of fighters, and has instructed his subordinates to conduct terrorist acts.’’ The 
designation continued, ‘‘Mali Khan has provided support and logistics to the Haqqani Network, and has 
been involved in the planning and execution of attacks in Afghanistan against civilians, coalition forces, 
and Afghan police.” U.S. Department of State, “Designation of Haqqani Network Commander Mali Khan,” 
November 1, 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/176452.htm. According to Jason Blazakis, the 
chief of the Terrorist Designations Unit of the Department of State, Khan also has links to al-Qaeda. U.S. 
House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, “H.R. 6036, 112th Congress, 2d 
Session, 4,” 2012, 
http://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/HaqqaniVersion2.pdf. 
255 U.S. Department of State, “Designation of Haqqani Network Commander Mali Khan.” Sirajuddin 
Haqqani, the overall leader of the Haqqani Network, as well as the leader of the Taliban’s Mira shah 
Regional Military Shura, was designated by the Secretary of State as a terrorist in March 2008, and in 
March 2009, the Secretary of State put out a bounty of $5,000,000 for information leading to his capture. 
The other four individuals so designated are Nasiruddin Haqqani, Khalil al Rahman Haqqani, Badruddin 
Haqqani, and Mullah Sangeen Zadran. U.S. Department of State, “Individuals and Entities Designated by 
the State Department Under Executive Order 13224,” September 26, 2013, 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/143210.htm. 
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international terrorist organizations outlawed in their country. In addition to lists being 
maintained by the other countries, the EU and the United Nations also maintain lists. In 
the country reports, however, the United States rarely acknowledges when an FTO 
appears on a terrorist list of another country.  
In fact, significant overlap occurs between the lists maintained by the United 
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Of the 18 organizations listed by 
Australia, all are on the U.S. FTO list. Of the 51 organizations listed by the United 
Kingdom, 32 are on the U.S. FTO list. Of the 46 organizations listed by Canada, 34 are 
on the U.S. FTO list.  
While many distinctions occur between the lists, such as the United Kingdom 
having a significant focus on Northern Ireland-based terrorist groups, significant overlap 
also occurs. The high overlap among these allied nations indicates that the countries have 
influence over each other in the designation of terrorist organizations, and have a 
common unifying interest served by collectively identifying certain groups as terrorists. 
This connectivity between allied nations is another factor that influences the designation 
process. 
4. Relationship to Other FTOs on the List 
Thirty-four FTOs were designated following 9/11. All but two256 of these post-
9/11 FTOs are affiliated in some way with another terrorist organization. Twenty-eight of 
the designated FTOs are organizations affiliated with al Qaeda or are identified as a 
radical Islamic group.  
The pre-9/11 groups have fewer identified connections to existing terrorist 
groups. Many of the groups designated pre-9/11 were founded on communist principles 
as opposed to being inspired by another terrorist group. Nevertheless, approximately half 
of the FTOs designated pre-9/11 had an association with other terrorism groups.  
256 The two groups for which the country reports do not indicate a connection to another terrorist 
organization are Jundallah and the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA).  
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5. Relationship to Terrorist Splinter Groups 
A number of the FTOs currently designated are splinter groups of FTOs and other 
terrorist organizations that pre-existed the creation of the FTO list (and therefore were 
never formally named), or are former terrorist groups that no longer espouse the use of 
violence to further their goals.  
For example:  
• Abu Nidal Organization (ANO): split from the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) in 1974. 
• Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG): split from the Moro National Liberation Front 
in 1991. 
• al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion: split from the Fatah party to attack Israeli 
military targets and settlers with the aim of driving Israel from the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip and establishing a Palestinian state. 
• Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): The Salafist Group for Call 
and Combat (GSPC), a splinter group of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). 
• The Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA): formed in the mid 1990s 
after it split from Sinn Fein in 1986, believes it is carrying on the original 
Irish Republican Army’s (IRA). 
• Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP): founded in 1969 
when it split from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(PFLP). 
• Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (HUJI): HUJI has experienced a number of 
internal splits and a portion of the group has aligned with al-Qa’ida (AQ) 
in recent years, including training its members in AQ training camps. 
• Islamic Jihad Union (IJU): splintered from the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan. 
• Jaish-e-Mohammed: By 2003, JEM had splintered into Khuddam ul-Islam 
(KUI) and Jamaat ul-Furqan (JUF).  
• Palestine Liberation Front, Abu Abbas Faction (PLF): broke away from 
the PFLP-GC in mid-1970s. Later split again into pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, 
and pro-Libyan factions.  
• Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-
GC): Split from the PFLP in 1968, claiming that it wanted to focus more 
on fighting and less on politics. 
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• Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C): a splinter 
faction of the Turkish People’s Liberation Party/Front. Renamed in 1994 
after factional infighting. 
The above are just 12 examples of splinter groups that have been designated as 
FTOs. As noted in many of the FTO descriptions, the splinter group frequently separated 
from the main group in an effort to become more violent or due to a disagreement over 
moving into the political arena.  
The splinter groups that have been designated FTOs demonstrate that even when 
political or other issues have resulted in the disbanding, elimination, or neutralization of a 
terrorist group, that new splinter terrorist groups may emerge that many be even more 
radical that the original group. As a result, it appears that being a splinter group of a 
known terrorist group, particularly when the splinter groups advocates increased 
violence, is a factor that influences the FTO designation process.  
D. SUMMARY OF THE NONSTATUTORY FACTORS 
Figure 13 represents a visual depiction of the nonstatutory factors identified in 
this research.  
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Figure 13.  The Nonstatutory Factors 
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VIII. UNDERSTANDING FTO DECISIONS 
Doing what’s right isn’t the problem. It is knowing what’s right. 
—Lyndon B. Johnson, 
36th U.S. President 
 
The previous chapters analyzed the FTO list and identified the nonstatutory 
factors that influence FTO decisions. That analysis, however, is incomplete without 
addressing how these nonstatutory factors are utilized in the highly complex 
counterterrorism environment. Understanding these decisions and how the nonstatutory 
factors are applied, adds to an understanding of the FTO list and helps address the 
criticisms of the FTO decisions presented in the literature. As noted previously, the FTO 
list has been criticized for representing a mixture of the “apples and oranges” of terrorist 
organizations. The FTO list includes groups based on Islamic ideologies and those based 
on Marxist ideologies, ethnic-based groups, Palestinian groups seeking a peaceful 
solution and those seeking to unravel peace negotiations, non-Palestinian leftist groups, 
European groups, radical Islamists, small Jewish groups, and idiosyncratic groups. Small 
groups with less than 100 members, and large groups numbering in the tens of thousands 
are also included.  
This chapter analyzes the nonstatutory factors more closely, and specifically 
through the lens of the Cynefin Framework, which assists in understanding the complex 
FTO decisions. While the FTO list reflects a diverse collection of terrorist organizations 
that initially appear to represent a disconnected list of organizations, the list, the 
nonstatutory factors that influence the FTO decisions identified in this research, and the 
FTO decision-making process itself, reflect the complex nature of U.S. foreign relations 
and strategy.  
A. CYNEFIN FRAMEWORK 
The FTO decisions represent a methodical system used by the United States to 
define those who represent a terrorist threat to the nation. The designation decision for 
some organizations is simple, with others, it is complicated, with others complex, and 
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with others, it is chaotic. The Cynefin Framework assists in evaluating the many factors 
that can help determine when and under what circumstances certain organizations are 
designated, removed, or omitted.257  
The Cynefin Framework is a “sense-making” tool, and is a way in which to 
“make sense of a wide range of unspecified problems . . . The framework is particularly 
useful in collective sense-making, in that it is designed to allow shared understandings to 
emerge.”258 The basic concepts of the Cynefin Framework are illustrated in Figure 14.  
 
Figure 14.  Cynefin Framework 
Using these factors, more fully described by David J. Snowden and Mary E. 
Boone in their Harvard Business Review article titled, “A Leader’s Framework for 
Decision Making,”259 the State Department’s decisions to include or exclude 
organizations from the FTO list can be explained. The analysis further demonstrates that 
the FTO decisions are tailored to U.S. counterterrorism priorities and strategies, and the 
complexity of that evolving strategy.  
257 David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard 
Business Review, November 2007.  
258 Cynthia F. Kurtz and David J. Snowden, “The New Dynamics of Strategy: Sense-Making in a 
Complex and Complicated World,” IBM Systems Journal 42, no. 3 (2003): 468. 
259 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making.” 
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1. The Simple Decisions 
Under the Cynefin Framework, simple contexts are characterized by stability and 
clear cause-and-effect relationships easily discernible by everyone.260 Problems can arise 
in this context when situations change or when new ways of analyzing a relationship 
develops. Further, complacency could result in this scenario due to a failure to review the 
details associated with a situation thoroughly. When this happens, simplicity can develop 
into chaos.261  
In the FTO decision-making context, a number of scenarios could be 
characterized as the simple FTO designations. In other words, those situations in which 
certain nonstatutory factors exist that will likely result in the United States designating a 
foreign organization as an FTO. These factors include if the organization has killed a 
U.S. citizen or attacked a U.S. embassy, if the organization is affiliated with al Qaeda, 
and if the organization seeks the destruction of Israel. As described previously, 
approximately 85% of organizations added to the FTO list following 9/11 attacked a U.S. 
interest or killed a U.S. citizen, 82% of groups designated to the FTO list following 9/11 
are aligned in some manner to al Qaeda, and 75% of the groups on the FTO list are 
opposed to the State of Israel. The existence of these nonstatutory factors appear to be 
clear indicators that an organization will be designated an FTO and, therefore, these 
designation decisions could be categorized as “simple” decisions.  
Even though these decisions appear simple, and it may be difficult to 
conceptualize situations in which the United States might compromise on any of these 
core national principles; it is this sort of situation in which analysis is required to ensure 
“complacency” does not develop in evaluating these factors. It will be important to be 
aware of issues that can result in these seemingly simple decisions turning complex or 
even chaotic. For example, peace negotiations in the Middle East could begin to impact 
FTO decisions with respect to Israel if political concessions are given to organizations 
seeking to legitimize themselves through the peace process. In such scenarios, it is 
260 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 2.  
261 Ibid. 
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possible that the secretary of state may not designate a group, may postpone a designation 
to determine the outcome of negotiations, or may delist a group in order to advance the 
peace process.  
2. The Complicated Decisions 
The next category of decisions is the complicated decisions, which include 
decisions for which there may be multiple rights answers. In this category of decisions, 
although a clear relationship exists between cause and effect, it is not necessarily evident 
to those reviewing the decisions.262 According to Snowden and Boone, “while leaders in 
a simple context must sense, categorize, and respond to a situation, those in a 
complicated context must sense, analyze, and respond.”263 The concern in this context of 
decision making is when entrained thinking (such as “this is the way we have always 
looked at this issue”) impedes decision making and creativity in the decision-making 
process. Another potential danger in this category is “analysis paralysis,” in which 
decisions cannot be made due to entrained thinking on the issues.264  
With respect to FTO decisions, terrorist splinter groups, groups that oppose peace 
processes, and groups that have never attacked the United States fall into this decision-
making category. FTO decisions involving these groups are difficult because it may not 
be clear which groups have splintered from another group, actually present a sustained 
terrorist threat, have the strength and capabilities to engage in actual terrorist activities, or 
pose a continued threat over time. Furthermore, the difficulty posed by these groups is 
that they may be difficult to identify as a threat until well after they have engaged in 
numerous acts of terrorism.  
Also, in this category of complicated decisions, are groups founded on communist 
principles. These types of groups, and the potential threat they pose to U.S. interests, 
represent Cold War era thinking. Thus, in the early years of the FTO list, some of the 
designated communist terrorist groups may have been added under the traditional 
262 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 3–4. 
263 Ibid., 3. 
264 Ibid., 4. 
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thinking that the greatest security threat to the United States continued to emanate from 
communism.  
FTOs that appear to be dormant also fall into this category of complicated 
decision making. When the FTO list was first developed, dormant groups were far more 
prevalent on the list, as the list included organizations that historically posed a threat as 
opposed to representing current threats. Many of those groups have since been removed. 
Over time, however, some other groups previously active have become dormant and 
continue to be on the FTO list. The decision whether to remove such groups is 
complicated because, in many instances, it may be unclear whether they have the 
potential to pose a continued threat or whether they have been sufficiently neutralized 
that the threat no longer exists. Such decisions are complicated.  
3. The Complex Decisions 
In a complex decision-making context, at least one right answer is possible, but 
the correct decision is not easily identifiable.265 “Most situations and decisions in 
organizations are complex because some major change . . . introduces unpredictability 
and flux.”266 The challenges in this context are that leaders may be tempted to fall into 
traditional command-and-control management styles, when the context may require more 
experimentation.267  
With respect to the FTO decision-making process, the complex decisions are 
those decisions involving allied nations. As noted previously, a variety of reasons exist as 
to why FTOs based in allied nations are designated. The reasons include a U.S. citizen 
was killed by the group, a U.S. interest, such as an embassy was attacked, the allied 
nation has a poor record in meeting terrorism challenges, the allied nation is strategically 
situated and success in that country could limit the spread of terrorism, the allied nation 
has requested the designation of the group, and the United States has been actively 
engaged in peace efforts in that nation or involving that particular terrorist group. A 
265 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 5. 
266 Ibid.  
267 Ibid.  
 101 
                                                 
complex set of issues are evaluated when determining which allied nations the United 
States supports through the naming of terrorist organizations that seek to undermine its 
government. In many cases, these organizations do not pose a direct threat to the United 
States, but protection of that allied nation and its government from the spread of terrorism 
is of strategic importance to the United States. The decision about whether to designate a 
group may not always be clear, because of the broader policy and strategic issues 
involved.  
4. The Chaotic Decisions 
In a chaotic context, relationships between cause and effect are impossible to 
determine because they shift constantly and no manageable pattern exists—only 
turbulence.268 This is considered the realm of the “unknowables.”269  
With respect to the FTO list, these decisions occur in response to terrorist attacks 
that have taken place where the group is not already designated. Admittedly, in the FTO 
decision-making context, it is somewhat difficult to characterize any decision as fully 
“chaotic” since every decision made occurs over the course of months with what could be 
perceived as sufficient time to deliberate about the issues and to obtain information 
supporting a designation. However, in this situation, the terrorist group is a new or 
emerging group and little information is likely available about the group. The exact 
nature of the group’s leadership, objectives, strength, and capabilities may be unknown. 
In addition, in this chaotic context, many external factors likely impacting the decision-
making process.  
For example, on January 10, 2014, three additional FTOs were designated, 
namely: Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi, Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah, and Ansar al-Shari’a 
in Tunisia, all of which were related to terrorist attacks against U.S. interests. The events 
that resulted in these groups being designated have been the subject of much inquiry, 
concern, and investigation. Most significantly, the events surrounding the attacks in 
Benghazi, and the murder of U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens, has been the subject 
268 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 5. 
269 Ibid.  
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of media investigations,270 Congressional hearings and reports,271 a State Department 
independent review,272 and considerable public debate. Throughout these reports and the 
resulting debates, the actions and inactions by the State Department have been under 
tremendous scrutiny,273 even by the department itself, which convened an independent 
report on its actions.274 
It is likely not coincidental that the designation of the groups associated with the 
Benghazi attacks occurred five days before the release of the U.S. Senate’s Committee on 
Intelligence Report on Benghazi. The designation then could be seen as an effort to 
demonstrate that the State Department was taking affirmative steps to identify the 
terrorists responsible for the attack, and to further define the terrorism threat to the United 
States before the U.S. Senate would again criticize the State Department for its handling 
of the events surrounding the terrorist attack.  
270 See e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, “A Deadly Mix in Benghazi,” The New York Times, December 28, 
2103, http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/benghazi/#/?chapt=0; Adam Goldman and Anne Gearan, 
“Senate Report: Attacks on U.S. Compounds in Benghazi Could Have Been Prevented,” The Washington 
Post, January 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/senate-report-attack-on-
us-compound-in-benghazi-could-have-been-prevented/2014/01/15/5e197224-7de9-11e3-95c6-
0a7aa80874bc_story.html; Michael Zennie, “Revealed: Ringleader Behind al-Qaeda Attack that Killed 
U.S. Ambassador was Former Guantanamo Inmate Handed Over to Libya by America,” The Daily Mail, 
September 19, 2012, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2205825/Sufyan-Ben-Qumu-Former-Gitmo-
inmate-planned-al-Qaeda-attack-Libyan-consulate.html. 
271 NBC News, “Congressional Report Lambastes Security at U.S. Consulate in Benghazi,” December 
31, 2012, http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/12/31/16258960-congressional-report-lambastes-
security-at-us-consulate-in-benghazi?lite; Joseph I. Lieberman and Susan M. Collins, “Flashing Red: A 
Special Report on the Terrorist Attack at Benghazi,” United States Senate Committee on Homeland 




Select Committee on Intelligence, United State Senate, 113th Congress, “Review of the Terrorist Attacks 
on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi Libya, September 11–12, 2012,” January 15, 2014, http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/CRPT-113srpt134/pdf/CRPT-113srpt134.pdf.  
272 U.S. State Department, Accountability Review Board, “Accountability Review Board (ARB) 
Report,” 2012, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/202446.pdf. 
273 See e.g., NBC News, “Congressional Report Lambastes Security at U.S. Consulate in Benghazi”; 
NBC News, “Benghazi Report Blames “Systemic Failures” Within State Department,” December 18, 2012, 
http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/12/18/16002158-benghazi-report-blames-systemic-failures-
within-state-department?lite. 
274 U.S. State Department, Accountability Review Board, “Accountability Review Board (ARB) 
Report.” 
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Another chaotic situation arose, not in the designation arena but in the delisting of 
an organization—the MEK. The multitude of issues swirling around the MEK created a 
chaotic situation for the State Department decision-making process. The MEK’s political 
and lobbying efforts overshadowed the fact that prosecutions of the organization for its 
terrorist activities occurred in the United States and in many allied nations,275 the MEK 
was involved in the 1979 takeover of the U.S. embassy in Iran,276 the MEK used 
weapons against U.S. troops at the beginning of the Iraq war,277 and the MEK possessed 
a large and powerful cache of military-style weapons in Iraq.278 In fact, in 1999, the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court found, relying on a 1993 intelligence research paper 
from the Central Intelligence Agency, that the MEK: 
Is the largest and most active Iranian dissident group. Its primary goal is 
the overthrow of the Iranian Government, after which it would seek to 
establish a non-theocratic republic . . . . The [MEK’s] history, marked by 
violence and terrorism, belies its claim to uphold democratic ideals. 
Formed in the early 1960s, its origins reflect both Marxist and Islamic 
influences, and its history is studded with anti-Western activity.279 
As a result of the prosecutions and military actions, the MEK’s terrorist 
capabilities and financial support ended.280 While those actions were successful in 
neutralizing the MEK as a terrorist organization, the group became a problem to the 
United States as the war in Iraq continued, as the U.S. military ultimately had to protect 
275 Ibid.; See e.g., Jarrett Murphy, “French Hold Iran Opposition Sweep,” CBS News, June 17, 2003, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/french-hold-iran-opposition-sweep/. 
276 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, 48–250; Audrey Kurth Cronin, 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Order Code RL32223 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 
Congressional Research Service, February 6, 2004), 66–67; Interview with Daniel Fried, Special Advisor to 
the Secretary on Camp Ashraf, U.S. Department of State, “Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador 
Daniel Benjamin and Special Advisor to the Secretary on Camp Ashraf Ambassador Daniel Fried on the 
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) Designation and the Current Situation at Camp Ashraf.”  
277 PMOI v. U.S. Department of State, 613 F.3d 220, 230–31 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
278 Ibid. 
279 People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. United States Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 20 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999). 
280 Ibid., PMOI v. U.S. Department of State, 613 F.3d 220, 230–31 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Murphy, “French 
Hold Iran Opposition Sweep.”  
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the MEK members in Iraq,281 and it became difficult to re-locate the MEK members who 
remained in Iraq.282 Ultimately, the group was delisted.283  
The chaotic scenarios represented by the Benghazi events and the MEK delisting 
issues reflect different but equally challenging circumstances in which events external to 
the State Department’s deliberative process intervened to compel action. David F. Kettl 
discussed the reaction of government to external events in his book, System Under Stress, 
Homeland Security and American Politics, wherein he explains that the political system 
used to address most public policy problems remains constant most of the time, with 
change occurring incrementally.  
However, forces tend to build then erupt explosively in large, fundamental 
change when big events roil the political system. Important political 
questions are often ignored for years, but sometimes everyone focused on 
the same issues in the same way. As attention surges, so does the pressure 
for policy change. As a result, external shocks periodically shift public 
debate and public policy.284  
It could be argued that the State Department designations of the FTOs involved in 
the Benghazi attacks 16 months after the terrorist attack is not the sort of abrupt public 
policy change that Kettl was referencing. In the FTO context, however, external forces 
intervened prompting, and in some cases forcing, action. With respect to Benghazi, 
further investigation and Congressional hearings are likely. In addition, further scrutiny 
of the designation and its meaning will likely continue and disputes linger over who was 
responsible for the attack, and how connected those responsible are to other terrorist 
281 PMOI v. U.S. Department of State, 613 F.3d 220, 230–31 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
282 See e.g., Shashank Bengali, “US to Adjust Terror List: An Iranian Exile Group Known as the 
MEK Will Be Taken Off, and Official Says,” Los Angeles Times, September 22, 2012; Elise Labott, 
“Clinton to Remove Iranian Exile Group MEK from Terror List,” CNN Wire, September 21, 2012.  
283 State Department, “Delisting of the Mujahedin-e Khalq,” September 28, 2102, http://www.state. 
gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/09/198443.htm. 
284 David F. Kettl, System Under Stress, Homeland Security and American Politics (Washington, DC: 
CQ Press, 2007), 130; see also Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil, Political Ethics in an Age of Terror 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 25–53; Victor V. Ramraj, Terrorism, Risk Perception 
and Judicial Review (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 113–126; Kent Roach, The Criminal 
Law and Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 131–151. 
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networks.285 As a result, this scenario has been categorized as chaotic under the Cynefin 
Framework.  
The Cynefin Framework, therefore, offers a tool through which the many FTO 
decisions made over the course of decades can be systematically analyzed and organized. 
It further provides insight into the nature of the FTO decision-making process and how it 
has evolved over the course of years, and is a sense-making tool for what may otherwise 
appear to be a disconnected decision-making process. It also reflects a systematic and 
logical decision-making process that is fairly predictable, and which further supports the 
conclusion that the list is the mechanism through which the United States defines 
terrorism.  
285 According to a report by the New York Times on the Benghazi attack, its investigation “turned up 
no evidence that Al Qaeda or other international terrorist groups had any role in the assault.” (Kirkpatrick, 
“A Deadly Mix in Benghazi.). This conclusion is disputed by other reports. State Department press release 
notes that the leaders of the newly designated FTOs are Ahmed Abu Khattalah and Sufian bin Qumu. 
Sufian bin Qumu has been identified as a former driver for a Bin Laden company. Qumu was also 
apprehended in Pakistan in 2001 and detained for six years at Guantánamo Bay before returning home to 
Derna, a coastal city near Benghazi known for a high concentration of Islamist extremists. Qumu runs 
Ansar al-Sharia. Goldman and Gearan, “Senate Report: Attacks on U.S. Compounds in Benghazi Could 
Have Been Prevented.” Individuals allegedly responsible for the attacks were charged in sealed criminal 
complaints filed in federal court by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, which includes 
Khattala, who was identified as having ties to al Qaeda. See also June 12, 2012, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency report titled, “Libya: Terrorists Now Targeting U.S. and Western Interests” that noted the growing 
ties between al Qaeda and Libyan-based terrorists; July 6, 2012, the CIA report entitled, “ Libya: al Qaeda 
Establishing Sanctuary,” noting al Qaeda affiliated groups and associates are exploiting the permissive 
security environment in Libya to enhance their capabilities and expand their operational reach, including 
conducting training, building communication networks, and traveling to and from safe havens. 
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IX. THE FTO LIST DEFINES TERRORISM 
Action will delineate and define you. 
—Thomas Jefferson, 
3rd U.S. President 
 
Many authors and academics have commented on the difficulty in defining 
terrorism.286 In fact, the many government departments engaged in the homeland security 
enterprise each utilize different, and sometimes competing, definitions of terrorism.287 
Title 22, United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, 
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational 
groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” Terrorism, as 
defined in by the Code of Federal Regulations, is: .” . . the unlawful use of force and 
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian 
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”288  
The various departments within the U.S. government engaged in the homeland 
security enterprise each have extrapolated variations on the statutory definitions for use 
within their own departments, to highlight the focus of each individual department’s 
counterterrorism efforts. The State Department definition includes “politically motivated 
violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine 
agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”289 The FBI distinguishes between 
international and domestic terrorism on its website, and relies on the statutory definition 
of the terms.290 Specifically, it relies on the Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) definition 
as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or 
286 Alex Schmid, Political Terrorism; A Research Guide (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 
1984), x.; Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 33–34.  
287 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 30–31, 35.  
288 28 C.F.R. § 0.85. 
289 22 USC § 2656f(d). 
290 The Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Definitions of Terrorism in the U.S. Code,” accessed 
January 19, 2014, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/terrorism/terrorism-definition. 
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coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of 
political or social objectives.”291 The DHS focuses on acts “to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; 
to affect conduct of a government . . .”292 The DOD defines it as, “The unlawful use of 
violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. 
Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and 
committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political.”293  
According to Bruce Hoffman, all the definitions used by the United States offer 
various but incomplete perspectives on terrorism. He notes that the State Department’s 
definition emphasizes “both the ineluctably political nature of terrorism and the 
perpetrators’ fundamental ‘subnational’ characteristic. . . .” but is deficient “in failing to 
consider the psychological dimension of terrorism.”294 The FBI definition, on the other 
hand, “does address the psychological dimensions of the terrorist act.”295 While finding 
that the FBI’s definition includes the social and political objectives aim of terrorists, 
Hoffman finds that its definition “offers no clear elucidation of the differences between 
them to explain this distinction.”296 The DHS definition focuses on its missions 
“concentrating on attacks to critical infrastructure and key national resources that could 
have grace societal consequences.”297 “The Defense Department definition, significantly, 
also cites the religious and ideological aims of terrorism alongside its fundamental 
political objectives – but omits the social dimension found in the FBI’s definition.”298  
To complicate the issue further, the meaning of the word has changed over time 
and “as the meaning and usage of the word have changed over time to accommodate the 
291 28 C.F.R. § 0.85; National Institute of Justice, “Terrorism,” 2011, http://www.nij.gov/topics/ 
crime/terrorism/Pages/welcome.aspx. 
292 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 31; Homeland Security Act of 2002, January 23, 2002, o. FR 5005–7.  
293 Department of Defense. “Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” 2010, http://www.dtic. 
mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/data/t/7591.html. 
294 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 32.  
295 Ibid. 




                                                 
political vernacular and discourse of each successive era, terrorism has proved 
increasingly elusive in the face of attempts to construct one consistent definition.”299  
While the departments of the U.S. government engaged in the homeland security 
enterprise use different definitions of the term terrorism, all the departments recognize 
the FTO list, all have input into the list, and all have a role in addressing the 
consequences facing the groups added to the list. Furthermore, all the departments 
recognize the FTO list as constituting the organizations that the United States has 
determined to be terrorist organizations that threaten the security of the United States. 
The consequences of an FTO designation includes a prohibition against persons 
knowingly providing material support or resources to the FTO for which violators can be 
prosecuted by the Department of Justice (following an investigation by the FBI, DHS, 
and other departments), the blocking of all property and interests in property of the 
organization in the United States, or come within the United States, or the control of U.S. 
persons (by the Treasury Department and DHS),300 and trying to neutralize each group’s 
activities abroad (DOD and the intelligence community).  
As with the changing definition of terrorism over time, the nature of the groups 
represented on the FTO list have also evolved. Prior to 9/11, the focus of U.S. 
counterterrorism foreign policy was on neutralizing the threat posed by communist 
insurgent groups that might undermine the government of an allied nation. Following 
9/11, the U.S. focus shifted to al Qaeda, and its associated and affiliated organizations. 
The shift in focus was appropriate, and is reflective of what Bruce Hoffman described in 
Inside Terrorism as the changing meaning of terrorism over time.301 The FTO list then 
represents what the United States perceives to be those terrorist organizations that pose 
the greatest risk to this nation, based on the actions taken by the group over time. The 
changes in the list over time reflect the evolving priorities and the evolving threats, and 
therefore, reflect how the United States defines terrorism. 
299 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 20. 
300 U.S. Department of State, “Secretary of State’s Terrorist Designation of Jundallah.” 
301 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 3–20.  
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Thus, while the federal departments engaged in the homeland security enterprise 
do not have a common definition of terrorism, and academics and authors have not 
agreed on a single universal definition, the FTO list reflects the criteria used by the 
United States in actually defining terrorism, by highlighting this nation’s priorities and by 
identifying U.S. enemies. Similarly, as groups are removed from the FTO list, terrorism 
is further re-defined by identifying shifting U.S. priorities and those groups perceived to 
no longer be a threat. As noted by Nadav Morag, “it is less important to determine what 
terrorism is than to determine who the terrorists are because, clearly, legal sanctions 
cannot be applied to the phenomenon of terrorism but can be applied to terrorist 
organizations and individual terrorists.”302  
As determined by the current FTO list, the United States defines terrorism as the 
following.  
• al Qaeda, it affiliates, and its associates 
• any organization that lends support or promotes the interests of al Qaeda 
• any organization that attacks a U.S. interest, such as a U.S. embassy, or 
attacks or harms a U.S. citizen 
• any organization that attacks Israel or attempts to undermine its existence 
• any organization that seeks to undermine a peace process advanced or 
advocated by the United States 
• any organization that seeks to undermine a country in a geographical 
location or region is strategically important to addressing U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts 
 
302 Morag, Comparative Homeland Security, Global Lessons, 68. 
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X. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A government for the people must depend for its success 
on the intelligence, the morality, the justice 
and the interest of the people themselves. 
—Grover Cleveland, 
24 U.S. President 
 
This research was aimed at determining whether the nonstatutory factors that 
weigh in a secretary of state’s FTO decisions could be identified. Through a quantitative 
and qualitative analysis of the State Department’s country reports that describe the FTO 
decisions made since 1997, the nonstatutory factors were identified. These factors include 
whether a group is affiliated with or supports al Qaeda, attacks an U.S. citizen, embassy, 
or interest; attacks or undermines Israel, thwarts a peace process advanced by the United 
States, or undermines a country strategically important to addressing U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts. Using the Cynefin Framework, this research further explored the 
nonstatutory factors as applied in the context of complex counterterrorism policy 
decisions. The nonstatutory factors also form the basis upon which the United States 
defines terrorism.  
This chapter examines whether the FTO process should be modified, since this 
research indicates the FTO list is a logical representation of U.S. counterterrorism policy. 
The literature reflects that the FTO list is regularly criticized for failing to apply 
consistent criteria, for being too political, and for being a vehicle through which the 
Executive Branch will abuse its power. Greater confidence in the FTO designation 
procedure could be developed by publicly identifying the nonstatutory factors that 
influence the decisions, by providing information about the application of these factors, 
by reviewing the FTO designations with greater frequency, and by providing detailed and 
more consistent information about each FTO. 
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A. THE LITERATURE VS. THE RESEARCH 
The research presented indicates that the determinations about which 
organizations are added to the FTO list is based on a fairly logical and systematic 
approach. As demonstrated in the literature review, the FTO list is, nevertheless, 
criticized regularly and is considered unfair by many.  
Subjective justice theory provides insight into the apparent conflict between the 
research results and the criticisms found in the literature. This theory suggests that people 
are “not always accurate in their assessments” of justice due to their perceptions.303 
While people tend to strive for justice in their interpretation of issues (under the just 
world theory),304 psychological distortion can come about through the selection, 
exaggeration, or minimization of the factors weighed in the justice calculation.305  
With respect to the FTO list, the role of the procedures used may be influencing 
perception of the list and the assessment about whether it is fair. As noted earlier, the 
nonstatutory factors that influence the decision-making process have never been 
identified by the secretary of state, which has led to speculation about the factors the 
secretary of state really relies upon in making FTO decisions. In addition, the factors used 
to evaluate whether an organization is a threat to the security of the United States (the 
third statutory factor) have never been identified publicly, which has also led to further 
speculation, concerns about secrecy and the potential abuse of power, and ultimately, the 
perception that the FTO list is unfair.  
Procedural justice, or the process through which decisions are made, is an 
important influence on the assessment of fairness.306 Procedural justice includes a wide 
range of issues, such as how people feel they have been treated, whether they think they 
have been listened to, and whether their view-points have been given respect and 
consideration. A 2002 study by Tyler and Huo concluded that people accept the decisions 
303 Fathali M. Moghaddam, Multiculturalism and Intergroup Relations, Psychological Implications 
for Democracy in Global Context (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2008), 108. 
304 Ibid., 79–80. 
305 Ibid., 111.  
306 Ibid., 113. 
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of legal authorities, even if they consider the decisions unfavorable, when they believe 
the procedure used was fair.307 Perceived unfairness in the exercise of authority can lead 
to alienation, defiance, and noncooperation.308 
Utilizing these theories, trust in the fairness and integrity of the procedures used 
to designate organizations could play an important role in how the FTO list is perceived. 
“Clearly, trust and other relational values profoundly influence perceptions of justice . . . 
[and] confidence in authorities.”309 Greater confidence in the FTO designation procedure 
could be developed by publicly identifying the nonstatutory factors that influence the 
decisions (and eliminate speculation), articulating these factors clearly, and providing 
information to the public about these factors.  
Despite the benefits that could be obtained from modifying the process, it could 
be argued that the U.S. FTO designation process does not need to be modified and 
maintaining the current system as it is currently functioning is appropriate. The U.S. FTO 
designation system is not as broad as other designation systems around the world, such 
the UK model that designates those who promote the “glorification of terrorism” and 
prohibits the wearing of clothing or carrying of articles that arouse suspicion. In contrast 
to these broad systems, the U.S. model is much narrower and more clearly defined. Even 
those who criticize the list rarely claim that a group on the list has not committed terrorist 
activities.  
The Executive Branch also has forceful arguments it could assert that the current 
designation process is not flawed and that no abuse of executive power occurs when it 
makes foreign policy decisions. The Executive Branch could effectively argue that the 
FTO designation process is designed to have flexible standards to allow the secretary of 
state the exclusive authority to weigh a variety of factors that will serve the diplomatic 
and strategic interests of the United States. The secretary of state may weigh the identical 
307 Tom R. Tyler and Yeun J. Huo, Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police 
and Courts (Russell Sage Foundation, 2002). 
308 Jason Sunshine and Tom R. Tyler, “The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping 
Public Support for Policing,” The Law and Society Review 37, no. 3 (2003): 514–515. 
309 Ibid. 
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factors with two different groups and reach contrary conclusions about whether it should 
be designated, and such a result can be appropriate given the particular situation. Such is 
the nature of complex foreign policy decisions, to which the Executive Branch has 
considerable discretion. Significantly, no evidence exists that any FTO decision made by 
the secretary of state was detrimental to the foreign policy or diplomatic interests of the 
United States.  
While an argument can be made to maintain the status quo and not alter the 
designation process in any way, this alternative is not practical since the designation 
process has been subject to increasing criticism and involvement by the legislative and 
judicial branches. Without changes, they may increasingly insert themselves into the 
process and increase oversight to ensure that “the intelligence community is properly 
carrying out its functions, that is whether the community is asking the right questions, 
responding to policy makers’ needs, [and] being rigorous in its analysis. . . .”310 In 
addition, absent a change, the charges of the politicization of the designation process will 
continue and may increase.311 While any designation process will and can be criticized, 
addressing some of the procedural criticisms can make the U.S. process more robust, and 
procedural justice theory suggests that such changes could instill greater confidence in 
the FTO designation process. In the current homeland security environment, in which a 
growing lack of confidence in the homeland security enterprise is occurring, due in part 
to a perception of government overreaching,312 this situation is an opportunity for the 
homeland security enterprise to gain public confidence through offering additional 
information on process and procedures. As a result of all these considerations, the 
recommendations listed as follows should be considered.  
310 Lowenthal, Intelligence, From Secrets to Policy, 217, 223.  
311 Johnson and Wirtz, Strategic Intelligence, Windows Into a Secret World.  
312 Pew Research, Center for the People & the Press, “Few See Adequate Limits on NSA Surveillance 
Program,” July 26, 2013, http://www.people-press.org/2013/07/26/few-see-adequate-limits-on-nsa-
surveillance-program/; Byron Acohido, “Most Americans Oppose NSA Surveillance,” USA Today, January 
16, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/cybertruth/2014/01/16/most-americans-oppose-nsa-surveillance/ 
4516291/; Emily Swanson, “Poll: NSA Oversight Is Inadequate Most Americans Say,” Huffington Post, 
August 17, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/17/nsa-oversight-poll_n_3769727.html. 
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B. SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS TO THE FTO DESIGNATION 
PROCESS 
1. Identify and Define the Nonstatutory Factors that Influence the FTO 
Designation Process 
The secretary of state has never publicly identified the nonstatutory factors that 
influence the decision-making process, which has led to speculation about the factors the 
secretary of state really relies upon in making FTO decisions, as well as to inter-agency 
disputes about the key factors that should be weighed in designating FTOs. These internal 
disputes have delayed the designation process,313 which creates the perception that the 
FTO designation process is too long and cumbersome, and fails to be nimble enough to 
address the rapidly changing terrorism environment.  
The benefits to identifying the nonstatutory factors include creating greater clarity 
about the key policy factors to be analyzed, developing consensus as to the specific 
factors used among members of the intelligence community, streamlining the process so 
that it is less time consuming, and avoiding controversy over specific designations. 
Further, by identifying the nonstatutory factors used to determine an FTO, the courts and 
Congress can receive the assurances they need that the designation process is thorough 
and expeditious, and may minimize the concern that political issues are overly 
influencing the process. 
Many of the nonstatutory factors that already weigh in the calculation to add an 
organization to or remove it from the FTO list have been identified through this research. 
These factors include whether the foreign organization or its affiliates have done the 
following.  
• Attacked the United States at home or abroad. Particular interest will be 
given to those foreign organizations that:  
• killed U.S. citizens 
• attacked a U.S. embassy 
313 Washington Post, “Obama Administration Divided Over Designating Haqqani Network As a 
Terrorist Group,” August 31, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-08-31/world/35493151_ 
1_haqqani-network-haqqani-group-terrorist-group.  
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• Attacked an allied nation, or another strategic interest of the United States. 
Particular interest will be given to those foreign organizations that:  
• are based in countries believed to be training grounds, hubs, or 
breeding grounds for terrorism, and to those countries whose legal 
systems appear to be challenged in handling terrorism issues 
effectively 
• attack Israel, seek to undermine the existence of the country, or 
otherwise, seek to challenge the stability of Israel 
• is a terrorist organization located in a geographic region of 
strategic importance to counterterrorism efforts 
• Are affiliated or associated with al Qaeda. Particular interest will be given 
to those foreign organizations that: 
• attack members of the U.S. military 
• develop as a result of the U.S. military presence in a particular 
country 
• Are committing terrorist acts aimed at undermining peace efforts lead by 
or promoted by the United States (peace process detractors) 
• Are named on another terrorist list maintained by the United States and its 
allies, or has a relationship to an individual or entity on one of the other 
lists. Particular interest will be given to those foreign organizations that:  
• have its leaders or founders, or the organization itself, named to 
other terrorist lists maintained by the United States 
• are aligned with or are receiving support from a designated state 
sponsor of terrorism, particularly from Syria and Iran 
• are aligned with other terrorist organizations named to the FTO list 
or other terrorist lists maintained by the United States 
• are designated on the terrorist lists of allied foreign countries, 
particularly the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia 
• are named to the terrorist lists of organizations of foreign nations 
to which the United States is aligned, such as the EU and the 
United Nations 
• have its leaders, members or supporters, arrested, indicted or 
subjected to other judicial process in the United States or 
elsewhere 
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• Are part of a network of resources designed to commit violence314 
Conversely, the factors weighed when determining whether an FTO should be 
removed from the list include whether the group has ceased committing terrorist acts for 
a period of five or more years, no longer poses a threat to the United States, has 
renounced terrorism, has engaged in a peace process (particularly where the peace 
process is led by or promoted by the United States), or has been dismantled due to arrests 
or deaths of its leaders. 
As noted earlier, other countries, such as the United Kingdom and Australia 
developed and publicly identified the nonstatutory factors that they weigh in their 
respective designation processes. The nonstatutory factors presented by those countries 
are more generic in nature than what is suggested in this thesis. For example, the U.K. 
factors include the nature and scale of an organization’s activities, the specific threat that 
the organization poses to the United Kingdom, the extent of the organization’s presence 
in the United Kingdom, and the need to support other members in the international 
community in the global fight against terrorism. Australia identified the factors as the 
organization’s engagement in terrorism, the organization’s ideology, links to other 
terrorist groups, links to Australia, threats to Australia’s interests, listing by the U.N. or 
like-minded countries, and engagement in peace processes.  
It is recommended that the State Department identify the nonstatutory factors, to 
include the factors identified in this research. Namely, whether the group attacked the 
United States at home or abroad, attacked an allied nation or other strategic interest of the 
United States, is affiliated with al Qaeda, committed terrorist acts aimed at undermining 
peace efforts led or promoted by the United States, are named on another terrorist list 
maintained by the U.S. or its allies, are named on the terrorist list of organizations of 
foreign nations to which the United States is aligned, and has its leaders, members, 
supporters arrested, indicated or subjected to judicial process in the United States or 
elsewhere. This level of detail about designation decisions is recommended because of 
314 Extrapolated from U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Terrorism 2011; U.S. Department 
of State, Country Report on Terrorism 2005; U.S. Department of State, Country Report on Terrorism 2006; 
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002. 
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the elevated position of the United States in the global counterterrorism effort and due to 
concerns about the United States using and abusing its power. Providing details about the 
decision-making process and demonstrating the logical nature of the FTO decisions will 
lend credibility to the U.S. approach to this aspect of the homeland security enterprise.  
2. Publish a Robust Explanation or Justification for the Designation 
The United States currently publishes FTO information in the annual country 
reports. These annual reports are generally published in the middle of each year by the 
State Department, to reflect the terrorist activities that occurred in the prior calendar year. 
For example, the 2012 country reports were published in July 2013. The FTO section of 
the country reports categorizes the information for each FTO and lists the following 
information: the date the organization was designated, a description of the FTO, a 
description of the FTO’s activities in the last calendar year, and occasionally, information 
about its prior terrorist activities—when those activities are particularly noteworthy, the 
location of the FTO’s activities, the FTO’s strength, and the FTO’s sources of funding. 
The information contained within each of these categories varies in terms of details each 
year, and it is necessary to read all the country reports from prior years to obtain 
complete information about each organization, the reasons the group is on the FTO list, 
and the evolving nature of the threat posed by each group.  
Providing more complete and detailed information in each annual country report 
will result in designation details being made available in a consistent manner that explain 
the basis for the FTO determinations. Such a methodology can avoid the need to review 
all prior country reports to have a complete picture of why an individual group was 
designated and why it remains on the list. In addition, such detail may avoid the 
perception that the information on which the list is based is dated. Furthermore, it is 
recommended that information provided in the press releases issued following the 
designation of the FTO be included in the country reports. Frequently, the press releases 
issued provide additional details, such as other terrorist lists on which leaders of the FTO 
appear or other terrorist lists on which the FTO appears, but this information is frequently 
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not included in the country reports. It is recommended that the country reports become a 
more comprehensive source for the information that supports the FTO designation.  
Furthermore, it is recommended that the United States adopt a public disclosure 
system that makes the information supporting the designation more easily accessible. 
While the State Department has a website that lists the current FTOs, as well as those 
groups that have been delisted, it is necessary to download the country reports to gain 
access to the information supporting the designation currently available. The information 
should also be available as link to the FTO list on the website, as the Australian 
government provides on its website.  
3. Clarify the Nature of the Evidence that the Secretary of State Will 
Weigh in the Designation Process 
Clarifying that the secretary of state will consider the quality and reliability of the 
information relied upon in the designation process could help address the concerns that 
the Secretary relies upon unverified and potentially unreliable information in making 
designation decisions.  
While considerable classified information is considered in the FTO designation 
process, considerable open source material is available as well. Identifying open source 
materials relied upon in the designation process can assist in gaining credibility and in 
instilling confidence in the designation process. Further, clarifying the factors that will be 
considered in relying on classified information, such as establishing that only 
corroborated information will be relied upon or otherwise demonstrating that the nature 
of the information used will be weighed in the decision-making process, can assist in 
lending credibility to the FTO designation procedures.  
4. Require More Frequent Review of the FTO List 
It is also recommended that a more frequent review of the organizations on the 
FTO list take place. Currently, FTOs are reviewed every five years unless an organization 
files a petition to be delisted, in which case, the FTO designation is reviewed sooner. The 
complexity and evolving nature of the counterterrorism threat, and the constant 
emergence of new terrorist organizations and splinter groups, suggest that a more 
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frequent review of the FTOs would offer benefits. The benefits to conducting the review 
more frequently include the following.  
• offering greater insight and more up-to-date information into the nature of 
the threats the united states faces by the organizations on the list 
• ensuring that the organizations designated are actively engaged in 
terrorism or pose an ongoing threat to the security of the united states 
• instilling greater confidence that the FTO list reflects the current priorities 
of the united states, and not simply a reflection of decisions made years 
ago without any relevance to current U.S. threats 
• encouraging the presentation of more current information about every 
FTO in the annual country reports. 
A more frequent review process is a change that can be implemented at the 
discretion of the secretary of state, and requires no legislative action, as long as the five-
year period, at minimum, is satisfied.  
C. IMPLEMENTATION 
The recommendations are designed to provide greater transparency in government 
and a greater understanding of the FTO designation process. In addition, they are 
designed to provide greater clarity into U.S. security interests in determining whether 
certain organizations pose a threat to the United States and the reasons why the secretary 
of state made that determination.  
Implementation of these recommendations should be relatively easy to 
accomplish. First, the information is available through open source data, and the 
information can currently be obtained by doing an analysis of the existing State 
Department country reports, as was done in this research. While the information is in the 
reports, it is not organized in any comprehensive manner and it is not offered in a 
systematic or easily identifiable way. It is difficult and time-consuming for the public to 
extract the information from the multiple country reports in which portions of the 
information is contained. The proposed changes are designed to collect the existing 
information from the annual reports, organize it in a meaningful and consistent manner, 
make the designation information easily accessible, and identify these as the nonstatutory 
factors that weigh into the FTO designation process.  
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The steps to the process should include, and progress can be measured by 
completing the following. 
• developing the list of the nonstatutory factors 
• ensuring that the secretary of state concurs with the list 
• meeting with the intelligence community in an effort to develop consensus 
with the nonstatutory factors and to ensure that the information being 
revealed does not negatively impact security issues 
• meeting with Congressional representatives in an effort to develop 
consensus on the factors, and to develop an appreciation for the disclosure 
of more information about the process 
• meeting with other stakeholders, such as critics of government secrecy 
regulations, and explain the nonstatutory factors that influence the FTO 
decision process (attempt to gain consensus for the information being 
disclosed, or to generate positive statements to be made about the 
alterations to the process) 
• developing the presentation for disclosure of the information on the State 
Department website and in the country reports, and comparing the 
presentation format and information to disclosures made by allied 
countries (in an effort to develop consistency in disclosures made and 
maximize transparency) 
• publishing the list of nonstatutory factors used by the secretary of state and 
providing information on why those factors are relevant to the national 
security interests of the United States 
• disclosing information about the nonstatutory factors used when new 
groups are added to the FTO list along with a description of how those 
factors influenced the designation process 
• monitoring the response to the changes 
The proposed modifications are designed to assist the public, the courts, and 
Congress in gaining a better understanding and appreciation of the FTO designation 
process and the decisions made, enhance confidence that the Secretary will consider the 
quality and reliability of the evidence in determining the FTO designations, develop 
greater transparency in government at a time when great debate and concern is occurring 
over the government’s counter-terrorism activities, ensure that the FTO list better reflects 
the organizations that present current and ongoing threats to the United States, and create 
a designation process able to be more nimble in identifying the development of emerging 
terrorist organizations. 
 121 
The cost for implementing the recommendations is expected to be minimal, since 
the information is readily available to the State Department. Much of the information 
appears to already be used in the designation process, and it is just a matter collecting the 
information and publishing it in a consistent and easily accessible format. Implementation 
is at the discretion of the Secretary and will not require any legislative action. 
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The research and recommendations offered represent a limited review of the FTO 
list. Additional research could add to the overall understanding of the list and its impact 
on U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Suggested areas for future research include the 
following. 
• The FTO list should be monitored for changes, and whether the changes 
reflect a change in U.S. counterterrorism policy. The FTO list is a 
constantly evolving list, where even minor additions or deletions could 
reflect a change in direction in U.S. counterterrorism efforts.  
• The research presented in this thesis only reviewed a limited set of State 
Department documents, namely the country reports. Many more reports, 
public statements, and press releases are available that could be reviewed 
that will add more context to the designations and the reasons certain 
groups are added to or omitted from the FTO list.  
• Litigation has occurred involving the FTO designations, mostly by the 
MEK and the PKK. A review of the litigation, and the government 
statements made in briefings and to the courts, may also add greater 
context to the FTO decision-making process.  
• The Afghan war against the Soviets was a unifying force for many 
terrorist groups. Additional study of the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
could be insightful to determine the long-term impact of wars on U.S. and 
global counterterrorism efforts.  
• An evaluation and analysis of terrorist organizations that have not been 
designated as FTOs could add greater insight into the factors the United 
States considers, and does not consider, in the FTO evaluation process.  
• An analysis of the impact FTO designations have on terrorist groups 
would assist in determining the nature and extent of the impact on FTOs, 
and may assist in determining the groups against which the designation 
would have the greatest impact.  
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E. CONCLUSION 
The recommendations presented are aimed at developing clarity and transparency 
in the FTO designation process, with the goal of gaining confidence in the process and 
the designation decisions. Implementation of the recommendations will not detract from 
the authority of the Executive Branch, but clarify how the Executive Branch exercises its 
authority without compromising its independence or its foreign policy decisions.  
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APPENDIX A. THE FTO LIST (AS OF JANUARY 2014) 
The following data is from the U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations,” at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm. 
 
Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
Date Designated Name 
10/8/1997 Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) 
10/8/1997 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 
10/8/1997 Aum Shinrikyo (AUM) 
10/8/1997 Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) 
10/8/1997 Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) (IG) 
10/8/1997 HAMAS 
10/8/1997 Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) 
10/8/1997 Hizballah 
10/8/1997 Kahane Chai (Kach) 
10/8/1997 Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) (Kongra-Gel) 
10/8/1997 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
10/8/1997 National Liberation Army (ELN) 
10/8/1997 Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) 
10/8/1997 Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 
10/8/1997 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLF) 
10/8/1997 PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC) 
10/8/1997 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
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Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
Date Designated Name 
10/8/1997 Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N) 
10/8/1997 Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) 
10/8/1997 Shining Path (SL) 
10/8/1999 al-Qa’ida (AQ) 
9/25/2000 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 
5/16/2001 Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) 
9/10/2001 United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) 
12/26/2001 Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) 
12/26/2001 Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) 
3/27/2002 Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) 
3/27/2002 Asbat al-Ansar (AAA) 
3/27/2002 al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
8/9/2002 Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) 
10/23/2002 Jemaah Islamiya (JI) 
1/30/2003 Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) 
3/22/2004 Ansar al-Islam (AAI) 
7/13/2004 Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) 
12/17/2004 Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) 
12/17/2004 al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) 
6/17/2005 Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) 
3/5/2008 Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) 
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Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
Date Designated Name 
3/18/2008 al-Shabaab (AS) 
5/18/2009 Revolutionary Struggle (RS) 
7/2/2009 Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) 
1/19/2010 al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
8/6/2010 Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI) 
9/1/2010 Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 
11/4/2010 Jundallah 
5/23/2011 Army of Islam (AOI) 
9/19/2011 Indian Mujahedeen (IM) 
3/13/2012 Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) 
5/30/2012 Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) 
9/19/2012 Haqqani Network (HQN) 
3/22/2013 Ansar al-Dine (AAD) 
11/14/2013 Boko Haram 
11/14/2013 Ansaru 
12/19/2013 al-Mulathamun Battalion 
1/13/2014 Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi 
1/13/2014 Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah 





Delisted Foreign Terrorist Organizations 




10/8/1999 Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine -Hawatmeh Faction 10/8/1997 
10/8/1999 Khmer Rouge 10/8/1997 
10/8/1999 Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents 10/8/1997 
10/8/2001 Japanese Red Army 10/8/1997 
10/8/2001 Tupac Amaru Revolution Movement 10/8/1997 
5/18/2009 Revolutionary Nuclei 10/8/1997 
10/15/2010 Armed Islamic Group (GIA) 10/8/1997 
9/28/2012 Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) 10/8/1997 
5/28/2013 Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) 10/11/2005 
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APPENDIX B. THE FTO LIST (AS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001) 
This list is extrapolated from U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of Global 
Terrorism 1997–2001”; see also Federation of American Scientists, “Fact Sheet: 
Secretary of State Designates Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOP’s),” October 5, 





Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) 
 
10/8/97 






Armed Islamic Group (GIA) 10/8/97 
Delisted 10/15/10 
Aum Shinrikyo (Aum)  
 
10/8/97 
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) 
 
10/8/97 












Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 
 
9/25/00 





Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 
 
10/8/97 







Mujahadin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) 10/8/97 
Delisted 9/28/12 
National Liberation Army (ELN) 
 
10/8/97 
Palestine Liberation Front—Abu Abbas Faction (PLF) 
 
10/8/97 
Palestine Islamic Jihad—Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ) 
 
10/8/97 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 
 
10/8/97 




Real IRA (RIRA) 
 
5/16/01 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
 
10/8/97 
Revolutionary Nuclei 10/8/97  
Delisted 5/18/09 
Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N) 
 
10/8/97 
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) 10/8/97 
Shining Path (SL) 
 
10/8/97 
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) 10/8/97 
Delisted 10/8/01 
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) 9/10/01 
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APPENDIX C. THE ORIGINAL FTO LIST (AS OF OCTOBER 8, 
1997) 
The following list is from the U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of Global 
Terrorism 1997”; see also Hellenic Resources Networks, “USIA—Fact Sheet: 
Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” October 8, 1997, at  
http://www.hri.org/news/usa/usia/1997/97-10-08_1.usia.html. 
 
NAME YEAR DESIGNATED/ 
DELISTED 
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) 10/8/97 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 10/8/97 
Al-Jihad (later merged into al Qaeda) 10/8/97 
Armed Islamic Group (GIA) 10/8/97 
Delisted 10/15/10 
Aum Shinrikyo (Aum)  10/8/97 
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) 10/8/97 




Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG) 10/8/97 
Hamas 10/9/97 




Japanese Red Army (JRA) 10/8/97  
Delisted 10/8/01 
Kahane Chai 10/8/97 
Kach (which was later merged into Kahane Chai) 10/8/97 
Khmer Rouge 10/8/97 Delisted 10/9/99 
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NAME YEAR DESIGNATED/ 
DELISTED 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 10/8/97 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 10/8/97 
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front Dissidents 10/8/97  Delisted 10/8/99 
Mujahadin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) 10/8/97 
Delisted 9/28/12 
National Liberation Army (ELN) 10/8/97 
Palestine Liberation Front—Abu Abbas Faction (PLF) 10/8/97 
Palestine Islamic Jihad—Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ) 10/8/97 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 10/8/97 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General 
Command (PFLP-GC) 
10/8/97 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 10/8/97 




Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N) 10/8/97 
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) 10/8/97 
Shining Path (SL) 10/8/97 
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